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1.  POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY 
MICHAEL EMERSON AND RICHARD YOUNGS 
Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the 
relationship between the West and political Islam has become a defining 
issue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research 
and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has 
helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions 
previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and 
intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a 
number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all 
(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab 
countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain 
atrophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been 
established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected by 
a range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the 
simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent 
analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but the 
actual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist 
organisations remains limited.  
Despite the centrality of debate over this issue, it is striking that 
detailed information is still scarce on Islamists’ perspectives on European 
foreign policy initiatives. Our project has sought to rectify this.1 
                                                      
1 The project has been a joint venture of CEPS, Brussels, with the Fundacion para 
las Relaciones Internationales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), Madrid, and the 
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1.1  Debating Political Islam 
Intellectual work on and debate over political Islam has mushroomed since 
2001. This has amply demonstrated how Islam is a fluid and internally 
diverse phenomenon. It has become almost universally accepted that 
Islam’s more radical forms and frequent questioning of democratic norms 
should be understood as reflective of a prevailing context, and not 
unchanging Islamic textual tenet or principle. The focus of enquiry needs 
therefore to be more practical, with a view to understanding more about 
Islamist parties’ policy goals and aspirations.  
For example, support for democratic norms has recently been 
stressed, even by those Islamist organisations often assumed to be towards 
the less moderate end of the spectrum.2 Also, it has been argued that 
illiberalism among Islamists is more prominent in the social rather than the 
political sphere.3  
One summary of the current situation asserts that Islamist 
organisations have gradually dropped their outright antipathy to ‘Western’ 
norms of democracy since the 1990s. On the other hand, a series of 
ambiguities has emerged as tensions surface between their role as religious 
organisations and as aspirant political players.4 These ambiguities relate to 
issues such as: 
•  Law: the relationship between the sharia and law-making by elected 
parliaments, for example on matters of family code and law; 
•  Violence: rejected by political organisations, but with more 
questionable positions taken by loosely-linked networks; 
•  Individual rights in relation to the good of the community; 
•  Women’s personal status issues; 
•  Respect for religious minorities. 
                                                                                                                                       
valuable cooperation of the Fundacion Tres Culturas, Sevilla; the latter kindly 
hosting a workshop of authors on 24-25 November 2006. 
2 Interview with Nadia Yassine, of Justice and Charity, in Morocco, in ARB 4/6, 
July 2006 
3 Olivier Roy (1994), “The Failure of Political Islam”, London: IB Tauris, p. 195. 
4 N. Brown, A. Hamzawy, M. Ottaway (2006), ‘Islamist Movements and the 
Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones’, Carnegie 
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Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 especially, Western 
commentators have claimed that their perspectives on Islam have shifted. 
Increasingly, broader recognition has emerged of the extent to which 
contemporary trends in Islam have been determined by prevailing political 
contexts. Leaders, ministers and senior diplomats have repeatedly rejected 
the notion that Islam should be conceived as a monolithic assault against 
Western values. Western analysts and policy-makers claim that non-
democratic interpretations of Islam are misplaced distortions. External 
actors, it is implied, can help release Islam’s democratic potential. Analysts, 
Western diplomats, donors, funding organisations and international 
institutions assert a belief that Islam can be a positive mobilising force for 
democracy, social justice and stability in the Middle East.5 
These viewpoints challenge dramatic scenarios of anti-Western 
fundamentalist forces taking power, and instead advocate engaging with 
moderate Islamist parties and organisations that are currently enjoying a 
rise in popular support. There is a need for coherent and integrated policies 
to deal with all non-violent political forces in these countries, rather than 
creating unnecessary resentment by, for example, condemning individual 
arrests of liberal figures while remaining silent in the face of numerous 
arrests of Islamists. Given the more pragmatic approach recently adopted 
by many of the moderate Islamist movements, many argue that this is a 
propitious time to take advantage of the latter’s relative openness towards 
engaging Western countries by reaching out to them and establishing 
strategic links. It is also being proposed that Western actors need to engage 
further in less politicised areas at the grassroots level. 
  Certain analysts have been critical of some of these assumptions, 
however. Central to one of the most influential theses on political Islam is 
the contention that the moderate and democratic platforms espoused by 
Islamist parties reflect deep internal contradictions. Islam, it is argued, has 
been weakened by a division between the moderates of the pious middle 
classes, on the one hand, and the frustrated young urban poor, on the 
other. For the latter, Islam continues to be a vehicle of protest, but one that 
has failed to develop any comprehensive political alternative. Taking into 
account underlying class structures, Islam has strengthened because the 
ambiguities of its message enabled quite different sectors of society to sign 
                                                      
5 One example is François Burgat (2003), “Face to Face with Political Islam”, 
London: IB Tauris. 4 | EMERSON & YOUNGS 
up to its cause. Regimes have exploited these internal tensions, often 
enticing and co-opting the middle classes through limited reform, and 
compounding the growing tension with poorer and more radicalised 
sectors. In short, the newly pro-democratic strands of the Islamist middle 
classes have not taken the poor with them on their journey towards more 
Western liberal norms, and are set to lose ground as a result.6  
In a similar vein, another expert rejects what is now the prevailing 
wisdom that the West should engage with Islamists on the presumption 
that a moderate and liberal form of Islam can thus be moulded. It is 
profoundly mistaken, he laments, to engage with the religion on the 
assumption that Islam provides the foundation of political identity. 
Reflecting the impact of social differences, the very fact that Islamic 
modernists tend to be from the elite provokes a backlash amongst poorer 
communities. Islam has become popular because it has been able to 
organise itself through the mosque in a way unavailable to secular parties; 
international actors need to redress this imbalance, it is argued, rather than 
engage with Islam, thinking this is the solution.7 
These debates clearly pose difficult challenges for the EU.8 They raise 
the question of where, within this spectrum of views on political Islam, 
might or should European strategy fall? 
1.2  What Role for Europe? 
So far, when work has focused on Islamists’ positions on international 
relations, the focus has been very strongly on their views towards the 
United States and US foreign policy. Understanding of Islamists’ 
perspectives on and aims towards specific areas of European  policy 
remains limited. The core aim of our book is to strengthen this 
understanding. In theory, the EU has a comprehensive and firmly 
established framework through which to pursue a more systematic 
engagement with political Islamists, namely the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (or Barcelona Process) complemented by the Neighbourhood 
                                                      
6 Giles Kepel (2003), Jihad: On the Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002; and by the same author, Bad Moon Rising: A Chronicle of the 
Middle East Today. London: Saqi, p. 17. 
7 Daniel Brumberg, ‘Islam is not the Solution (or the Problem)’, The Washington 
Quarterly 29/1: 97-116 
8 Fred Halliday, 100 Myths about the Middle East, London: Saqi, 2006. POLITICAL ISLAM | 5 
Policy. Yet it is acknowledged that so far these policies have only had a 
marginal relevance to, and impact upon, trends in political Islam.  
In recent years, European foreign policy speeches and documents 
have been replete with commitments to strengthen engagement with 
Islamist organisations both within and outside Europe. At a meeting of EU 
foreign ministers in Luxembourg in 2005, considerable attention focused on 
the EU’s commitment to develop engagement with a wider range of civil 
society organisations in the Arab world, including ‘faith based groups’. 
Engagement with Islamists is a central plank of the ‘Alliance of 
Civilisations’ originally conceived by Spanish prime minister José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, now a joint Hispano-Turkish sponsored initiative 
being developed under UN auspices.9 The former British Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, recently advocated a foreign policy based on distinguishing 
‘Reactionary Islam’ from ‘Moderate, Mainstream Islam’, and attempting to 
draw the latter away from the former.10 A common view is that the EU has 
‘conceptualised radical Islam in less absolute terms’ than the US.11 
In practice, caution has predominated in the approaches of external 
actors. Despite frequent assertions of a commitment to engage with 
moderate Islamists, Western governments have in fact remained reluctant 
to offer such groups support. Many talking shops have been convened on 
‘Islam and democracy’ and ‘cultural understanding’ between Islam and the 
West. However, Western governments have declined to provide concrete 
backing for moderate Islamists engaged in pro-democracy campaigning. 
Dialogue with Islamists has been low key and private, carried out mainly at 
the discretion of individual Western ambassadors. While Islamists’ control 
of many professional syndicates offers the possibility for engagement on 
relatively non-political issues, donors have distanced themselves from this 
area of civil society as it has become ‘Islam-ised’. In sum, despite shifts in 
the agendas of Islamist networks and in the way these are perceived by 
Western powers, the international dimension remains an equivocal factor 
in the prospects for realising Islam’s democratic potential. The British 
Foreign Office has a unit devoted to political Islam, but when faced with 
                                                      
9 Speech by the President of the government, Don José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, at 
the summit of the League of Arab States, Argel, 22 March 2005. 
10 Tony Blair, Speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, 1 August 2006. 
11 Wyn Rees and Richard Aldrich, “Contending Cultures of counterterrorism: 
transatlantic divergence or convergence?”, International Affairs 81/5, 2005: 905.  6 | EMERSON & YOUNGS 
objections from regime leaders it has advanced with extreme caution.12 The 
German government has been one of the most forward-looking in pursuing 
new dialogue with Islamist organisations, with a new unit at the foreign 
ministry created specifically for this purpose.  
Contacts with Hamas and Hezbollah have of course been most 
sensitive, and are currently at the forefront of political attention, following 
the August 2006 war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel, and over 
the issue of the national unity government in Palestine to include Hamas. 
One expert is critical of the basic premise of European policy: he argues 
that it is not appropriate to think in terms of Hamas being pressed to move 
from resistance movement to political party, as such movements shift 
between these two types of action, and are still responsible for ending 
violence when they decide the context is right. He laments that, as a result, 
in Europe “we choose to talk to fewer and fewer” Islamist groups. 13 He 
insists that EU officials never thought their policy of not talking to Hamas 
would work, but that they “felt trapped”.14 
1.3  Aims of our Project and Book 
Against this background, the purpose of our project has been to collect and 
present detailed information on: 
•  The engagement pursued to date between the EU and Islamist 
movements in the southern Mediterranean 
•  The opinions of key Islamist-oriented thinkers and activists 
towards the specifics of European policy in the Arab world, 
focusing on a number of central questions:- 
-  If Islamists were to win a greater share of power, what view 
would they take of possible changes in the constitution and 
political reform? 
                                                      
12 In the UK high-profile press coverage was given to Foreign Office documents 
revealing internal deliberations over a new diplomatic engagement with the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; a recommended strategy to increase the frequency 
of contacts with MB parliamentarians, but this ceased after the Egyptian 
government complained. Martin Bright When Progressives Treat with Reactionaries: 
The British State’s Flirtation with radical Islamism (London, Policy Exchange, 2006), p. 
12, p. 18, p.43 and p. 49 
13 Alistair Crooke, Leaning on Hamas?, IPG 3/2006: 162. 
14 Alistair Crooke, Talking to Hamas, Prospect, June 2006. POLITICAL ISLAM | 7 
-  If Islamists were to win a greater share of power would they 
support a deepening of current cooperation with the EU? 
-  What views do they hold on the economic and trade 
liberalisation measures being pursued by the EU with their 
Mediterranean partner states? 
-  Are there elements to the Islamists’ economic agenda that could 
conflict with European policy proposals and interests? 
-  What do they seek, if anything, from Europe in terms of human 
rights protection? 
-  Would Islamists support cooperation with Europe on counter-
terrorism and illegal migration?  
-  Are Islamists any less hostile to European involvement in 
matters of social change than to US involvement? 
The objective has thus been to compile a book that is informative on 
what Islamists themselves are saying and thinking about Europe.  
We have specifically not set out to offer an academic analysis of the 
nature of Islam, or to add to growing literature on political Islam in general. 
The case studies provide a brief overview of trends in the domestic political 
situation in each respective country. Their primary purpose, however, has 
been to cover in detail Islamists’ perspectives on the European Union and 
its foreign policy. 
In terms of research methodology, each case study was heavily based 
on semi-structured interviews with representatives of Islamist groups, as 
w e l l  a s  o n  t h e  r e v i e w  o f  m a t e r i a l  p r oduced by these organisations. To 
maximise comparability across case studies, research should be guided by a 
common questionnaire, set out in Annex A below (in English), and as 
adapted in Annex B (in Arabic) by one of the authors for his field work.  
The case studies devote most space to the main Islamist party in each 
country, but also include some coverage of other Islamist organisations. 
While seeking a common structure across chapters, we have been mindful 
of the need for variation, given the wide range of situations, between 
Islamists that are now parties of power (the AKP in Turkey, Hamas in 
Palestine), to those that are in government/parliament but with minority 
positions, to those that are active but repressed (Egypt), and those that have 
had to flee abroad (Syria, Tunisia). The interviewers and authors of the 
country case studies were (with one exception) nationals of these countries, 
and the interviews were conducted in the Arabic or Turkish languages. It 
was intended to have such case studies for all the Mediterranean Arab 
states and Turkey. However, in two cases, for Palestine and Jordan, the 8 | EMERSON & YOUNGS 
studies solicited were not forthcoming.  
The main political parties interviewed were as follows: 
o  in Morocco, Samir Amghar interviewed the Party of Justice and 
Development (PJD), and the Association for Justice and Charity 
(JC); 
o  in  Algeria, Amel Boubekeur interviewed the Movement of 
Society for Peace (MSP), and the Movement for National 
Reform (MNR); 
o  for Tunisia, Salah Eddine Jorshi interviewed the Renaissance 
Movement, which operates mainly in exile in Europe; 
o  in Egypt, Emad El-Din Shahin interviewed the Muslim Brothers 
and the Wasat party; 
o  in Lebanon, Talal Atrissi interviewed Hezbollah; 
o  for  Syria, Salam Kawakibi interviewed the Muslim Brothers, 
which can operate only in exile in Europe; 
o  in  Turkey, Senem Aydin and Ruşen Çakır interviewed the 
Justice and Devlopment Party (AKP) and the Felicity Party (SP). 
Part A of this book consists of these seven case studies.  
Part B consists of evaluations and overviews by Western authors.   
The omissions from the case-studies were partly compensated through the 
chapter by Nathalie Tocci, evaluating Western policies towards Hamas 
(alongside Hezbollah). The final chapter, by Robert Springborg, brings 
together the common threads and differences in the case studies, and 
concludes with recommendations for the European policy-maker. 
Our focus in this volume is in large measure on the less radical part 
of the Islamist spectrum. Our case studies examine most closely those 
Islamist parties generally tolerated by regimes, and which, in a small 
number of cases (Algeria, Lebanon) have participated in government, 
although in the two cases (Syria and Tunisia) the research by necessity 
relied on political actors in exile, given their prohibition from the national 
political arena. We are aware that this does not provide a comprehensive 
picture, and leaves for a further, complementary project, the issue of 
Islamist groups espousing far more confrontational tactics with the West. 
Within these parameters, our broad aim was to ‘give the word’ to key 
actors within Islamist parties and organisations, through fieldwork carried 
out (in all but one case) by nationals of each of the countries covered.    
As editors we considered it important for our authors to report the 
views of Islamist parties without intervening judgements on our part over POLITICAL ISLAM | 9 
whether these perspectives could be contested or not. We are thus not 
necessarily in agreement with the views presented in the volume. Indeed, 
some of the perceptions of the EU and of European policies suggest that on 
certain matters, Islamists’ understandings of Europe are as distorted as 
Europeans’ understanding of political Islam.  
Conclusions  
While some of the opinions reported are unsurprising, others are more 
revealing either for their nuances, or for the strength and unity of views 
among analysts from this heterogeneous group of countries of Muslim faith 
and culture. Our summary of the main findings – (see Robert Springborg’s 
chapter for a much more refined account) – are as follows: 
(1) Islamists in general expressed positive views of European 
democracy, suggesting that the latter played a useful role as a reference 
point for their own aims. The aspect of EU democracy that was seen in the 
most positive light was the guarantee of freedom of association – the 
democratic freedom most pertinent to many Islamists’ immediate concerns. 
However, even here there was a balance of positive and negative 
perceptions: some gave greatest weight to the fact that Islamists enjoyed 
more freedom to organise in Europe than in their countries; but others saw 
this as overshadowed by what was judged to be a deepening Islamophobia 
in Europe.  
(2) If Islamists almost universally spoke of Europe as providing a 
positive reference point for political rights, their views were strongly 
negative in respect of liberal civil rights. The elements of the ‘European 
model’ most strongly rejected by our interviewees were moral laxity; the 
decline of spirituality; permissive homosexual rights; a certain conception 
of women’s rights, and the lack of ‘social justice’ judged to be prevalent in 
European societies. Many of our interlocutors saw these aspects of 
European societies as inseparable from democracy as a political system – 
even as they insisted that their commitment to the latter was steadfast.  
(3) Indeed, many Islamists manifestly seek European support for 
democratic opening for tactical reasons, without this diluting an outlook 
they described as essentially ‘anti-Western’. 
(4) It emerges from our interviews that the most serious damage to 
Europe’s image amongst Islamists in the countries considered derives from 
the EU’s perceived unwillingness to support democratic reform in the 
region. European governments are still broadly seen as thinking that their 
own systems of democracy are ‘not appropriate’ for Arabs. This is viewed 10 | EMERSON & YOUNGS 
being as patronising and one of the most potent breeders of contempt for 
the European Union. Most of our interviewees felt that, despite so much 
rhetoric to the contrary, European policy had not become more supportive 
of democracy and human rights in their countries in recent years. European 
governments are still seen as offering unconditional support for autocratic 
regimes and thus being ‘anti-Islam’. Some of our interlocutors tended to 
view such efforts as did exist to promote democracy as representing 
unacceptable neo-colonial self-interest. But, more often, there was 
frustration that the EU had not been more critical and assertive in its 
actions towards Middle Eastern regimes. This question clearly touched a 
raw nerve, when at times both these positions were expressed by the same 
interviewee.  
(5) Our interviews amply corroborated the well-known position that 
the EU’s credibility has suffered major damage through its suspension of 
aid to the Hamas-led government in Palestine and, to a lesser extent, 
through its procrastination over Turkey’s quest for accession. In response 
to our questions about the EU’s policies towards democracy promotion, 
this Hamas episode was the issue most quickly and forcefully raised.  
(6) There was a clear (but in our view questionable) correlation made 
between EU member states’ foreign policies and how democratic they were 
judged to be by the Islamists in our case studies. The UK was seen as the 
least democratic and the least respectful of democratic norms because of its 
involvement in Iraq. Curiously, while Islamists called for more EU pressure 
against their authoritarian regimes, they claimed to feel warmest towards 
the most status-quo oriented powers such as France and Spain, seemingly 
on the basis of the positions these countries took over Iraq. 
(7) The level of awareness of the more specific instruments of EU 
policy was extremely low. Our interviewees admitted to having a limited 
awareness of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and even less of the 
Neighbourhood Policy. They blamed the EU for this, pointing out that the 
latter had connived with their partner governments in the region in 
excluding Islamists from these initiatives. With ‘no place for Islamists’ in 
either the EMP or ENP, these policies were criticised as initiatives designed 
to contain rather than engage with Islam. 
(8) Overall, Islamists admitted that their own thinking on possible 
engagement and cooperation with Europe had so far not been a priority 
issue. We asked our authors to focus only on Islamists’ views on EU 
policies, rather than on general political trends in the Middle East and 
North Africa. If this is not seen in some of the chapters, it was because our POLITICAL ISLAM | 11 
interviewees had ‘little to say’ on European influence and little awareness 
of EU initiatives.  
(9) Those Islamists that had given thought to this matter were 
adamant that they did not wish to be singled out for special treatment by 
the EU, but included within dialogue and initiatives on a ‘normal’ basis 
alongside other political actors. Sensitivities were evident in discussing the 
hypothesis that engagement with Islamists might suddenly become a 
priority for Europe; such engagement could be taken as a self-interested 
manoeuvre in Europe’s own interests.  
(10) On economic policy, while several Islamists admitted that their 
own approach needed to be worked through more fully, most of our 
interviewees insisted that Islamists would be more supportive of economic 
liberalisation towards European markets than current regimes had so far 
been, notably as a move to achieve less corrupt economic governance.   
(11) Our interviews mostly supported the view that compared to the 
US, Europe enjoys a more favourable reputation. But there were some 
important exceptions here. Morocco in particular emerges as a case where 
Islamists have welcomed a new engagement with and backing from the US 
(government and more especially academic and non-governmental 
organisations), and are far more critical of European policies that ignore 
them.  
(12) The case studies draw attention to the crucial point that the EU’s 
interactions with the countries of its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and 
Neighbourhood Policy can no longer be seen only through the prism of 
conventional foreign policy. European democracy is part of the context 
within which Islamist parties aim for democratic change in their own 
societies. Because of the presence in Europe of substantial diasporas as well 
as influential political activists in exile, European democracy is not only a 
reference point, but also an instrument for the pursuit of their democratic 
aspirations. Europe-based Islamist associations, and not only dissidents in 
exile, are increasingly acting as conduits for the dissemination of 
democratic norms across trans-Mediterranean party structures.  
Finally, our own conclusions as editors are that it is now time for the 
European Union, its institutions and member states, to undertake an 
explicit review of its current policies of virtual neglect of this broad 
grouping of ‘Muslim democrat’ parties. The evidence seems to be 
mounting that this is no longer a policy of ‘benign neglect’. On the 
contrary, it may lead to the reinforcement of anti-democratic regimes, and 
radical Islamism. We would advocate a broad inclusion of Muslim 12 | EMERSON & YOUNGS 
democrats in EU initiatives aiming at the reform of governance and the 
development of civil society, without extending to them any singular, 
exclusive or unsolicited privileges.  
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2.  MOROCCO 
SAMIR AMGHAR 
Islamist parties in Morocco have seen an ideological transformation from a 
radical  − even violent − political doctrine to a more pragmatic and 
progressive strategy in recent years. This chapter seeks to show how the 
internal ideological evolution of Moroccan Islam and the international 
context have made collaboration with Europe and the US possible. The key 
Islamist players on the Moroccan political stage are the Party of Justice and 
Development and the Association for Justice and Charity, both of which 
have shown a desire to increase cooperation with Europe. But this, they 
claim, has not been reciprocated by the EU. 
Nearly twenty years ago, to talk about political Islam in the Maghreb 
was to talk exclusively about its Algerian and Tunisian variants. At the 
time, it seemed unlikely that Islamism could emerge in Morocco, where 
Moroccan observers and political figures alike were firmly convinced that 
the King’s political function (Amir al Muminin - Commander of the Faithful) 
protected the country from this ideology. That all changed at the beginning 
of the 1990s, when Islamism burst upon the Moroccan political scene. 
Despite concerns among European Union (EU) and Moroccan political 
figures, the development of Islamism has upset neither the country’s 
political balance nor the monarchy’s relations with Europe.  
2.1  The Evolution of Moroccan Islamism 
The Islamist movement in Morocco is far from homogenous.15 Pluralistic by 
nature, Moroccan Islamism can be divided between two groups: the Party 
                                                      
15 Malika Zeghal (2005), ”Les Islamistes marocains, le défi à la monarchie”, Paris: 
La Découverte. POLITICAL ISLAM | 15 
 
of Justice and Development (Hizbo alaadalati wa atanmia, or PJD in its French 
acronym) under the direction of Saad Eddine Othmani, and Justice and 
Charity (al ‘Adl wal ‘Ihsan, JC), led by Sheik Abdessalam Yassine. 
In political terms and by virtue of its clandestine organisation, JC 
must be considered as the other most important Islamist group. After a 
long history of tension between Yassine and Hassan II, stretching back to 
the 1970s, in 1988 the former established JC as a new organisation. In 1989, 
Yassine was freed from prison but members of his group were often 
arrested by the police. In January 1990, the association was officially 
outlawed. Upon the death of Hassan II, the new King Mohammed VI 
changed strategy with regards to the movement and ended surveillance of 
Yassine. Since then, the movement has consistently demanded legalisation. 
In contrast, the PJD was formed from the fusion of a large number of 
small moderate Islamist organisations and monarchist insiders. Under the 
name of the Constitutional and Democratic Popular Movement (MPDC) 
this coalition competed in the 1997 legislative elections and entered 
Parliament for the first time after winning nine seats. In 1998, the party 
changed its name to become the Party of Justice and Development. During 
the 2002 legislative elections, the PJD won 42 out of 295 seats, becoming one 
of the country’s main political forces. In 2004, Saad Eddine Othmani 
became the party’s secretary general. 
The PJD represents what might be described as ‘legitimised Islam’ or 
‘state Islam’. In contrast with JC, it does not call into question the Moroccan 
kingdom’s political foundations. The party is pro-monarchist and does not 
endorse a revolutionary rhetoric of social change aimed at creating an 
Islamic state. On the contrary, it holds that state and society are not to be 
Islamicised because Morocco is already a Muslim country. It nevertheless 
insists on the principle of defending Moroccan society’s Islamic identity 
through legislative and institutional means when that identity is 
threatened. This involves a basic discourse of probity founded on respect 
for religious morality. From this point of view, the PJD has acted as a party-
pressure group, mobilising when needed all those within Moroccan society 
and the Moroccan administration who believe that the country’s Islamic 
identity is under threat. The PJD frequently condemns all proposed 
measures that would diminish the Muslim character of the state or the 
monarchy. The PJD’s religious discourse is close to that of the Waqfs 
Ministry (Ministry of Religious Affairs). Its detractors hold that it is 
manipulated by the monarchy as a bulwark against Islamic terrorism and 16 | SAMIR AMGHAR 
non-official Islam more generally. The party has recently moved from 
critical support for the government to ‘constructive opposition’. This 
strategy allows it to both satisfy the party’s radical wing and pursue a 
policy of integration by means of political alliances. PJD criticisms of the 
government thus aim at gaining a certain popularity among the 
impoverished segment of the middle class, but without jeopardising more 
complex state alliance strategies on issues related to the defence of the 
country’s Islamic identity.16 
In Parliament, PJD politicians now downplay religious themes and 
questions related to religious faith in favour of more political and secular 
matters. Moreover, they have adapted their political programme to the 
government’s public policies. It is difficult to precisely define the party’s 
political programme; it is characterised by inconsistency. Political 
pragmatism takes precedence over the clear definition of a recognisable 
ideology. The party’s political programme does not result from a 
homogenous way of thinking founded upon a fundamental theory 
developed by party leaders and intellectuals. Its positions are sufficiently 
flexible to allow the party to endorse various government policies when 
necessary, and at the same time to criticise other government positions in 
order to appear as a platform for protest among militants.  
Organised as a political party, the PJD’s structure is nevertheless tied 
to a religious association, the Movement for Unity and Reform (MUR), 
which brings together 200 different groups. Although the party denies any 
organic relationship with this federation of religious associations, most PJD 
leaders are members of the MUR, holding various functions, depending 
upon the structure to which they belong. There is a division of labour 
between the MUR and the PJD: while the latter adheres to its pro-
monarchist position, the MUR is more critical of the authorities and 
remains in contact with its base through religious and pastoral 
associational work. 
JC differs significantly from the PJD in terms of its ideology and its 
relationship with the monarchy. JC is highly critical of the monarchy and 
resolutely affirms the necessity of adopting a republican form of 
government. The movement does not hesitate to openly criticise 
Mohammed VI, calling for the construction of an Islamic republic that 
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would respect democratic values and human rights. According to Nadia 
Yassine, the daughter of JC’s founder, “the monarchy is not made for 
Morocco”, “the Constitution deserves to be thrown upon the garbage heap 
of history”, and “all signs indicate that the monarchy will soon collapse”.17 
The organisation places itself outside the system. Organised around the 
figure of its charismatic leader, the movement’s open conflict with the 
regime makes it the most virulent opponent of the monarchy in Morocco. 
While the PJD develops its non-confrontational relations with the King, the 
JC is in permanent conflict with the authorities and has on several 
occasions been subjected to repression. “We are the object of very strong 
police pressure in Morocco because we are critical of the system”,18 states 
Nadia Yassine. Yet, while it openly opposes the monarchy, the JC 
nevertheless condemns political assassination and armed violence. Instead 
of indirect action, the JC prefers recourse to legalistic and pacifist action 
(demonstrations, petitions, and so forth); its members have disowned the 
violent tactics deployed in the 1970s and 1980s. The JC is tolerated but 
closely watched. It does have its own press. Invoking Sufism, the 
organisation proclaims a desire to Islamicise society non-violently through 
education. It is active in the charitable domain and owes much of its 
influence to its social activism. While the PJD separated its political and 
religious wings, religious activities and political activism coexist within the 
JC. 
For the PJD, support for democracy in part results from a desire to 
appear respectable in a context in which Islamism was considered an 
unreliable partner. For the JC, locked in conflict with the monarchy, 
supporting democracy represents a means of showing opposition to the 
regime. While both organisations have thus come to support democracy for 
tactical reasons, this positioning has arguably pushed party members to 
internalise a positive belief in democracy as the most legitimate political 
system. It is for this reason that JC and PJD members go to such lengths to 
define the contours of ‘an Islamic democracy’ and Islam’s intrinsically 
democratic dimension. Nadia Yassine regularly asserts Islam’s democratic 
character, claiming that the Prophet himself governed according to the 
principle of popular sovereignty. 
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2.2  Moroccan Islamists and European Democracy  
More than merely rhetorically supporting the democratic norms that 
prevail in Europe, Moroccan Islamists have increasingly become 
participants in the European political arena. At the end of the 1990s, Sheik 
Yassine’s JC movement began viewing Europe as a land of exile and 
political expression. Realising that the spread of their ideology was limited 
and even blocked by the monarchy, JC decided to ‘export’ their movement 
beyond national frontiers. This took place through the creation of an 
association whose subsidiaries are found both in Europe and the US: the 
Muslim Participation and Spirituality (MPS) association. The creation of 
this movement was the result of the activism of political refugees who had 
fled political repression in their countries of origin, as well as political 
engagement on the part of students undertaking advanced degree 
programmes in the early 1990s. Expressing itself from outside the country 
on the Moroccan situation and hoping thereby to put pressure on the 
monarchy, the MPS seeks to profit from its presence in Europe to gain legal 
status for the Moroccan JC, as well as guarantees concerning democracy 
and human rights. For the Islamists of the JC, having a foothold in Europe 
is part of a strategy to ensure that their country is not their only site of 
political engagement.  
By becoming a force of opposition in Europe to the Moroccan regime, 
the JC-MPS movement appeared mutadis mutandis to be an agent for 
democratisation. The French and Belgian branches of the MPS regularly 
organised demonstrations denouncing the political situation in Morocco. 
The MPS’ chief of public relations in France, Abderrahman Makhlouf, 
affirms that “no one talks about the catastrophic political context in 
Morocco. With the means at our disposal, we have sought to alert French 
public opinion to the very poor situation in which the movement of Sheik 
Yassine finds itself in Morocco”.19 It is in the same spirit that Nadia Yassine 
regularly visits France in order to denounce the political situation in her 
country and the repression to which her movement is subjected. Thus, on 
17 June 2006, the ‘New Europe-Morocco Friendship’, an association close to 
Sheik Yassine’s Islamist movement, denounced the political repression of 
the movement on the part of the Moroccan government by organising a 
conference in Brussels hosted by the Sheik’s daughter, on the theme 
‘Human Rights Flouted in Morocco’.  
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With repression of the Justice and Charity continuing a month later, 
Nadia Yassine launched a tour around Europe to denounce police 
oppression. At one of her appearances in France, she declared, “The 
conditions for political and democratic participation in Morocco are not 
present. How are people to vote and choose their leaders when an 
important segment of the population is illiterate? In these circumstances, 
talk of free elections is a joke. There’s a lock on the political game and 
elections are nothing more than a farce”. Despite a structure that is 
presented as autonomous, the MPS continues to be directed by Sheik 
Yassine’s daughter and to give voice to his party’s ideology, particularly 
via conferences concerning Islamic banking and modernity (democracy, 
secularism, women’s rights). French-language Muslim internet sites such as 
Saphirnews20 and Oumma.com, which are read by many young Muslims in 
Europe, also advocate the party’s positions. In a statement posted on 
Oumma.com, Nadia Yassine asserts: 
Contrary to other countries like Spain, Belgium and even the 
United States, France barely respects the human rights of which it 
is so proud, especially where we are concerned. In practice, human 
rights only go one way and are chosen and applied according to 
the standards of Western political correctness. France is so close to 
the Moroccan monarchy that it has forgotten its strongest and most 
essential principles! I believe that France will pull itself together 
and prove to the world that all oppressed people can count on it 
now and forever. 
Moroccan movements in Europe have integrated into the available 
political framework, by means of councils such as the French Council of the 
Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM), the presence of 
imams in local mosques, or into the Islamic associative landscape. The JC 
thus decided to pursue its policy of criticising the Moroccan regime within 
the MPS, not by addressing the question of the monarchy’s illegitimacy, but 
rather in the area of human rights and public liberties. In 2006, PSM 
supporters living in Belgium and France created the Alliance for Freedom 
and Dignity (AFD), an association responsible for promoting and 
defending democracy and human rights in Muslim countries (and 
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particularly Morocco) by organising various demonstrations and 
conferences.  
While Sheik Yassine’s movement uses Europe as a political platform 
(something it cannot do so freely in Morocco), for the PJD maintaining a 
presence in Europe is more a question of electoral strategy. Nearly three 
million Moroccans (or nearly 10% of the total Moroccan population) live 
abroad, most of them in Europe (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Italy). The PJD regards these immigrants and their dual-nationality 
children as a not insignificant electoral reservoir, capable of being 
mobilised in the course of campaigns. In April 2006 the PJD organised a 
‘European electoral campaign’ aimed at their compatriots living in Europe, 
in the hope of winning their votes in the 2007 elections. As a militant of the 
Islamist party living in France suggested: “With legislative elections 
approaching, it is normal that we should organise official meetings and 
informal gatherings in order to inform Moroccan immigrants about our 
social project and our programme. The aim is to found an electoral base in 
Europe”.21 
Given the electoral strength of Moroccan nationals living abroad, the 
PJD has even recently exerted pressure to ensure better representation in 
elections. Thus, together with other political groups, in 2006 it signed a 
communiqué condemning “government backsliding with regards to the 
organisation of elections among Moroccans living abroad”. 
In addition to pressing for change in Morocco within European 
democracy, the PJD and JC have also increasingly taken a stand in support 
of representing the Muslims of Europe via numerous Islamic structures. 
Indeed, these parties are not present as such in Europe but are rather to be 
found enmeshed in the European Islamic landscape in the form of cultural 
and/or religious associations, which have either been created as associative 
structures ex nihilo or integrated into already existing organisations. 
Numerous high-ranking members of the National Federation of 
French Muslims (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France, FNMF)22 are 
                                                      
21 Interview with G. Tariq, Saint Denis, 31 May 2006. 
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500 associations. Considered close to Morocco, it is a member of the French Muslim 
Council (CFCM), which was created by the French Minister of the Interior. The 
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members and supporters of the PJD, following the example of Anouar 
Kbibech, President of the Regional Council of the Muslim Faith (CRCM) for 
Ile-de-France East (Conseil Régional du Culte Musulman-Ile-de-France Est), the 
regional branch of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français 
du Culte Musulman, CFCM). The CRCM-Ile-de France East was responsible 
for the creation of a new Muslim movement, the Rally of Muslims in France 
(Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, RMF) that held its first meetings in 
Paris in June 2006 and brought together around 200 mosque and associative 
leaders. According to the President of the CRCM Ile-de-France East, this 
initiative aspires to be “complementary to and not in competition with the 
French Muslim Council”.23  
Founded more recently than the FNMF, Muslim Participation and 
Spirituality (Participation et spiritualité musulmane, PSM)24 identifies with the 
Moroccan Sufist and Islamist Justice and Charity movement founded in 
Morocco by Abdessalam Yassine. This association constitutes the JC’s 
European arm (principally in France, Belgium but also Canada). Set up by 
Moroccan students who came to Europe to study in the early 1990s, it has 
grown considerably since the year 2000 and is today one of the most active 
Islamic associations in Europe.  
Conceived as structures to defend the interests of Muslims in Europe, 
these organisations propose an Islam that allows one to be a good, engaged 
Muslim without questioning integration into European society. The Islam 
advocated by these structures does not claim to break from European social 
and political values and, according to the leaders of these associations, the 
Muslim religion itself constitutes a means for self-affirmation within 
European society. These movements make a point of publicly advocating 
                                                                                                                                       
landscape. Its purpose is to serve as an interface between public authorities and 
French Muslims and to collectively manage questions related to religious practice. 
23 Interview with Anouar Kbibech, Paris, 9 June 2006. 
24 The PSM is distinguished by the originality of its doctrinal origins. Borrowing its 
modes of mobilisation from political Islam, it also identifies with Sufism. The 
PSM’s success is due to the fact that it serves as a refuge for members without 
demanding exclusive membership. The doctrine of the UOIF, for its part, belongs 
more or less to the same line of thought as that of the Muslim Brotherhood. It 
encourages them to hold political positions at the local level and to participate in 
various citizens’ rights associations, without asking them to refer to the movement 
in the course of their public activities. 22 | SAMIR AMGHAR 
respect for European political standards around such values as citizenship 
and seek to promote an Islam that takes account of Western social realities. 
In this respect, they are attempting to establish an ‘Islamic citizenship’ and 
present themselves as the privileged interlocutors of local and national 
public figures in relation to such diverse questions as religious activities, 
racism and the problem of juvenile delinquency in the banlieues. While the 
first generations of Muslim immigrants preferred to organise themselves 
around projects related to the construction and management of mosques, a 
n u m b e r  o f  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n ,  m o s t  o f  w h o m  w e r e  b o r n  a n d  e d u c a t e d  i n  
Europe, are finding a means of fully realising themselves as practising and 
engaged Muslims in this ideology, without repudiating successful 
economic and social integration. The PSM has thus actively mobilised in 
France against the legal project to forbid wearing religious symbols at 
school by participating in the ‘a school for all’ collective. This permitted the 
emergence of an original coalition of Muslim and secular associations. 
As a third strand to their policies, Moroccan Islamists have sought 
dialogue with political and academic bodies within Europe. In this way, 
they can present their often little-known programmes outside their country, 
while appearing within Morocco as central political actors with access to 
networks and international support. A trip to Spain to meet several 
political leaders between 26 March and 1 April 2005 was among the PJD’s 
recent initiatives. Five members of the party’s General Secretariat, 
including secretary general Saaddine Othmani, were received by the vice-
president of Spain’s Socialist Party and the Popular Party. This delegation 
also met with the President of the Spanish Parliament, representatives of 
the Association of Moroccan Workers and Immigrants in Spain (AMWIS), 
the President of the Spanish Employers’ Union, José Maria Cuevas, and the 
President of the Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations.  
This visit was part of a programme established by the General 
Secretariat of the party to visit several European capitals in the run up to 
the 2007 legislative elections in Morocco. As part of this programme, on 6-
12 April the PJD delegation also visited Paris where it met with several 
representatives of France’s main political parties. Among them were a 
representative of the Union for a Popular Movement (Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire, UMP), François Bayrou; the President of the centre 
Union for French Democracy (Union pour la Démocratie Française, UDF), 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement; and Gérard Chenel, the Socialist Party’s (Parti POLITICAL ISLAM | 23 
 
Socialiste, PS) representative in charge of Mediterranean affairs. Here, too, 
the delegation’s meetings with political parties were accompanied by a 
strategy targeting Muslim communities in France.25 
While the PJD’s external relations efforts target European 
institutional and political groups, the non-legalised JC is forced to focus on 
alternative political networks and intellectual forums. Nadia Yassine 
participates in a series of forums and meetings organised by such anti-
globalisation movements as the IV European Social Front held in Athens 
from on 4-7 May 2006, and the first congress of Islamic feminism held in 
Barcelona on 27-29 October 2005. Positioning oneself as a ‘thinker’ or 
‘university academic’ is a means by which figures without official 
recognition can make their voices heard by their respective states and thus 
by EU member states. Nadia Yassine also often participates in university 
conferences where she is invited to express her views as an intellectual on 
the state of Islamic political thought today, as she did in May 2003 during 
the VI International Congress of the Mediterranean Studies Association in 
Budapest, in June 2004 at San Sebastian and again the same year in 
Amsterdam on the initiative of the ‘Al Bayt al arabi’ institution.  
2.3  The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
While Moroccan Islamists claim to support democratic rule and show an 
admiration for Europe in this regard, there is a desire to distinguish 
between being pro-democracy and being pro-Western. Both the PJD and JC 
maintain that there is no necessary relation between the two. The Islamists 
regularly denounce Western cultural and political imperialism towards 
their country, claiming that democratisation is only a pretext for Europe 
and the US to Westernise (and thus de-Islamicise) Moroccan society. They 
assert that Moroccan society itself possesses the cultural resources 
necessary to become a democratic society and that these are to be drawn 
from Islamic sources. This is why Moroccan Islamists also desire to 
distance themselves from Western influence and schools of thought (the 
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philosophy of the Enlightenment, for example). The same refusal to borrow 
Western political culture is extended to minority rights, where these rights 
are said to have a non-Western, Islamic origin. During a 2004 conference in 
Paris organised by a French Muslim association, Nadia Yassine argued that 
the Prophet himself protected religious minorities and that, in consequence, 
“it is useless to turn to Western political culture in this area”. 
Apart from this refusal to borrow Western models, Moroccan 
Islamists denounce what they see as the selective and opportunistic manner 
in which Europe applies democratic principles. Europe does not require 
that its authoritarian allies practise democracy. Moreover, they believe that 
Europe opposes elections when Islamists are brought to power. As a PJD 
leader who lives in France stated, ‘On the one hand, Europe suspects us of 
having an ambivalent relationship with democracy, but when we win in 
elections, they oppose our victory, as happened with Hamas in Palestine. In 
such a context, how are we supposed to value democracy and desire that 
the democratic process develops in the Arab world?’26 These anti-Western 
criticisms, however, do not at all represent a desire to break with Europe. 
On the contrary, in the mind of the Islamists, collaborating with the West is 
a political necessity: their aim is to appear as respectable agents of change. 
Crucially, the views of the PJD and JC on European foreign policy 
initiatives in Morocco are not strongly favourable. Despite the importance 
of EU aid to Morocco, European policies have yet to conceive of a place for 
the Islamists in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Also, they have 
not considered their possible integration in the context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The failure to integrate Moroccan Islamists 
into the EMP/ENP contrasts with the American policy of establishing 
relations with these political actors. Since the 11 September attacks, the US 
regards Moroccan Islamists as reliable partners capable of playing a driving 
role in the democratisation process and as a bulwark against Islamic 
terrorism. Europe, by contrast, has always been reluctant to include North 
African Islamists in their partnership and neighbourhood policies, which 
are very strongly marked by security preoccupations. In a context of 
Islamic terrorism, EU relations with southern countries have been driven 
by a concern to preserve political stability. This has led Europe to support 
Arab regimes threatened by the rise of Islamic terrorism, even when those 
regimes are authoritarian. The EU views the Islamist movements of the 
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region above all from the perspective of security concerns, considering 
them as having equivocal relations with terrorism. Strongly influenced by 
the spectre of Algerian Islamism, it has refused to accept North African 
Islamists as reliable partners in dialogue, judging that these groups 
advocate the creation of an Islamic state opposed to democratic principles. 
This security-based perspective also prevents the EU from considering 
these parties as political partners and has thereby led it to exclude all civil 
society NGOs with an Islamic identity from the structures of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. The result has been an over-representation of 
secular and pro-government associations as well as relative indifference on 
the part of the Islamists towards the EMP. 
Moroccan Islamists regret the absence of supportive EU policies and 
denounce Europe’s slowness in addressing the Islamist phenomenon. “The 
Europeans still see Islamism as a phenomenon synonymous with instability 
and conflict”, one PJD member lamented. “Yet Islamism is plural and part 
of the Islamist trend has changed and evolved. This latter has long accepted 
Western political values and the need for dialogue with Europe”.27 Given 
the importance it occupies on the Moroccan political scene, the Islamists 
say that they would willingly respond to any overture on the part of the 
European Union. ”Europe has still not understood that we represent a 
majority of Moroccans and, by consequence, Morocco”,28 bemoans one 
Justice and Charity militant. “If Europe wishes to engage in dialogue with 
Morocco and encourage political pluralism here, it has to speak with us 
rather than denounce us as dangerous terrorists. We are better positioned 
than anyone else in Morocco to encourage the emergence of a genuine 
democracy”.29 
Given the expressed desire of the PJD and JC to establish relations 
with the EU, they deplore the lack of policies seeking dialogue with Islamic 
parties within the European Union.30 Moroccan Islamists, for their part, 
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and programmes (Crisis Management, Human Rights and Democratisation), the 
European Commission delegations in Algeria and Morocco, European 
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have been particularly critical vis-à-vis the policies pursued within the 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, condemning what they 
see as Europe’s desire to impose its own values through cooperation 
programmes, especially concerning women’s rights.31 Another criticism 
made by the Islamists of European policy is that instead of attempting to 
give lessons to Muslim civil societies, Europe should address respect and 
defence of the rights of Muslim Europeans. 
Some links exist on an ad hoc basis with Moroccan Islamists through 
projects run by a number of individual EU member states. The resulting 
initiatives are thus those of individual member states rather than of the 
European Union as a whole. Instead of being coordinated, there is a 
divergence between the policies of the various EU member states.  
Although they have received very little media attention, initiatives 
such as the convention of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC)32 on the fight against international terrorism signed at Ouagadougou 
on 1 July 1999, as well as the exchanges that have taken place since then 
between the OIC and the EU, are examples of how the Islamic factor has 
found some place in discussions between the EU and its neighbours. 
Despite several attempts at rapprochement and the growing interest 
shown by the European Union in the question of political Islam, these 
initiatives remain informal and do not take place within an institutionalised 
structure. Within the foreign ministries of certain member states such as the 
UK and Spain, however, there are discussion and reflection groups devoted 
to Islamic parties. These initiatives have yet to be translated into concrete 
measures within EU institutions, as evidenced during the November 2005 
‘Barcelona +10’ summit, the absence of new tools and actors for tackling 
                                                                                                                                       
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the action plans drawn up for each country (the one 
for Algeria will soon appear) and finally the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP), to which both Algeria and Morocco belong. 
31 Ammor, Fouad (2005), “Morocco’s Perspectives towards the EMP”, in Haizam 
Amirah Fernández and Richard Youngs (eds), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: 
Assessing the First Decade, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el 
Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) and the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales 
y Estratégicos, Madrid. 
32 The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was founded in 1970 and 
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political questions (particularly that of democratisation) with southern 
states has confirmed a pro-regime focus on the fight against terrorism. 
As already stated, Moroccan Islamists compare the EU approach 
unfavourably in this regard with the US policy of deepening engagement. 
When a part of the Moroccan political class, strongly supported by the 
government’s left wing, called for the PJD to be dissolved in the aftermath 
of the 16 May 2003 attacks in Casablanca, American Ambassador Margaret 
Tutweiler intervened with the support of her administration to prevent this 
from happening. Moroccan Islamists complained of European silence on 
this issue. American diplomats have come regularly to consult the Islamists 
on Morocco’s political situation.33 
While the Islamists congratulate American policy towards them and 
recognise the courage of American authorities in this area, they express 
their regret that the European Union does not have a similar policy. As a 
result, the EU has an image problem within Islamist parties while the US is 
increasingly seen in a positive light, despite criticism of its Arab policy. As 
a JC militant explained, ‘The US has scored points in this area and caught 
up with Europe. If the US didn’t support Israel and wasn’t at war in Iraq, 
American policy towards Muslim countries would be excellent’.34 
The US has also forged relations with the clandestine JC organisation. 
American officials thus recently defended Nadia Yassine when Moroccan 
authorities sought to punish her for her vitriolic remarks against the 
monarchy. She has also been invited to speak at conferences held at a 
number of American universities, such as the University of California, 
Berkeley and Harvard University, among others. 
Conclusion 
The EU’s support for the Moroccan regime and its eschewal of significant 
engagement with Moroccan Islamists ensures that the PJD and JC remain 
critical of the ENP and EMP. Soberingly, these groups complain that the EU 
has fallen well behind the US in terms of engagement with Morocco’s 
Islamists. Significantly, the PJD and JC have become more active within 
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European democracies than the EU has in recognising them as democratic 
actors within Morocco. This imbalance is especially marked in the case of 
the JC movement.  
The integration of Islamists into some of the processes of the 
EMP/ENP would allow these policies to have a better impact on the 
ground, since the Islamists represent a significant sector of public opinion 
and enjoy popular support. This would help the EU and its various 
cooperation programmes to reduce anti-European sentiment over questions 
of democratisation and to catch up with the US in this area. By including 
them in these European dynamics, the Islamists would be in some ways 
prodded to clarify their still ambiguous positions regarding democracy and 
human rights. Multiplying interlocutors in the framework of the ENP and 
EMP would force the Moroccan regime to take greater account of EU 
recommendations concerning democracy and the economy. This policy will 
only be possible if the EU clearly defines its action lines towards the 
question of Islamist politics in the Arab world, while also multiplying its 
political exchanges, not only with the Islamists, but with all Moroccan 
political actors, particularly those representing civil society. 
Faced with the absence of opportunities for dialogue at the level of 
the European Union, Moroccan Islamists have increasingly turned towards 
the US, which has observed a policy of consulting Islamist parties in the 
past five years. But the EU could nevertheless make a profound difference 
and play a distinctive role. The privileged position that it occupies among 
leaders of Southern states, as well as the tools that are at its disposal for 
engaging civil societies in the EMP/ENP, might facilitate the establishment 
of a triangular diplomacy between the EU, state leaders and Islamist 
parties. This would give new momentum to the theme of democratisation, 
today entirely subordinated to security preoccupations. 
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3.  ALGERIA 
AMEL BOUBEKEUR 
Introduction 
The recent legislative elections of May 2007 in Algeria showed how 
complex the evolution of Islamist parties is in this country and how crucial 
an understanding of these mechanisms has become for Europe. Since 
the  civil war of the 1990s, Islamist parties have experienced increased 
political participation. Drawing on interviews with various Algerian 
Islamist actors, this chapter analyses how Islamist parties are building a 
new relationship with democratic mechanisms in Europe. These 
developments mean that a reconsideration of the EU’s democracy 
promotion policies is now necessary. 
Algerian Islamist movements are some of the most heterogeneous in 
the Arab world, illustrated by Islamist parties’ different strategies towards 
the state, civil society and external partners such as the European Union 
(EU). This chapter will focus more specifically on the two major Islamist 
political parties in Algeria, the Movement of Society for Peace (Harakat al 
Moujtama’ As-Silm, MSP; formerly called Hamas) and the Movement for 
National Reform (Harakat al-Islah al Watani or el-Islah, MNR). After having 
been founded clandestinely in the 1970s, these parties became components 
of the official Algerian opposition in the 1990s. This ‘officialising’ of some 
Islamist movements by the Algerian government occurred after the failure 
of revolutionary Islamist strategies, in particular those of the Islamic 
Salvation Front (al-Jabhat al-Islamiyya lil-Inqad, FIS) banned by the Algerian 
regime in 1992.35 The MSP and MNR have adapted their ideology to the 
                                                      
35 On the question of the failure of political Islam to impose an Islamic state on the 
regime, see, among others, Roy (1992) and Kepel (2000). For a description of the 
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daily concerns of civil society, moving away from their previous 
revolutionary posture. This evolution demonstrates how Islamism as a 
social movement has become one of the most important forces for change 
in the region, having spread to different sectors such as trade unions, 
women’s associations, young people and students, and even business 
networks. 
By reporting on the views of Algerian Islamists towards European 
Union policies, this chapter underlines the need to understand the far- 
reaching and complex dynamics of change within Islamism.36 The views of 
Algerian Islamists reveal that the challenge of including Islamist 
movements in Euro-Mediterranean relations is not only related to the need 
for the EU to rethink its relations with specific political actors, but also to 
the EU’s capacity to propose a democratisation programme that is more 
credible for Arab civil society as a whole. 
3.1  The Evolution of the MSP and the MNR 
The MSP was created in 1990. The history of the MSP is closely linked to 
that of its founder, Mahfoudh Nahnah. Born in 1938, this teacher of Arabic 
started his preaching activities at the end of the 1970s and was an opponent 
of President Houari Boumedienne’s regime. In 1977, he carried out 
sabotage operations by demolishing electricity pylons and was sentenced 
to 15 years in prison. Pardoned by the next President, Chadli Bendjedid, 
Nahnah was then reported by various sources to have made a commitment 
to the security services to be less extreme in his preaching. He is also said to 
have promised to abstain from any association with Islamist groups which 
were critical of the authorities. 
Following the youth riots in Algiers in October 1988, Nahnah was 
asked by Ali Benhadj, a young preacher, to take part in setting up the FIS. 
He refused and instead decided to create his own association – Guidance 
and Reform (Al-Irshad wa-l-Islah). This association was seen as a non-
political organisation for religious education, preaching and charity work 
that was largely financed by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), with which 
Nahnah sympathised ideologically. In 1990, the association became a 
                                                                                                                                       
dynamics of the evolution of Islamist parties, see, among others, Dale Eickelman 
and Piscatori (1996); Beinin & Stork (eds) (1997); Hafez (2003) and Wiktorowicz 
(ed.) (2004).  
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political party under the name of Movement for an Islamic Society (Harakat 
li-Mujtama’ Islami, MSI; later Hamas). Its political activities were 
complemented by important social actions ranging from employment to 
helping families, assisting widows and the poor, as well as providing 
access to medical care. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Hamas has focused on cooperating 
with the state. Nahnah supported the government’s decision to interrupt 
the electoral process of 1992 (Hamas received only 5.3% of the votes during 
the legislative elections of 1991). During the 1990s the party condemned 
terrorist violence by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS, the armed-wing of 
the FIS) as well as the repressive policies of the Algerian security services. 
This intermediary position cost Hamas the lives of nearly 50 senior party 
members, who were killed by terrorist acts. 
In 1995, Nahnah was invited by the Algerian regime to re-launch the 
democratic process and decided to take part in elections (especially the 
presidential ones), highlighting his strategy of participation in the official 
political process. He put himself forward as a candidate in the 1995 
presidential elections and officially won 25% of the votes, coming second to 
the Algerian army’s candidate, Liamine Zeroual. In 1997, following a law 
on political parties that banned any ideological use of Islam, Hamas 
became the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP).  It then switched its 
slogan from ‘Islam is the solution’ to ‘Peace is the solution’. In the 1997 
legislative elections, the MSP officially secured nearly 7% of the votes in 
parliament and 69 seats, becoming a significant political party in the 
country. But the Algerian state did not give the MSP the opportunity to run 
in the 1999 presidential elections.  
Thus, since 1997, the MSP has been part of different government 
coalitions and is today a member of the Presidential Alliance, comprised of 
the MSP, the Algerian National Front (Jabhat at-Tahrir al-Watani, FLN) and 
the National Democratic Rally (at-Tajammu’ al-Watani ad-Dimuqrati, RND). 
But this policy of participatory strategies had negative consequences for the 
MSP as in the 2002 legislative elections it only won 7% of the votes and 38 
seats, half the number of seats that it had in 1997. Mahfoud Nahnah died in 
2003 and was replaced as party leader by Aboujerra Soltani. Since 2002, the 
MSP has held five ministerial portfolios – Mustapha Benbada, as Small and 
Medium-sized Businesses Minister; El Hachemi Djaaboub, as Industry 
Minister; Smaïl Mimoun, as Fisheries Minister; Amar Ghoul, as Minister of 32 | AMEL BOUBEKEUR 
Public Works; and Aboujerra Soltani, as Minister of State without 
portfolio.37 
The MNR was created in 1999 by Abdallah Djaballah. Born in 1956, 
Djaballah was among the first activists on Algerian campuses to begin 
spreading Islamism in its political form. After having studied Islamic 
sciences in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s,38 Djaballah returned to Algeria where 
he presided over an Islamist association called Al Jama’a al-Islamiyya (the 
Islamic group). In 1990 he founded his own party – the Islamic Renaissance 
Movement (Harakat an-Nahdha al-Islamiyya or an-Nahda). Even though close 
to the political perspectives of the FIS, Djaballah refused to be associated 
with its creation. Djaballah’s successive parties incorporated a large 
number of former FIS activists and voters after the latter’s prohibition in 
1992.  
With an-Nahda, Djaballah won 34 seats during the legislative elections 
of 1997, becoming the fourth largest power in parliament. In 1998 he had to 
face the hostility of a large number of an-Nahda’s activists who decided to 
expel him, following his refusal to be co-opted by the Algerian 
government. It was at this point that he created the MNR. Just before 
founding the MNR, Djaballah had run for the presidential elections of 1999 
as a free candidate, but decided with all the other opposition actors to 
withdraw from the electoral process before the vote. In the 2002 legislative 
elections, the MNR became the third most powerful political force and the 
leader of the Islamist parties with 43 seats. Djaballah was again a candidate 
in the 2004 presidential elections, finishing third with 5% of the votes.39 
                                                      
37 For a more complete list of MSP officials and their programme, see the MSP 
website (in Arabic), http://www.hmsalgeria.net/. 
38 Willis (1998). 
39 This article was written and edited before the Algerian legislative elections of 
May 2007. The MNR underwent much turmoil during these elections. In fact, in 
February 2007 the Algerian Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem refused the 
participation of the MNR in these elections on the technical grounds that they had 
not held a party congress before the closing of the lists. Djaballah argued that this 
was a deliberate ploy, since requests by his party to hold a congress had been 
systematically refused by the government. This implicit refusal by the government 
to see Djaballah take part in the elections is also echoed by complaints within the 
dissident wing of the MNR, led by Mohamed Boulahya. Numerous MNR militants 
denied Abdallah Djaballah the right to stand in the 2007 elections, arguing that his 
mandate as president ended in 2004 and had not been renewed by elections within 
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In sum, from their beginnings as clandestine organisations with a 
revolutionary discourse, the MSP and MNR have transformed themselves 
into conservative pillars of Algerian society and the state. With a pro-
nationalist stance, they are highly sensitive to the value given to the Islamic 
part of Algerian identity regarding the state and its institutions. They 
present themselves as defenders of the national Islamic characteristics of 
the country. They now insist that Algeria is already Islamic, toning down 
their demands for an Islamic state. A former MSP member of parliament 
for the region of Béjaïa argues: ‘Algeria is a Muslim country; the call for 
prayer can be heard, Ramadan is observed, women increasingly wear the 
veil, so talking about the Islamicisation of society when the country is 
already a Muslim country is a false problem’.  
State co-optation has led to a greater professionalisation of these 
parties, around the notion of musharaka (partnership).40 They see 
themselves as embarking upon a practical apprenticeship of more day-to-
day management and less revolutionary policy issues. The MNR 
supposedly represents the opposition to the more co-opted MSP, but aligns 
itself with the government when Islamic national identity is challenged, 
especially when political exchanges with the West occur. One MSP 
politician explains: 
We are currently in the presidential coalition, which means that we 
are no longer in the opposition. However, we are not exercising 
power as the two other parties (RND and FLN). We were obliged 
to take part in the democracy-building process because the context 
                                                                                                                                       
the party. Djaballah therefore lost the presidency of his party to Mohamed 
Boulahya in April 2007. Finding himself excluded from the party he founded, as in 
1998 with his En-Nahda party, Djaballah called for a boycott of the 2007 elections 
while promising to return to the political scene soon at the head of a new party he 
would create. We should remember that Djaballah succeeded in making the MNR 
the second most powerful political force after the elections in 2002. The legislatives 
of May 2007 recorded a historically low level of participation at 36.51 %. The 
absence of Djaballah from the electoral race benefited the Islamic MSP party with 
52 seats. The other traditional parties remain in power with 136 seats for the FLN 
and 61 seats for the RND. The new MNR led by Mohamed Boulahya has only 
secured 3 seats. The Algerian assembly numbers a total of 389 MPs. 
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was specific, but we always express our differences when we have 
to. We enjoy this independence.41 
The MNR leader insists: 
I am just positioning myself as an official Algerian party. When I 
am discussing EuroMed issues, I am doing it as an Algerian party, 
looking at issues which concern Algeria as a nation. They call us 
Islamists, but this is not a dialogue among religions that I am 
trying to manage! For me Islam is a complete system with its faith, 
economic, social, legal and political aspects. But I am doing it 
above all as an Algerian.42 
The MNR has created alliances with clearly non-religious parties such 
as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (at-Tajammu’ min ‘ajl at-taqafah wad-
Dimuqratiyya, RCD) and the Worker’s Party (Hizb al-‘Ummal, PT), which it 
then considered to be the only true opposition parties (apart from itself), 
after having said previously that secular parties were anti-constitutional − 
Islam being the religion of the Algerian state.  
One impact of this party professionalisation has been the weakening 
of ties with the grassroots. The two parties have lost their influence on the 
ground as Islamic associations. With their support for the state’s national 
reconciliation initiative43 they also under-estimated the size of the anti-state 
Islamist electorate, thought to be around four million people. Faced with 
this increasingly middle class profile, many former activists are turning to 
Salafism.44  
So, while the MSP and MNR have succeeded politically by accepting 
co-optation, many of their supporters still vote for them in protest at 
Western policies and state authoritarianism. The parties run political 
education programmes that the activists cannot find elsewhere. They also 
organise meetings to comment on current news. Activists and supporters 
also see in these parties a socialising element which allows them to find a 
                                                      
41 Abdelkrim Dahmene, Foreign Relations representative of the MSP. 
42 Interview with Abdallah Djabellah, former leader of the MNR.  
43 The national reconciliation charter was proposed by President Bouteflika in 
order to pardon crimes committed during the Algerian civil war.  
44 ‘Youridoun moughadarat al-bilad wa bad’ safha jadda: Shabab Jazairiyoun 
tarakou al-silah ila al-Ouslah wa Khaybat al-Amal’, Al-Hayat, 23 May 2000 - (They 
want to leave the country and move on: young Algerians are giving up weapons in 
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network of solidarity among members, helping them to get married, to set 
up businesses (via investment vehicles known as tontines) or to find 
accommodation. The parties also often benefit from the vote of activists 
from other banned Islamist parties, as was the case with some of the FIS 
votes going to the MNR in 2002. 
The process of professionalisation also obliged the MSP and the MNR 
to rethink the ‘grey zones’45 of their policies with regards to democracy. 
How do you continue to be opponents and set yourself apart as Islamists, 
while at the same time playing the inclusion card? Instead of adopting a 
politically Islamist programme, these parties prefer to present themselves 
as defenders of Islamic virtue and morals. The MSP continues to be vague 
on the rights of religious minorities. It also took issue with the government 
decision to remove the teaching of the Koran from the baccalaureate. In 
2004 the MNR proposed the law forbidding alcohol imports, and also 
opposed the revision of the Algerian family code, which aimed at giving 
more independence to women in family affairs: 
Our party is the target of those who want to impose an imported 
project of society to Algeria and who want the Westernisation of 
the nation. Our project of society is democratic. Islam and 
nationalism are its two main pillars.46 
This focus on morals is designed to win popularity among the 
masses, without frustrating strategies of alliance-building with the state. 
Thus, Menasra, the MSP’s second in command, explained that the party 
agrees with the RND when it comes to the economy because it advocates 
the opening of markets. Its differences with the FLN have more to do with 
religion and freedoms. The MNR often allies with extreme left-wing parties 
in order to denounce election fraud, the privatisation of national resources, 
or to defend the independence of lawyers and labour union rights. The 
political programmes of the MNR47 and the MSP are imprecise, often 
supporting government policies while distinguishing themselves as 
‘Islamic’. As professional and legalised parties, both organisations are re-
thinking their place not only in their national context, but also in relation to 
                                                      
45 Brown et al. (2006). 
46 An activist from the MNR.  
47 For a general view of the MNR programme, see http://www.elislah.net/ (in 
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external actors such as the EU. They have increased contacts in Europe, 
where they often send representatives to present their programmes, carry 
out interfaith dialogue and participate in discussions on Arab reform. 
3.2  Activities with European Muslims  
Algerian Islamists express strong interest in political action linked in one 
way or another to Europe. Their own presence in Europe is partly due to 
the fact that the scope for political action has been so limited within 
Algeria. After the interruption of the electoral process in 1992, many 
Islamist leaders, activists and supporters left the country and settled down 
in France, the UK, Germany and Belgium. In France, exiled members of the 
FIS created the Algerian Brotherhood of France (FAF).  
Their political struggle could be pursued via transnational 
opposition, representing a deterritorialisation48 of Islamist activity from 
Algeria to Europe. Islamist movements used available political structures in 
Europe (through Islamic councils, the presence of imams in the local 
mosques, and by joining Islamic associations that already existed in 
Europe). Some former FIS activists became members of the Union of 
Islamic Organisations of France (Union des Organisations Islamiques de 
France, UOIF),49 the main federation of Islamic associations in the country, 
and a pillar of the French Council of Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman, CFCM), which was created in 2003 with the support of the then 
                                                      
48 Olivier Roy (2002). 
49 Committed to a strategy of using associations at national and European level, the 
UOIF became a major player in the re-Islamicisation of young European Muslims 
by proposing a range of social services (school support, psychological and legal 
help for families, among others) and religious services. It is part of a supranational 
structure whose headquarters is the UK-based Union des Organisation Islamiques 
en Europe (UOIE), led by a Briton of Iraqi origin, Ahmed al-Rawi. The UOIF 
manages around 30 mosques throughout France, including in Bordeaux (800 seats) 
and Lille (1,200 seats). Every spring, it organises an annual event in France, the 
Congress of Bourget, bringing together huge crowds of participants from all over 
Europe.  Mahfoud Nahnah, the founder of the MSP used to give a lecture there 
every year. Currently, it is MSP President Aboujerra Soltani who speaks on behalf 
of the movement. In 2006, his speech was about the ‘Ethics of Dialogue’. Also, 
numerous imams who operate in French mosques are linked to the MSP and the 
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Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, to represent the interests of 
Muslims in France.  
Europe represented a land of exile for some Algerian Islamists, but 
also an opportunity to use European Islamic structures to defend Muslim 
minority rights. In the 1990s, Algerian Islamists decided to use associative 
frameworks rather than political parties for their activities on Islamic 
issues. These associations aimed at controlling the activities of a new type 
of activist – young Muslims born in Europe – and led campaigns to 
integrate Muslims into the European political and social landscape, calling 
on them to join electoral lists and vote.50 
The UOIF started off with an Islamist heritage but gradually shifted 
its activities to the defence and integration of Muslims in Europe. Founded 
in 1983 by a group of Tunisian and other Middle Eastern political refugees 
and Islamist students, the UOIF was destined to become the host 
organisation of exiled Islamists. Linked to the international Muslim 
Brotherhood, the UOIF initially had a strong Islamist tradition and had 
little interest in action in the host country. Towards the end of the 1980s, it 
changed direction, convinced of the relevance of and need for being active 
in France and Europe. The UOIF took up the cause of the young veiled 
students who were excluded from schools in 1989, organising 
demonstrations and alerting the media. It also tried to ban the publication 
in French of the Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie. More recently, it called 
on members of the Muslim community to mobilise through petitions, 
demonstrations and boycotts to bring an end to Islamophobic 
representations of the prophet Mohammad during the recent cartoon affair. 
Some MSP activists and supporters, such as Okacha Ben Ahmed, Secretary 
General of the UOIF, and Fethi Belabdelli, former president of the UOIF 
student section, known as the Muslim Students of France (EMF), were 
among the senior officials of the UOIF. With Algerian roots, they were 
active in Algeria through the General Free Students' Union (UGEL), which 
had close ties to the MSP, before moving to France to pursue their higher 
education. When they arrived in France, they continued their activism in 
the EMF, present in twenty French universities. They then joined the 
management structures of the UOIF. Islamist parties were not present as 
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such in Europe, preferring to work with cultural associations, either 
creating new associations, or joining existing organisations. 
Undermining the extent to which Algerian Islamist parties view 
Europe as a normative model, they are now mobilising from their home 
countries to defend European Muslims. During the 33rd session of foreign 
ministers of member countries of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) in 2006, Aboujerra Soltani proposed setting up a 
mechanism to fight the Islamophobia he claims is rife in the West:  
Its aim is to bring Islamic states to pass laws to fight this 
phenomenon and work towards adopting a UN resolution to 
protect Islam and its symbols. The Algerian proposal calls for the 
c r e a t i o n  o f  a n  I s l a m i c  f u n d  t o  s u p p o r t  e f f o r t s  t o  c o m b a t  
Islamophobia in Western countries and to promote the values of 
dialogue and tolerance between cultures, religions and 
civilisations. It also puts the emphasis on the need for Islamic 
countries to impose economic boycotts against countries that 
encourage Islamophobia. The proposal sets out a series of 
measures – mobilisation of Muslim NGOs working in Europe and 
stepping up cooperation with the Council of Europe and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It 
also advocates closer dialogue with political parties, decision-
makers and NGOs to influence the content of school programmes 
that circulate a ‘distorted image’ of Islam passed from generation 
to generation.51 
With more than a million Algerian nationals living in Europe, mainly 
in France, the MSP and MNR see these immigrants and their dual-
nationality children as a significant pool of voters that can be mobilised 
during election campaigns. These parties’ election campaigns are therefore 
also targeted at their compatriots living in Europe. In the words of an 
official from the MSP network in France: 
There is a quota share of parliamentary seats reserved for 
Algerians in France. The authorities organise elections in the 
consulates to elect these MPs. So, in the MSP we target our 
campaign in France at Algerian nationals by distributing leaflets or 
organising little meetings. The aim is to woo the immigrant voters. 
We engage in politics here in France to win the elections; we try to 
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have a network within the Algerian community in Europe. We 
also have a party representative in each consulate.  
In the case of the MSP, the idea is also to maintain the feeling of 
national belonging amongst Algerian nationals and to carry out a cultural 
development policy between the two countries. According to an MSP 
official: 
The MSP’s policy on immigration is to act as a bridge between the 
immigrants and their country of origin. We also want to take part 
in bringing France and Algeria closer together. Personally, I’ve 
tried to twin two towns – one Algerian and the other French – we 
have had meetings with French and Algerian doctors, researchers, 
etc. Having a network is really our first objective. All moderate 
Muslims in France and Algeria vote for us even if they are not 
members because they recognise themselves in our discourse. 
Now with the beurs [second-generation North Africans living in 
France], it is true that it doesn’t really work for all Algerian parties. 
They are much more interested in French politics. We prefer that 
they take an interest in France but if they can do both that’s good. 
During the 1997 presidential elections, the MSP candidate Mahfoud 
Nahnah came first in the Algerian consulates of Strasbourg, Nice and 
Grenoble, well ahead of the candidate winning the presidential elections, 
Liamine Zeroual. Although dissolved since 1992, the FIS is also trying to 
influence the votes of Algerians abroad. Rabah Kébir, head of the FIS 
executive delegation, who took refuge in Germany for a long time, called 
on Algerians to vote for Abdellaliz Bouteflika during the 2002 presidential 
elections. He also invited the different Islamists living in Europe to come to 
Algerian consulates abroad to benefit from a law on civil concord, 
promulgated in 2000, whose aim was to grant amnesty to those responsible 
for crimes during the civil war. In short, Algerian Islamists’ views on what 
Europe should do are partly related to their own differing degrees of 
embeddedness within European policies.  
3.3  The Failure of Europe as a Democratic Model  
The bitterness over Algeria’s civil conflict in the 1990s and the fact that 
European governments largely supported the military regime’s harsh 
tactics against Islamists have ensured that Algerian Islamists have a 
particularly critical perspective on EU policies. Unsurprisingly, the 
common view is that the EU actively collaborated in the repression of 
Algerian Islamists’ democratic rights. Significantly, this legacy from the 40 | AMEL BOUBEKEUR 
1990s can still be seen in Algerian Islamists’ views towards more recent EU 
initiatives. Interviews reveal that Algerian Islamists are particularly critical 
of new democracy promotion policies pursued under the EMP, decrying 
Europe's supposed determination to impose its own values through its 
cooperation programmes. Another frequent reproach by Islamists is that 
Europe should work to ensure respect for the rights of Muslims in Europe 
rather than try to influence the orientations of Muslim civil societies in the 
Arab world.52 
The EU’s refusal to recognise the democratic electoral victory of 
Hamas in the Palestinian Occupied Territories has further undermined the 
credibility of EU discourse on democratisation amongst Algeria’s Islamists. 
Today, a number of Islamist party leaders and activists are considering the 
possibility of an ‘Islamic democracy’, that is, a democratic system inspired 
in large measure by the European democratic model and Islam, but with a 
distinctive set of beliefs independent of Europe's ‘whims’.53 During the 
interviews carried out for this chapter, the majority of Islamist players 
declared that they did not reject the possibility of becoming more 
democratic ‘thanks to Europe’ and its support, but not ‘like Europe’. What 
they dispute is the necessity of conforming to European demands and of 
acting in response to the democratisation programmes proposed by Europe 
– from which they are invariably excluded, but often by their own choice. 
Algerian Islamists also oppose what they judge to be Europe’s security 
objectives for promoting democracy. They believe this leads to a form of 
democracy promotion geared towards European allies’ stability, energy 
interests, counter-terrorism and the condition of amenability on Israeli-
Palestinian issues. All this is seen as being to the detriment of high-quality, 
genuine democracy, with its implications for freedom of expression, civil 
society, opposition parties and access of the masses to the political sphere).  
The US and Europe are both criticised for wanting a democratisation 
of their own choosing, realising that the democratisation dynamics they 
have long been advocating will not necessarily produce the political result 
they are seeking for the stability of their dealings in the region.54 
I was at this [European] conference and they were wondering how 
to have a more efficient democratisation process in the region. 
                                                      
52 Interviews with several members of various Islamist parties and structures. 
53 Sayyid (1997). 
54 Causse III (2005). POLITICAL ISLAM | 41 
 
Honestly, I was sceptical about their proposals as I saw how they 
support the undemocratic aspects of our governments, or with 
regards to their unfairness towards the Palestinian occupation or 
the Hamas victory! For these reasons I always prefer to talk about 
the need for a dialogue with the EU than for genuine 
cooperation.55 
The EU’s disregard for cases of torture and abusive detention of 
Islamist activists, the exclusion of trade unions dominated by Islamists 
from Euro-Mediterranean networks, and the intercultural aspect given to 
inter-religious dialogue have also given credence to Algerian Islamists’ 
perception that the EU seeks to export a profoundly secular European 
conception of democracy, leaving very little room for the expression of 
religious identities. 
The West  was living in darkness while we had Andalusia, Al 
Qarawiyine [an Islamic university in Morocco]. They began to learn 
about justice, citizenship or even the relationship between people 
and the state when we had all this for 1,000 years! Why are they 
silent on the legacy of the ‘South’ in today’s Europe? What about 
St Augustine? What about Constantine I? Islam is dine wa daoula 
[religion and state affairs]. We cannot have religious beliefs [aqida] 
without a law [sharia]. This is also the way Europe has been built, 
between faith and jurisdiction, and now they are going through a 
major identity crisis. I want them to talk about Islam from an 
Islamic perspective, not only from their own conception. I do not 
talk about democracy because it is already in my Islamic culture. 
Democratising a religious party [hizb dini] sounds strange to me! 
Thinking in terms of ‘Islamism versus democratisation’ is the sign 
that the West refuses to understand my conception of governance, 
politics etc.56 
Accordingly, the democratisation initiatives promoted by the EU 
seem no longer to inspire confidence among Algerian Islamists, who have 
difficulty in identifying with these. A reflection in the EU on Islamic 
political and social values could help dissipate Muslim countries’ 
“impression of cultural imperialism”57 in Europe’s attempts to promote 
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democracy in the region. Europe should in this sense be open to “an 
Islamic ethic of democracy”.58 Europe has not considered drawing on 
resources from within the Islamic heritage in support of democracy and 
human rights such as the concept of shura (fair consultation in a policy-
making process), respect for law, the central role of moral values such as 
equality and social justice. It is here that Algeria’s Islamists feel that their 
basic beliefs and political orientations remain poorly understood by 
European governments: 
OK, we are heirs of the Islamist tendency. But today we are 
inspired by the European Christian democrat experience. Islamist 
is a highly pejorative term  for Europe. Our movements are not 
well understood. I understand myself as a Muslim democrat. Our 
specific Islamic values are indeed universal. I even think that we 
can be a model for Europe’s transforming identity.59 
Talking about Islamism is the sign of Europe’s ignorance. I 
have the right to refuse this imported distinction between secular 
parties considered democratic and so-called religious parties 
which should be democratised. Islamic political thought does not 
differentiate between Islamic parties and non-Islamic ones. The 
W e s t  i s  a b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  d e m o c r a t i c  t o o l s  s u c h  a s  p a r t i e s ,  
institutions and parliaments, and I can adopt and use these tools. 
But it doesn’t mean that I am going to give up my Islamic culture 
and its philosophy in order to imitate imperialist and rogue states 
which call themselves democracies!60 
Including elements of Islamic philosophy in the arguments in favour 
of democracy does not, however, mean locking this issue into an Islamic 
framework. Europe should, in this view, avoid reducing democratisation in 
the South to a sort of intercultural dialogue between the two parties, 
legitimating therein the use of political norms different from those 
applying to political players in the North. It is precisely the argument of an 
‘Islamic cultural specificity’ that has enabled the authoritarianism of certain 
Islamist actors and Arab states to monopolise Islam as a resource, and to 
crack down on all attempts at opposition and change. Paying heed to the 
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requests of civil societies and what they are trying to build, and thus 
ensuring their representation in institutions in these countries, will 
consequently be more effective than the North's current obsession with the 
question of ‘Arab reform’, without, moreover, managing to identify the 
reformers. It would also be illusory and superficial to consider the Islamists 
as the new ‘miracle’ political protagonists of the region, after the EU had 
erred in treating them for so long as the “untouchables of the democracy 
assistance world”.61 
3.4  Areas of Potential Collaboration with Europe 
For the MSP much more than the MNR, the new challenge is about 
developing networks outside Algeria via meetings, conferences and 
seminars where diplomats, politicians, senior civil servants and Islamist 
party officials meet. By developing relations of this kind, party 
representatives can present their often poorly-known programme to the 
outside world – while gaining standing within Algeria as central political 
actors able to muster international networks and support. However, it 
should be underlined that Islamists in Algeria are not doing it as well as 
their Moroccan neighbours. This isolation is partly due to the Algerian civil 
war of the 1990s. Following these events, a party such as the MNR does not 
seem to attract a renewed interest among European policy-makers. The 
MNR’s marginalisation acted clearly to the benefit of the active external 
work of the MSP, which appears as more moderate to the West and enjoys 
assets that the MNR lacks, such as multilingual activists. 
I am not asking for anything. I don’t ask people who stigmatise 
me. I had exchanges with the EU in the 1990s but since the national 
crisis is over and we don’t appear as dangerous for their 
democracy anymore, I feel that they don’t want to learn about 
what so-called Islamist parties really are. They only want to 
discuss with parties that have renounced their Islamic identity.62 
In the 2004 MRN programme for the presidential elections,63 there is 
coverage of the North African region, Africa, the Islamic ‘area’ and the 
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Arab region in the chapter devoted to external relations policies. But the 
MNR does not deal with Europe or even with the West as such. It is only 
under the terms of ‘international organisations’ and the ‘worldwide space’ 
that a partnership with Europe is suggested. “Encouraging the culture of 
dialogue and positive reciprocity”; “Rejecting nuclear proliferation and 
preserving peace and security in the Mediterranean region”, and 
“Encouraging economic and scientific exchanges” are for the MNR 
examples of possible areas of collaboration with the EU. 
Alongside Muslim communities present in Europe, there is an effort 
to establish a political dialogue with EU member states both at a structural 
(party, policy, trade union) level and an intellectual or semi-political (think 
tanks, foundations, universities, among others) level.  
We do have formal exchanges with ambassadors from EU member 
states in Algeria. Encounters outside Algeria are mainly done 
through our parliamentary roles  and do not allow us to build 
direct relationships. Exchanges at an institutional level are still 
complicated but other structures are more yielding such as 
European political parties, European think tanks or foundations. 
With these structures we have exchanges on the issue of reform 
and not only on the Islamist issue. The European Union should 
better understand why it is not successful in achieving reform in 
the Arab world and increasing its dialogue with the whole civil 
society. In any case, we are looking for any type of partner in terms 
of dialogue. Cooperation issues will depend on the interests of 
each other.64 
Conclusions 
The official entry of Algeria’s Islamist parties into politics has had two 
results: deradicalisation and professionalisation. Having dropped their 
revolutionary trappings and become committed to the political 
management of the daily problems of their voters, these parties could well 
participate in cooperation programmes, from which the EU should, in the 
opinion of a large part of Arab civil societies, no longer exclude them. 
There is no need to envisage new programmes specifically created for 
Islamist actors and their organisations but simply to encourage their 
inclusion in existing ones.  
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Since Algeria has a long history of cooperation with Europe, the 
interest of its Islamist parties in the policies of the EU is relatively strong, 
compared to elsewhere in the Middle East. Nevertheless, European policies 
towards the region are still not well-known by Algerian Islamists. The EU, 
especially via its delegations in the countries concerned, could increase the 
visibility of its main policies (EMP, ENP) in associating grassroots activists 
and Islamic civil society associations with training activities on Europe. The 
emphasis should be placed on the political nature of Islamist actors and 
their parties, rather than religious or intercultural themes. Members of 
these parties need to acquire specific skills and align their experience with 
international political practices. Exchanges of experience between Maghreb 
Islamist parties and European foundations and political parties could be 
promoted both by member states at a national level and by the EU as part 
of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges (notably via the Euro-Mediterranean 
Parliamentary Assembly).  
The broad issue of democratisation should also leave room for joint 
work on specific points where the institutions can address social issues, 
such as the so-called ‘grey areas’ of high importance to the Islamist parties 
– women’s rights, religious minorities, morals in public life, among others. 
The message from Algeria’s Islamists is that engaging with their parties in 
operational programmes would help counter the feeling that the EU only 
proposes a Euro-centred democratisation that does not meet the 
expectations of local communities.65 
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4.  TUNISIA 
SALAH EDDINE JORSHI 
Introduction 
Political Islam has been harshly repressed in Tunisia and many of its most 
significant figures have long been based in Europe. This gives the debates 
over the relationship between European and political Islam particular 
salience in the Tunisian case. This chapter finds a notable diversity of views 
among Tunisian Islamists on the questions explored by this book. One 
point of commonality is the strong criticism from all Islamist leaders of the 
EU’s failure to pressure the Bin Ali regime for democratic reforms. Tunisian 
Islamists are keen for cooperation with the EU, although admit to lacking 
ideas on how to take this forward. But before such cooperation takes place, 
they seek a tougher European line towards the Tunisian regime. 
This chapter is based on material obtained from interviews with 
members of Islamist organisations, including the Renaissance Movement 
leader Sheikh Rachid al-Gannushi (based in London); the Movement’s 
official spokesman Amer El-Arid (based in Paris); Sayed Al-Farajani, who 
still considers himself a leader in the Movement despite quitting the actual 
leadership; and Morsel Al-Kousseiby, who now lives in Germany after 
resigning from the Movement. 
4.1  The evolution of Political Islam in Tunisia 
Tunisia gained independence in 1956, after its new President, Al Habib 
Bourguiba, had led the National Movement for more than twenty years. 
His view of progress and of the West was totally different from that of his 
contemporary in Egypt, Abdul Nasser. The Tunisian historian, Hicham 
Jaitt, has said of Bourguiba: “[He] was dazzled by Europe, and particularly 
by France, and considers that Arabism is drowned in irrational traditions 
and that the Arab Union is a demagogical idea”.  POLITICAL ISLAM | 47 
 
Indeed, upon taking power and establishing the nation state, 
Bourguiba took several unexpected positions, far removed from Islamic 
tradition. For example, Tunisia became the second Islamic country after 
Turkey to make the taking of a second wife a crime punishable by prison. 
Women can only be divorced after a judicial judgement that guarantees 
their financial and familial rights, and girls cannot be married unless they 
give their explicit consent before witnesses. Bourguiba further surprised 
the traditional milieu with his decision to reform the education system, 
ending the dominance of Al-Zaytouna teaching, which had been the central 
focus of economic, social and religious life in Tunisia for centuries. 
Religion, including the mosques, imams, fatwas and Islamic education, was 
placed under the control of the government. Bourguiba was so confident 
that he called upon the Tunisian people to stop fasting during Ramadan, 
and to advance economic development as “the greatest jihad”, after ending 
French colonisation, which he described as the “lesser jihad”. 
However, since the 1970s, Tunisia has witnessed the foundation of 
several Islamic movements. The Renaissance Movement (al Nahda, 
originally called the Islamic Orientation Movement) was always considered 
as the main political Islamic actor. The movement started in the early 1970s 
among a group of preachers. It gradually changed into a political 
movement that defended Islam, decrying “ideological and moral 
corruption”. 
According to its texts the Movement aims, among other things, at 
renewing Islamic thought on the basis of unchangeable Islamic principles, 
helping the nation to restore her legal right to self-determination without 
foreign hegemony, re-establishing economic life on a more humane basis 
and distributing wealth equitably. It also hopes to re-establish Islam as a 
civilised entity at the international, Arab, Maghrebi, and local levels, and to 
save mankind from psychological alienation, social exclusion and 
international domination.  
Not unlike analogous movements, the Tunisian Renaissance 
Movement began by opposing the West and ‘Europeanism’, i.e.: the policy 
of taking Europe as an example of progress to be followed. This was a main 
cause of its political and cultural conflict with the Bourguiba regime. 
However, once the Renaissance Movement had modified its political and 
theoretical positions, with a relative openness to the liberal system and a 
denial of the complete contradiction between Islam and democracy, its 
leaders started to look differently at Europe.  48 | SALAH EDDINE JORSHI 
 
A second tendency is the Islamic Liberation Party, a branch of an 
international organisation founded in Jerusalem in 1953 by the Muslim 
Brothers dissident preacher Takieddine Nabhania. In 1973 it established its 
first cells in Tunisia. The party believes in “radical, global and irreversible 
change” in the Islamic world. It aims at “reanimating Islamic life by 
establishing the Caliph state. This cannot be achieved without “toppling 
the systems deemed to be extensions of the Western imperialistic 
domination of the Muslim countries”. Its activists have been prosecuted 
repeatedly – in 1983, 1986, 1990 and 2006 - for seeking to overthrow the 
regime, for belonging to the Liberation Party, or for trying to recruit 
military personnel. 
Tunisia also has an apolitical missionary group, based on that 
founded by Sheikh Mohammad Elias in India. It is distinct from the other 
Islamic movements in avoiding political affairs, and pursuing as a unique 
goal the correction of the individual, encouraging Muslims to perform their 
prayers and calling for a simple way of life. The group became widely 
known in Tunisia in the early 1970s, and attracted mainly middle-class, 
educated followers. Nonetheless some of its leaders were prosecuted on 
grounds that they were calling for an Islamic state and the rule of sharia 
law. 
As is well-known, the regime of President Ben Ali weakened the 
phenomenon of political Islam to such an extent that, during the 1990s, 
some thought it had become a thing of the past. However, no sooner had 
the new millennium begun than the phenomenon started to re-emerge.  
4.2  Tunisian Islam and European democracy  
At the time of the Renaissance Movement’s foundation, Islamists in Tunisia 
used to prefer the term “deliberation” in order to confirm the “privacy of 
their political thought”. But today “democracy” has become an integral 
part of the political lexicon of the Renaissance Movement, although it still 
uses the term ‘deliberation’ as well.  
Democracy, according to Ali El-Arid, means the adoption of honest, 
periodical elections, the acceptance of the right of the majority to rule and 
the commitment to respect the rights of minorities and individuals in 
expressing criticisms and in the defence of their opinions. Morsel Al-
Kousseiby agrees, and his views are based on his own experience. Having 
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appreciation to the European democratic pattern and consider it as an 
experience worthy of study and contemplation by the Arab political elites”. 
Hamadi Al-Jibali, having been released a few months ago after more 
than 16 years in jail, thinks that the European model is the most suitable, 
albeit with some dissimilarities. For him, the democracy concept stands for 
the “sovereignty of the people in a community based on justice, freedom 
and equality between individuals and groups”. For instance, the European 
model provides “a real plurality of parties of different social, political and 
intellectual orientations, where we can find the most right-wing and the 
most left-wing, the proletarian and the capitalist, the rich and the poor, the 
liberalist and the conservative; which is a diversity that makes the concept 
of democracy a reality”. As for Amer El-Arid, the most important point in 
the democratic system is its ability to prevent violent conflicts over 
authority, and to set the principles for the peaceful coexistence of 
concurrent powers as well as a durable foundation based on citizenship. 
Nevertheless, some divergences emerge in the attitudes of the 
Movement’s members concerning the ‘European democratic pattern’. Ziad 
Al-Dolatli looks at the ethical dimension in Western democratic regimes, 
considering that “Western democracy has made liberalism and secularism 
its basic conditions, which has good and bad impacts”. Sayed Al-Farajani 
observes that European democratic patterns are not the same: “There are 
significant differences between the democracies promoted by the 
Europeans of the Mediterranean and the Scandinavian countries and 
Britain”.  
As is generally known, Islamists vehemently refuse to import all that 
is related to Western political and social regulations, principles and ideas. 
When they want to reject any theory or system, they declare it “goods 
imported from the West”. Radical Islamists, such as the Salafi movement, 
consider democracy a form of infidelity and polytheism, as they believe it 
replaces the command of God with the command of the people and the 
nation. These ideas were adopted early in the history of the Islamic 
orientation, when its leadership followed the thinking of Sayed Qutb. 
Today, similar thinking has reappeared in Tunisia along with the 
surprising spread of the Salafi movement. The partisans of the Islamic 
Liberation Party also reject the idea of taking the European democratic 
model as a political reference for Islamic communities. The party sees an 
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In light of these developments, it is remarkable that while regimes in 
the Arab world are resorting to cultural and religious ‘privacy’ in order to 
avoid democratic political reforms, some of the leaders and cadres of the 
Renaissance Movement, such as Ziad Dolatli, consider democracy as an 
example of mechanisms, institutions and principles that are worthy of 
adoption. Amer El-Arid declares that the European democratic model 
corresponds to the aspirations of the Islamic and Arab communities to 
achieve a democratic advance, protect civil liberties and ensure overall 
development.  
Many Islamists think that democracy is a product of the European 
and Western environment, and thus, a flower that cannot be planted in 
Islamic Arab soil. The cadres of the Renaissance Movement are trying to 
prove otherwise, but with obvious divergences. Ali El-Arid thinks that 
democracy is “valid for different environments, without disrupting their 
essence”. Even when he speaks about the complicated relation between 
democracy and religion in the European context, he declares that “if some 
Western democracies set themselves against religion and religiousness, this 
is due to historical conflict with the church”. Denying any opposition 
between Islam and the democratic system, Al-Jibali considers the Islamic 
system to be founded on components of democratic life such as the 
freedom of belief, opinion and the rule of people themselves on the basis of 
deliberation, free agreement and the separation of power and 
independence. 
Al-Jibali’s standpoint matches that of the Renaissance Movement 
chief, Rashid al-Gannushi, who also legitimises “the adoption of the 
European democracy model”, provided that this serves Islamic values and 
does not replace them. In this context, al-Gannushi distinguishes between 
the reformists who have Islamic tendencies and the secularists that he 
considers to be the leaders of westernisation.  
Morsel Al-Kousseiby meanwhile considers that “it’s fundamental for 
Islamic and Arab societies to learn from these experiences, since they 
belong to the entirety of humanity and can’t be considered a strange 
culture or imported goods from overseas”. However, he supports a 
standpoint that seeks harmony between democracy and privacy: “It’s 
possible to inquire about some cultural specificities for Islamic societies 
while applying the European democratic model, by respecting the 
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Thus, the essential obsession haunting most Islamists is how to avoid 
a contradiction between the requirements of a democratic system based on 
liberty and Islamic beliefs and principles based on minimum precepts and 
holiness. Sayed Al-Farajani points to “the attachment of every European 
state belonging to the European Union to its identity, language and 
culture” which is “a good example of the respect of each country’s 
particularities”. Moreover, the European democratic model has been 
“consolidated by the European court and constitution and by the laws that 
guarantee the rights of minorities”.  
When the Renaissance Movement’s cadres were asked to compare 
American and European democracy, most promptly took the side of 
European democratic systems. Al-Jibali noticed that the American and 
European examples are based on “the same value reference and intellectual 
system with the difference in time and experience in favour of Europe as it 
is the source of Western civilisation and its guardian”. As for the 
dissimilarity between the two examples, it resides “in the style and means”. 
On this sensitive point, he declared without hesitation that “the European 
example surpasses the American one concerning the freedom available to 
the different political parties and intellectual and cultural schools”. He 
pointed to the narrowness of the American political arena around its two 
main poles. 
Ziad Al-Dolatli focused, in his criticisms of the American democratic 
example, on the absence of a social dimension, because, according to his 
point of view, “it shows the ugliest aspects of Western liberalism, where 
power and money prevail, while European democracy is more moderate in 
regard to its social dimension and political systems”. Ali El-Arid shares the 
same point of view. Al-Farajani also says American democracy “does not 
give too much importance to the social coverage of more than sixty million 
Americans who live below the poverty line”. “Even though the American 
example is composed of immigrants, racial diversity and freedom of 
opinion, the negative effects of pressure groups and informational and 
financial power on America’s democracy are more conspicuous than those 
of the European example”.  
4.3  The Vices of European Democracy 
While the Renaissance Movement cadres adopt democracy as a mechanism 
and set of values, they also criticise it. They attach importance to the moral 
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For Dolatli, non-compliance with moral standards and the separation 
of religion from policy are some of its problems. He gave as an example the 
moral crisis that Western democracy is going through after invading 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the attack against Lebanon. Moreover, in 
the name of this democracy, the West has “allowed homosexual marriage 
and sexual liberty, prevented the wearing of headscarves in France, 
deprived the Palestinian people of their rights and taken sides completely 
with the Zionists”.  
Al-Gannushi supports this position. He believes materialist 
philosophy and secular thought are at the root of the problem. People are 
no longer human beings, but ‘things’ and social communication networks 
in the great democratic cities are destroyed after they have been changed 
into “huge cement blocks that lack sociable people”. These people “suffer a 
terrible solitude after the foundation of family is replaced with a 
foundation of economic production”. Al-Gannushi also considers that the 
corrosion of the family, and of moral and mental values indicate an 
intensified crisis. He pointed out that “in the mere demographic trend, the 
West is set to become extinct, since reproduction designates hope and trust 
in the future as well as trust in the partner. These are all spiritual elements 
that are disappearing where instincts such as the sexual drive are moving 
outside the moral and spiritual circle, putting an end to marriage, 
childbearing, motherhood, fatherhood… and legitimising everything, even 
what’s called “new forms of family”. This process, which is approved of by 
some European democracies, is described by al-Gannushi as the 
“democratic degradation” of the world of values in favour of world of 
material benefits and production. The deterioration of these values is, he 
says, accelerating as secularisation spreads.  
Turning to the international arena, al-Gannushi says that Western 
democracies were initially established on a structural defect - the idea of 
the nation state - which has served to involve the more mature democracies 
in destructive colonial wars and the extermination of peoples and 
civilisations. The most recent of these are the moral scandals caused by the 
American army and its allies through its use of secret and public jails to 
incarcerate innocent people. Besides, he says, “Western democracies 
support the worst regimes in the world, at the expense of those peoples’ 
ambitions to win liberty and democracy, when it suits their interests”. 
Ali El-Arid added a slightly different nuance, stating: “If the Western 
democracies produced problems such as family break-up, drug problems POLITICAL ISLAM | 53 
 
and addiction… these negative factors are also present in dictatorial 
countries, and in poor as well as rich ones”.  
Al-Kousseiby also disagrees with al-Gannushi, defending the 
Western democratic model, which remains standard. In his view it is 
difficult to identify direct and negative results. However, he considers that 
the “the defence of the minorities’ ideologies and their religious rights need 
to be developed beyond the Christian cultural cadre, with a universal 
vision overlooking colour, sex, ideology or place of origin”. In order to 
achieve this he proposes “official recognition of other ideologies as part of 
multicultural and multi-ethnic societies, which all seek to live in 
brotherhood with the European citizenship and in a comprehensive 
humanitarian harmony”. 
The European Union position regarding Turkey’s candidacy for 
membership is one of the most disappointing issues for Islamists, with Al-
Jibali citing “double standards”. The opposition to Turkey, despite its 
progress in the domains of liberties and human rights, “confirms that the 
European Union is a Christian association that doesn’t accept peoples who 
are Muslims in their majority”.  
4.4  Views on European Integration 
When Islamists talk about the European Union, they usually compare it to 
the unsuccessful projects of the Arab Union. Al- Gannushi thinks that some 
of the advantages of the European Union’s foundation are “the acceptance 
of the principle of gradual progression, the long-suffering policy and the 
moving of its members as one unit at different speeds. This is seen as high 
rationalisation, contrary to the Arab Union’s experiences of starting with 
total integration, but collapsing very soon in the face of challenges”. Thus, 
he shows an admiration for this model: “Perhaps, the European Union is 
the first one, following the regime of the Islamic Khalifa, to bring together 
under its command this great number of races, languages and religions in a 
magnificent free-wheeling union”. “The supremacy of the European 
Court’s authority over local courts is among the advantages of the Union, 
as well as its economic policy concerning the solidarity of the economies of 
the most powerful countries with those of the less powerful ones, which 
first helped Spain and Portugal, and today helps the countries of Eastern 
Europe”.  
The weak points of the Union, according to al-Gannushi, are “the delay 
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dealing with applications to accede to the Union. Ten members were 
smoothly admitted in one go, even when some were outside the European 
continent, such as Cyprus and Malta, while obstacles are still blocking the 
application of Turkey”. He also argued that the European parliament’s 
authority is restricted, especially whe n  i t  r e q u e s t s  t h a t  E U  g o v e r n m e n t s  
encourage democratic transformation in the Southern Mediterranean 
countries, and cease to support authoritarian regimes.  
El-Arid points to “the formation of a common international European 
political identity”. As for the negative points, he considers that the support 
the Union provided to the non-democratic regimes in the region is due to 
“the exaggerated privilege of interests and the fear of the alleged Islamic 
risk”. Al-Farajani generally agrees with El-Arid. However, he took a 
positive standpoint in declaring that the European Union “represents a 
cultural, scientific and economic power and enjoys a political regime 
characterised by lots of advantages from which we must profit in order to 
develop our educational, political and economic systems”. He affirmed that 
the respect for human rights, which is the cornerstone in the Union’s policy 
“represents a good reference to be followed, and the inclusion of Article 2, 
concerning respect for human rights, stipulated in the partnership 
agreement signed between Tunisia and the European Union is very 
important for us as Islamists”.  
Al-Kousseiby places at the top of the list of positive aspects of European 
policies “the respect for law and the independent judiciary, the equality 
between the politician and the rest of citizens during prosecution, as well as 
the great importance of political studies and research in shaping interior 
and foreign policy orientation”. As for the weak points, he points to “the 
role of money in pressuring electoral competition, which may prejudice the 
selection of representatives of communities and European countries”.  
4.5  Muslim Diasporas 
The Islamic movement’s interest in the Muslim diasporas in Europe and 
the US dates back to the 1970s and 1980s. Some, such as Sheikh Rachid al-
Gannushi, count on them because he thinks that the Islamic presence in the 
West constitutes “an opportunity to develop its thoughts in an advanced 
civilised frame, from which it acquires a huge experience and knowledge 
that it needs”. These Muslim minorities in the West “may get the chance, in 
alliance with liberal local powers, to impact on the politics of these 
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new relations with the Islamic world based on mutual respect, equitable 
interests, support for liberation and democratic transformation”. 
This was al-Gannushi’s standpoint in 2000. However, since the 
September 11 attacks, the Tunisian Islamists and others believe that Muslim 
minorities in Europe are going through a crisis. Ziad Al-Dolatli says they 
“suffer from different levels and forms of oppression”. He expects “the 
situation to explode at some point in the future if the Europeans do not 
become aware of the seriousness of the problem, not only in their 
parliament in Strasbourg, but also in their extremely racist media”. He 
pointed to the issue of headscarves in France and to the concern of 
municipal councils in Denmark over Muslims buying houses. Therefore, he 
explained, the Danish newspapers seek to limit this, for fear of the cultural 
effects on the Danish community. According to Ziad Al-Dolatli “the current 
campaigns aim at isolating the Muslim minorities in Europe, blockading 
them and making them resort to violent acts in order to displace them. This 
does not serve the West’s interests, but on the contrary stirs up the clash of 
civilisations”. 
Al-Jibali has a more positive attitude: “I frankly say, without shyness 
or hesitation, that the Muslim minorities in Europe and the West, in spite of 
the September 11 attacks, are unfortunately entitled to more rights than 
they are in their homes”. Yet, “in spite of the good efforts and positive 
attitudes of many parties in the European civil community, the Muslim 
minorities are increasingly suffering on different levels”. Al-Jibali was more 
forthright: “The minorities are partially responsible for the transgressions, 
the reactions and the negative image in the West’s mind towards Islam and 
Muslims”. Amer El-Arid agrees, underlining that “some Muslim behaviour 
nourishes racist trends and gives them justification before their citizens”. In 
addition, “the declarations of the Pope do not consolidate the fundamentals 
of cohabitation and communication between religions and civilisations”.  
Al-Farajani also avoided generalisations, and confirmed that the 
Muslim minorities in Europe “enjoy lots of rights guaranteed by the law”. 
But he noticed that their situations “vary from one European country to 
another”. He considered that Muslims in Austria, Sweden and Britain for 
instance, enjoy more rights than they do in France, Germany, Greece, 
Denmark, Malta and Portugal”, and that “Muslim minorities do not enjoy 
their rights entirely as provided for by international law, European Union 
law and the World Charter of Human rights”. Kousseiby added another 
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and terrorist attacks, which may occur in any region”. The rights of Muslim 
minorities “still need to be protected by the constitutional and legal texts 
and a new spirit free from feelings of hate”. 
It is thanks to whom that the Muslim minorities in Europe have 
achieved the advantages they now enjoy? Sheikh al-Gannushi says “the 
recent Islamic presence in Europe has become prosperous through 
secularism – which is one of its good features – and not through a 
Christianity that has refused multiplicity alongside its rationalism. 
However al-Gannushi wonders: “Has the situation of Muslim minorities in 
Europe been remedied and settled on the basis of citizenship? This is not 
yet clear. In spite of the dissolution of the churches’ authority – consciously 
or unconsciously - the West is still somehow filled with traits dating back to 
the Middle Ages and to the colonisation wars. There are groups opposing 
Islam such as the extreme left wing and the powerful Zionist lobby. The 
guardians of the Christian and Jewish religions have done nothing to 
recognise Islam as a religion, as Christianity did with Judaism”. 
On the political level, according to al-Gannushi, Western politicians 
“have not been aware of the transformations occurring in Western 
communities which made Islam, for the first time, one of the components of 
Western society. Thus, the Western policy-maker should take this fact into 
consideration in each decision taken with respect to the Islamic world, in 
the same way as s/he does regarding Israel. Tony Blair still refuses to 
admit that the policies adopted towards Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan are 
the main reason for the increase of extremist tendencies and terrorism 
among the Islamic youth in Britain”. Nevertheless, al-Gannushi admits that 
“Western democracy is recognising diversity and citizenship rights, and 
carrying out a wide normalisation process through new generations born in 
the West”. He appealed to Europeans to proceed with “positive 
discrimination” in favour of minorities, and “make the Islamic presence 
useful”. 
4.6  European Union Foreign Policy: Between Rhetoric and Reality 
The Palestine issue and support for non-democratic regimes in the Arab 
world constitute two basic focuses for the evaluation of the Union’s 
policies.  
Ziad Al-Dolatli focused on the attitude of Europe towards the Israeli-
Arab conflict, and its partiality, according to him, towards the Israeli side. 
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people after the election of the Hamas government. A second example 
relates to “the support for Arab rulers despite their injustices and 
despotism”. For him, these two examples give an impression that “the 
main European objective in its policy towards its neighbours is to dominate 
the capacities and fortunes of Arabs, and invade their markets with 
overwhelming competition”. Al-Gannushi questioned the credibility of 
European policy: “Is there a united European foreign policy independent 
from the United States and Israel?” He answers: “This is not evident, 
although Solana takes action everywhere”. He also adds that “it is much 
more realistic to recognise what Donald Rumsfeld called “old Europe” 
versus “new Europe”, or the Europe dependent on the US, led by Britain, 
and the new democracies. There is also another Europe led by France and 
Germany. Al-Gannushi accuses Europe today “of participating in the crime 
of overthrowing the elected government of Hamas in favour of a substitute, 
which Europe knows very well is corrupt, and is dependent on American-
Zionist policy”.  
Concerning the Union’s declaration that it backs democracy in the 
Arab and Islamic world, al-Gannushi considers that “in fact, this lacks 
credibility”. Yet, he thinks that “the American attitude can be deemed as 
better or less negative, at least at the level of discourse, as the US has 
exerted greater pressure on authoritarian regimes, albeit with unsuccessful 
results due to Zionist interference and the war on terrorism”. 
Consequently, according to him, “Europe is more indulgent and partial 
towards authoritarian regimes”. As, for example, in the Tunisian case, 
where “Europe concluded a partnership agreement with a state in the 
South at a time when it was severely oppressive, according to European 
human rights organisations. In fact, democracy did not play any role in this 
issue. It was nothing but a game of self-interest, including the strategic 
security interest in exterminating Islamists, even if this is achieved at the 
expense of human rights and democracy”.  
Al-Gannushi seems to be equally conclusive regarding this matter. In 
fact, he did not note any good points in Europe’s record. He says: “If we 
search into the history of European foreign policy, there is no page 
regarding morals, enlightenment or democracy... Moreover, some of their 
newspapers support our concerns and disclose the vicious alliance between 
our dictatorial governments and their democratic regimes, which indicates 
a gap in the elites’ representation and that of their peoples”. He pointed to 
opinion polls conducted by the European Union asking which countries 58 | SALAH EDDINE JORSHI 
 
constituted the most dangerous threats to world peace: the answers were 
Israel and the USA.  
In contrast, Mr. Arid has a more moderate standpoint. He noted that 
Europe’s position concerning the Palestinian issue is “more balanced and 
less partial than that of America”. Yet, he thinks that the Union’s policy in 
this respect is hesitant and ineffective for it has feelings of guilt over 
expelling and killing the Jews during World War II. He wishes that the 
European Union would break off its relations with the regimes he considers 
to be despotic, yet he does not want to be misunderstood as “supporting 
interference in national affairs”. Democratisation “shall be nationalistic and 
non-compulsory, and the interior problems must be resolved nationally”. 
As for the function of friendly ties, it resides in “encouraging democracy, 
condemning violations and injustice, respecting the sovereignty and the 
independence of the nation, and enhancing economic development and 
social justice”. 
Ali El-Arid tried to highlight positive interaction in “the association 
agreement between Tunisia and the European union, in spite of the 
disequilibrium between them”. Eighty percent of exports and imports are 
exchanged with the Union, in addition to half a million immigrants, not to 
mention the fact that the tourists who visit Tunisia are mostly European. 
Tunisia has “got grants, loans and some facilities in order to establish 
foreign companies, make investments and develop agriculture. The EU 
looks at the South as nothing more than a market to which it exports its 
goods and from which it imports its wealth. It also considers it as a security 
threat because it borders poor countries which are overpopulated, 
overloaded with debt and governed by authoritarian regimes. Therefore, 
the Union fears immigration, the instability and the terrorism it expects”. 
El-Arid understands the transformation in the Union’s policy as replacing 
partnership agreements with “a more strict policy dealing with each 
country on a case-by-case basis under the Neighbourhood Policy”. But he 
believes that the success of the new policy depends on two conditions; 
changing the security/commercial orientation and considering the 
Southern states as true partners. 
Hamadi Al-Jibali seemed more realistic in considering that the 
European Union has made the right decision, at least theoretically, by 
establishing a global partnership with its neighbours and determining 
terms and priorities. However, he wondered: “What is our role in this 
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set up a permanent and strong common foreign policy, based on the 
powers of its member states”. Although he supports the policy of 
partnership, he has many reservations about some of its contents. He 
criticises, in particular, the Tunisian regime for “rushing to sign a 
partnership agreement unbalanced towards the Tunisian economy 
separately and without the knowledge of the Maghreb Union”. He 
wondered: “How could Tunisia open its markets to European industrial 
products, while Europe closes its market to Tunisian agriculture, which 
represents the most vital sector in employing great numbers of Tunisian 
manpower? Europe excessively promotes its own rural products, and does 
not abide by the free market rules that symbolise its system of economic 
liberalism”. He added: “We call for the re-examination of the partnership 
agreement so that it becomes more conducive to a rural renaissance, which 
might eliminate unemployment and poverty in order to effectively tackle 
the problem of illicit immigration to Europe”. 
As for Amer El-Arid, he praised the Neighbourhood Policy stating 
that “it is unavoidable due to the geographic situation, the importance of 
history and common interests”. “We are for a partnership policy grounded 
in mutual respect, the exchange of benefits, the promotion of human 
principles, dialogue and the exchange of cultures among civilisations”. 
4.7  The Perception of Europe as defending Moderate Islamists 
When we asked al-Gannushi, as a political refugee resident in Britain, 
about the European Union’s defence of Islamists’ political rights, he replied 
immediately: “For me, there are no defects in the Union states’ policy 
regarding Islamist refugees, except in enacting laws against terrorism”. He 
added: “In general, the policy of Union member states regarding Islamist 
refugees is helpful, as they resisted requests from Arab dictatorships that 
wanted to prevent their Islamist opponents from taking refuge in these 
states, even when these requests were repeated during the crucial period 
following the events of September 11”. He added: “They failed to achieve 
their aim to have all Islamists put on terrorist lists and delivered to their 
countries of origin. Moreover, many of those Tunisians have been able to 
attain passports and nationalities from the states in which they took refuge. 
Some of their family members have achieved high academic qualifications, 
or joined the labour market, while others have kept on struggling for their 
cause in their homelands”. He also commended the European Union 
countries for distinguishing between Islamic groups advocating violence 
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fabricated by the security services of their home countries, although some 
security services are cooperating with their Tunisian counterparts in 
accusing the Renaissance Movement of terrorism”. He is glad that his 
Movement was not included on any of the terrorism lists in European 
countries, or in the wider world, except in Tunisia.  
However, Hamadi Al-Jibali, who has just been released from prison, 
regretted that the European Union did not defend the political rights of 
Islamists. He judged that the Union member states have different policies 
on this. He believes that the Mediterranean European states, which have a 
historical relationship with Tunisia, “were those inside the Union that 
defended the dictatorial regimes most, and that tried to deprive the 
moderate Islamic movements of their legal right to exist as political parties 
with popular support”. At the same time he recognised that some other 
European states adopted “more moderate and pragmatic positions for the 
sake of their principles and interests”.  
4.8  European Efforts to support Democracy in the Region 
When the Tunisian opposition parties are asked about their evaluation of 
the European Union’s efforts to support democracy in the Southern 
Mediterranean states, they often reply negatively, most notably in the 
context of the repression and exclusion that have been experienced in 
recent times. Al-Gannushi replied briefly that Union countries supported 
despotism. Ziad Al-Dolatli traces this to the fact that Europe “deals with 
the Arab World as if it is the coloniser and the owner of the truth, 
considering the Western model as the only one to be followed to achieve 
development”. Therefore, “Europe is supporting corruption and despotism 
to preserve its material interests and making alliances with those who 
adopt its model of civilisation, despite the failure of all cultural invasion 
attempts”. Amer El-Arid was less severe in his criticism, saying: “Europe 
supports democracy and has wide experience in this respect. But 
unfortunately, many dictatorial Arab regimes depend on European 
support, but can stick to their policies anyway as the European countries 
need them”. Al-Jabali invites Europe “to be coherent with its principles and 
slogans, such as the protection of liberties and human rights”. Al-
Kousseiby could not find anything positive in European policy, because it 
is governed by a strict dualism: “It backs democracy at home, yet beyond 
its frontiers it gives priority to its economic and cultural interests, 
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Al-Farajani considered that “the European Union’s problem is that 
democracy and human rights are not always compatible with its interests… 
yet it does not realise that the principles of democracy and human rights 
represent the essence of its interests, because the instability in the Islamic 
and Arab world is due to despotism, injustice and corruption”.  
According to al-Gannushi, Islamists feel that Europe has a definite 
influence in the region, but “in the wrong way”. He gave many examples. 
The first is often reiterated by Islamists, and is related to the 1990s Algerian 
crisis. “If Europe had not backed up those who crushed the ballot boxes 
with their tanks in 1992, Algeria would not have passed through the misery 
it still suffers”. 
A second example concerns Tunisia, where he condemned Europe for 
backing the regime of President Ben Ali in the 1990s and agreeing to make 
a partnership agreement with it. Al-Gannushi said that the democracy and 
human rights crisis in Tunisia would not have persisted and worsened if 
Europe had not supported this regime.  
In the third example, he cited the “continuous support of Europe for 
Israel”. He said that Europe played the primary role in planting this 
tumour in the core of Islam and then developing it before conferring its 
guardianship to the United States. 
Amer El-Arid meanwhile acknowledged that European Union policy 
has an influential impact on the evolution of the Islamic Arab states, but 
“we request that Europe abide by its slogans and principles”. Al-Farajani 
affirms the contrary, that the Union’s policy has only limited influence on 
the region, “thanks to the fact it has strengthened its historical relationships 
with economically corrupt governments and political despots, as well with 
the elites”. Al-Kousseiby agrees with the idea that the Union is weak, due 
to “the absence of political will in determining its objectives, as well as the 
slyness and the ability of the Islamic world’s regimes to resort to the 
foreign sophism, forgery and the tricky political marketing”. 
4.9  Cooperation with Europe  
The leaders of the Renaissance Movement adhere to the principle of 
cooperation with Europe, but Amer El-Arid considers it as “swinging 
between hope and fact, and between principles and interests”. “On the one 
hand we, like many liberal powers in Europe, think that this cooperation is 
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despotic governments use this cooperation in order to guarantee their 
continuity at the expense of the will of their citizens”.  
Al-Kousseiby is optimistic about future relations between Europe and 
the Islamic world. In fact, he believes that this future will be promising 
even though “it is impeded by many obstacles and difficulties, due to the 
repressive regimes which see it as a political and financial cash cow whose 
milk must always flow even by sneaky and tricky means”. 
As for the potential for cooperation between both parties, the 
Renaissance Movement’s cadres fail to propose clear and practical plans. 
Al-Gannushi considered that there are numerous areas for cooperation, the 
most important of which would be the protection of the common 
Mediterranean environment, “the womb that embraces all of us”. But he 
insisted on first of all asking Europe to recognise Islam and to “stop 
excluding it and interpreting it as it likes”. He also added that “it is 
disappointing to find people in America who call for the recognition of an 
Islamic world governed by Islamic moderate movements, even though they 
are dominated by Zionist lobbies, while Europe, which is closer to us, is 
more inflexible towards Islamic movements, even the most moderate, such 
as the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development, the Renaissance 
Movement and the Muslim Brothers.  
Amer El-Arid tried to be both practical and strict. He defined four 
essential and possible fields of cooperation: managing dialogue and 
removing all elements of hate and violence; supporting aspirations for 
reform, development, education and scientific research; establishing clear 
political relations; and encouraging the principles of cohabitation, tolerance 
and the prevention of violence. 
For Al-Kousseiby cooperation can “enclose all life’s aspects and 
activities”. Yet it seems he gives priority to avoiding “prejudgments and 
confusion provoked by the ignorance of other civilisations and the 
fabrications of some authoritarian governments or some of their extremist 
or corrupted wings”.  
Sayed Al-Farajani believes that cooperation may include all fields, 
including “security and defence”. In this respect, he said: “We refuse to be 
the tool used to threaten the security of Europe, or a crossroads for drugs or 
clandestine immigration; we refuse to be a power of hostility in the name of 
Islam against Europe or Christianity, Judaism or the non-religious 
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Al-Farajani supported Amer El-Arid’s proposals, while formulating 
his own as follows: “Our Movement and the European Union should agree 
to: establish official political relations, activate Article 2 of the partnership 
agreement between Europe and Tunisia; realise a dialogue in all domains; 
establish a centre for Islamic and European studies and research, in which 
Islamic and European academic researchers interact and aid cooperation 
between the European Union and the Islamic Movement; and determine a 
common view on how to tackle the problems of terrorism, clandestine 
immigration to Europe, despotism and the Tunisian development process. 
Conclusions 
Throwing the ball into the European court, Hamadi Al-Jibali affirmed the 
Renaissance Movement’s deep interest in opening a debate with Europe, 
considering that any cooperation process “necessitates an honest will for 
cooperation, a mutual trust and sincerity for the benefit of both parties”. 
Al-Jibali meanwhile refuses to be forced to choose between “a special 
relationship with Europe and belonging to the civilisation of Arabism, 
Islam and Africa”. Al-Jibali agrees with those who nominate Tunisia as “a 
link and a bridge extended between the two banks of the Mediterranean 
and two deep-rooted civilisations”.  
Our interviews reveal that the Renaissance Movement leadership and 
a large number of independent Islamists are ready to cooperate with the 
European Union and its different bodies. However, the Renaissance 
Movement is mainly interested in being recognised by Europeans as a 
legitimate party in the Tunisian arena. The Movement appreciates the 
protection and asylum granted to some of its members, yet asks Europe to 
exert pressure on the Tunisian government to release its prisoners and 
recognise it legally as an opposition party.  
Throughout these conversations it becomes apparent that the 
Renaissance Movement does not have a substitute for the current 
government policies on relations with the European Union. This does not 
mean that there is no discord between the two parties. In essence the 
M o v e m e n t  w o u l d  g e n e r a l l y  b e  i n  f a v o u r  o f  a  m a r k e t  e c o n o m y  w i t h o u t  
restricting its openness to Europe. The potential modifications or changes 
that the Renaissance Movement might undertake in the constitutional, legal 
and social domains are still ambiguous to politicians, researchers, and 
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While awaiting the latest developments and reactions from within the 
Tunisian arena, an increasing number of the Renaissance Movement 
leaders have declared that they still work towards achieving democracy. 
Moreover, any cooperation between the European Union and Tunisian 
Islamists, who believe in the importance of this relationship, will greatly 
affect future developments. 
  
| 65 
 
 
5.  POLITICAL ISLAM IN EGYPT 
EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN 
Introduction 
Drawing on results from a survey among members of the Muslim Brothers 
and the Wasat Party, this chapter looks at changes in Egyptian political 
Islam and examines the views of mainstream Islamists of the European 
Union policies and initiatives in the Mediterranean. The discussion focuses 
on the Muslim Brothers, the country's main opposition force, and the Wasat 
Party, as purporting to represent an evolving Islamic centrist orientation. 
Despite their seemingly different orientations, the commonalities between 
the two groups regarding their views of the EU far outweigh their 
differences. Their shared Islamic frame of reference and a perceived 
inconsistency of EU policies in the region largely explain this similarity. 
5.1  Changes in Egyptian political Islam 
The landscape of political Islam in Egypt has changed dramatically over the 
past decade and a half. Since the mid-1990s, the country’s mainstream 
Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or Muslim Brothers), has 
undergone a significant transformation; an Islamist centrist party, Hizb al-
Wasat, has emerged and for the past ten years has been struggling to 
acquire official recognition; and the country’s radical movements, 
especially the Jama`a Islamiya, have reassessed some of their tactics.  
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement 
of the twentieth century (established in 1928) and perceives itself as “the 
mother of all centrist Islamist movements”. It is an activist movement with 
a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensional spheres 
that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is 
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synthesised version of earlier reform movements (such as Salafi reformism 
and Islamic modernism) and can claim to be the heir of ‘reformist Islam’.66 
It has adopted a gradualist bottom-up approach to change that seeks to re-
socialise society along Islamic lines: the individual, family, society, and 
then the state. The Brotherhood is also one of the most institutionalised 
movements in Egypt. Its structure has survived the lifetime of its founder, 
Hassan Al-Banna (1906-49), despite suffering repeated phases of brutal 
regime repression. All this has generated a particular political orientation 
that is characterised by caution, gradualism, slow adaptation, and fear of 
experimentation and failure. In the movement’s view, failure will not 
simply reflect on the leadership of the group at a particular moment, but on 
the entire movement. It could even affect the fortunes of political Islam as 
an alternative to post-independence and foreign-inspired secular models. 
Therefore, preserving the survival and structural coherence of the 
movement has always been a top priority. It is an objective that has for long 
has dominated the Brotherhood’s political calculations and levels of 
interaction in the political process, and enabled the movement to exhibit a 
pragmatic attitude whenever the circumstances warrant it. 
In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has revised its political 
strategies and policy orientations. To many observers, it seems as if it has 
made a clear and deliberate departure from its traditionally cautious 
approach. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Muslim Brothers rejected 
the idea of getting directly involved in the political process, participating in 
the parliament, or taking part in the trade unions. Their attention was 
mainly focused on rebuilding the organisation’s structures and avoiding 
confrontations with the regime that might have provoked repression of the 
movement. By the mid-1980s, they gradually began to participate in 
parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties like the Wafd 
Party in 1984 and the Labour Party in 1987. They also contested elections in 
the trade unions and succeeded in gaining control over many of the latter 
during the 1990s. After 2000, the Muslim Brothers adopted an increasingly 
assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime and took on a 
pragmatic reform agenda. This change became more marked in early 2005, 
when the Muslim Brotherhood insisted on reasserting their presence in the 
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political process, defied regime bans on their demonstrations and even 
threatened ‘civil disobedience’. They also cooperated with other political 
forces that did not share their ideological perspectives and jointly formed 
reform-oriented fronts. 
All these developments emerge from a long history of major 
revisions, introduced gradually since the mid-1990s. These revisions were 
clearly reflected in the movement’s documents in 1994, its electoral 
programme of 1995, its Reform Initiative of 2004, and its electoral 
programme of 2005. They are also reflected in a seemingly consistent vision 
among the movement’s leadership of reform and the means by which to 
achieve this reform. In essence, the documents and statements reassert a 
commitment to the civic nature of political authority, notwithstanding their 
adherence to the principles of the sharia and respect for the basic values 
and instruments of democracy; respect for public freedoms; acceptance of 
pluralism; transfer of power through ‘clean’ and free elections; sovereignty 
of the people; separation of power; rejecting the use of violence and 
adopting gradual and legal means to achieve reform; acceptance of 
citizenship as the basis for rights and responsibilities for Muslims and non-
Muslims; and support of human rights, including those of women and the 
Copts.67 
The changes could be ascribed to developments within the movement 
itself and in the Egyptian political process in general. By the end of the 
1980s, the Muslim Brothers were able to rebuild their structures and better 
position themselves to engage in the political process and interact with 
other political actors. A relatively young generation of Islamists with 
different political experiences and a more proactive political culture joined 
the movement and gradually managed to influence its orientations. In 1995 
the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a split within its ranks, which 
underscored the need for change. Several young members, later to form the 
Wasat Party, broke away in protest at the movement’s lack of ideological 
clarity and rigid leadership style. The ascendancy of Mahdi Akef as the 
General Guide in 2004 also contributed to changes in the movement’s 
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strategies and orientations. Akef does not shy away from politics and is 
known to side with the views of the movement’s younger generation.  
By the end of the 1990s, the MB had concluded that its policy of 
trying to accommodate the regime’s restrictions and absorb its repression 
was not having the desired placatory effect, as the regime systematically 
continued to crack down on the movement and its active leadership and 
members. Within the larger political arena, Egypt was also changing. The 
regime’s legitimacy and popularity was eroding. To contain increasing 
popular dissatisfaction with its performance and stagnation, it began to 
allow some political opening that generated pro-reform movements and 
new political actors. As the largest organised political force, the Muslim 
Brothers had to adapt quickly to this changing environment to safeguard 
their influence from newly emerging pro-reform groups (like Kifaya and 
others). The Brothers’ adoption of a reformist agenda and a more pragmatic 
strategy paid off, as they emerged after the parliamentary elections of 2005 
as the largest opposition force, capturing 20% of parliamentary seats. The 
Brothers’ remarkable performance was a result of long years of reasserting 
their presence at the public level, their direct engagement with the people, 
an appealing and pragmatic reform agenda, and their willingness to 
confront the regime and pay the price of their defiance. 
At the same time, the MB had to contend with a new rival, in the 
form of the Wasat Party. Some observers suggest that if Wasat policies 
were combined with MB structures the century-old quest for a 
programmatic mainstream Islamic modernism could be resolved. The 
Brotherhood certainly has the numbers and discipline, while the Wasat has 
a centrist vision and a young leadership, but without a wide following. The 
origins of the Wasat date back to the mid-1990s, when a group of young 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood split because of differences in 
orientations and in protest at internal organisational rigidity within the 
movement. They formed a party and applied for a licence three times, in 
1996, 1998 and 2004, to the regime-dominated Party Formation Committee. 
Each time, the party’s request was denied. The founders pursued their case 
through the judicial channels, which have also repeatedly denied them 
recognition; the reason given was that the party’s programme was not 
sufficiently distinguishable from those of already existing political parties. 
In fact, the Wasat’s programme does present a new orientation. It is a 
civic political party with an Islamic reference that attempts to appeal to 
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distinction between politics and religious proselytising (da`wa). It presents 
Islam as a cultural framework that can assimilate the religious aspirations 
of Muslim Egyptians and the natural cultural affiliations of the country’s 
Copts. In fact, several founding members of the party were Copts. 
According to its programme, the party’s vision of Islam is based on three 
fundamental pillars: citizenship that provides equal rights for Muslims and 
non-Muslims; the right of all citizens to assume all public positions; and 
coexistence with other cultures on the basis of respect for cultural 
specificities, justice and equality, interdependence and mutual interests. 
The Wasat has reconfirmed its unequivocal commitment to peaceful and 
legal change and to the fundamental democratic principles of: sovereignty 
of the people; separation of powers; transfer of power; citizenship; freedom 
of belief; political and intellectual pluralism; full equality between men and 
women; freedom of expression; and respect for human rights. The Wasat 
also seeks to implement the principles of the sharia through democratic 
means, through a selective and modernist process that, while achieving the 
objective of the sharia, would lead to the development and progress of 
society.68 
5.2  The Islamists and the European Union 
In order to ascertain the views of the Muslim Brothers and the Wasat Party 
on European Union policies, questionnaires were sent to 20 members in 
Cairo between September and October 2006, including the leadership of the 
two movements and a number of rank and file members. The 
questionnaire, in Arabic, appears in annex B of this book. Members of the 
Muslim Brothers consulted included: Deputy General Guide Muhammad 
Habib; members of the Guidance Bureau Abd al-Moneim Abul-Foutouh, 
Mahmud Ghozlan and Muhammad Sami; member of the Press Syndicate 
Board Ali Abd al-Fattah; Ibrahim Houdaiby, a Western-educated and 
active member; and a member of the Political Office who wished to remain 
anonymous.69 Members of the Wasat Party included Abul-`Ula Madi, 
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representative of the founders; and leading members Amr Farid and 
Hossam Khalaf.70  
5.3  Europe’s democratic model 
There is a diversity of opinion amongst Egyptian Islamists regarding the 
West and Europe as democratic models, but it is still possible to discern 
common elements. Recently, many leading Islamists have explicitly 
declared their commitment to democracy, but they frequently distinguish 
between democracy as a system of values and democracy as a policy-
instrument. Most Islamists have no problem with the latter; the issue is 
with some of the values on which the Western model of democracy rests. 
On the one hand, there seems to be agreement on recognising 
European democracy as a model, but one that is particularly for Europeans. 
There is also a feeling that the democratic values in this model are often 
contradicted by European practice and policies in the region. Muhammad 
Habib, Deputy General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, views Europe as 
representing a model of democracy which “is particular to European 
societies only. This model is often disregarded when Europe interacts with 
the Arab and Islamic worlds”. It is driven by “the interests of European 
states that do not object to supporting repressive regimes and do not accept 
the outcomes of democracy [in the region]”. For Abd al-Moneim Abul-
Foutouh, member of the Guidance Bureau, “Europe presents a model of 
democracy from a Western perspective”. He also identifies a number of 
positive elements in this model: “the freedom of expression is guaranteed, 
in general. Human rights are respected. There is also a genuine respect for 
the opinion and will of the people. In most cases, the people elect the 
government they want to represent them. And they can hold that 
government accountable”. Muhammad Sami, also member of the Guidance 
Bureau, agrees, “Yes, for its own citizens in their respective countries. As 
for us and for our Arab and Islamic causes, it does not represent a 
reference; their model has no democracy or justice for us”. Ibrahim el-
Houdaiby, a Western-educated active member, views Europe as presenting 
a certain model of democracy: 
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In the sense that the people do choose who rules in free, fair, and 
democratic elections. These elected governments are, for the most 
part, accountable to the people who elected them. Furthermore, 
there is a general respect for human rights, at least within the 
Union, and there are real, pro-democracy movements that work to 
overcome the problems of democracy. Yet, most important is that 
the EU has one of the most significant benefits of democracy which 
is the self-reforming system that allows those who see real 
problems with the system to change it from within. Nonetheless, 
the EU is not the only model of democracy, as there are different 
models in the world. As the Middle East takes other steps towards 
democracy there could be more models. It is important to 
understand that the real tenets of democracy are accountability 
and answerability. That is: a democracy is real when it is 
governing on behalf of the country’s people, according to an 
agenda they accept, and is accountable to and removable by these 
people.  
Some views are more qualified. In the words of Mahmud Ghozlan, 
member of the Guidance Bureau, Europe “does not present a model of 
democracy for me”. Similarly, Ali Abd al-Fattah, member of the Press 
Syndicate Board, qualifies his answer by saying that “Europe does not 
present an ideal model for democracy”.71  
Wasat views of Europe as a democratic model were largely positive. 
Abul-`Ula Madi, representative of the Wasat founders, responded with an 
unqualified, “Yes”; Amr Farid, “Yes, with some reservations”; and Hossam 
Khalaf, “Yes, with regards to the electoral system and the transfer of 
power”. 
5.4  Reservations about Europe’s democratic model 
All Islamists expressed some reservations about the European model of 
democracy, especially the relationship between the latter and Islamic 
precepts, as well as to some European policies that violate democratic 
practices. For Abul-Foutouh, “the West is preoccupied with material issues. 
Its democracy looks at the human being as a material entity. It overlooks 
the spiritual aspects that are there and cannot be denied”. He also expresses 
reservations about the state-money-media nexus, 
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[T]he exploitation of the government and economic institutions of 
the media to influence public opinion in a specific direction. As 
was the case in Britain during the war on Iraq, when they 
convinced the public of the weapons of mass destruction issue and 
that Iraq represented a danger to world security and stability (…) 
In some cases, this democracy is marred by issues such as 
discrimination against some segments of society, despite the fact 
that this contradicts the democratic principles that stand against 
discrimination. 
Ghozlan is more explicit about the philosophical differences between 
the European and Islamic models. For him, 
[U]ltimate sovereignty in Western democracy belongs to the 
people, and that gives them the right to legislate anyway they 
want, regardless of what is considered from a shar`i point of view 
as  halal (licit) or haram (illicit), or even if it contradicted moral 
principles, such as not to commit adultery, homosexuality, alcohol, 
and gambling (…) All these are deplorable issues, but still are 
considered legal in the West.  
Habib explained that “The EU places freedom before justice. We try 
to balance the two. We want to strike a balance between the rights of the 
individual and the rights of society”. Most of the interviewees pointed to 
issues where Islamists and the EU differ on human rights, such as female 
inheritance, the rights of homosexuals and sexual freedom. Ghozlan opines 
that, 
[O]ur vision of human rights is based on Islam which, centuries 
before Europe knew human rights, has approved these rights in 
the most perfect way and to the largest extent. Whereas Islam 
approved the rights of the individual, it did not consider them as 
absolute. It balanced between those rights and the rights of the 
society. Europe’s vision of human rights, on the other hand, is 
based on the philosophy of individualism which takes the side of 
individual interest over society’s interest.  
Egyptian Islamists also invariably think that European democracy is 
compromised by the nature of some EU external policies. Ghozlan, for 
instance, refers to certain European policies that for him contradict 
democracy: 
Its [European] unjust policies towards popular resistance 
movements, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and categorises them 
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law double standards. While the West supports the Zionist entity 
and overlooks its possession of nuclear weapons and avoids a 
confrontation with North Korea, it besieges Iran for trying to 
develop a nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, and not 
nuclear weapons. [It] supports dictatorial systems in the Arab 
world, while besieging the government of Hamas, which has been 
democratically elected, in order to bring it down (…) Western 
democracy works for the dominance of one people over others or 
the control over the markets, or the seizure of land, or the 
monopoly over the oil resources. For all this, it wages wars, spills 
blood under false pretexts. The best evidence for that is what is 
happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, and the sanctions 
that the Congress and the House of Commons issue to punish 
certain states. 
Similarly, Muhammad Sami’s reservations focus on policies. Europe 
lacks a normative influence “because of the double standard through which 
Europe addresses our just causes in Palestine, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan and others. Europe stands with the aggressor and does 
not defend the wronged. It wrongly takes the side of Israel. It does not 
seriously advocate human rights”. The latter point is shared by the member 
of the Political Office who points to the “discrimination against Muslims in 
European countries”. According to Houdaiby: 
The intellectual and philosophical pillars of democracy… are not 
the same in the EU and the Middle East…. For instance, 
democracy in the West in general, or at least as I regard it, is a 
problem-solving mechanism that aims at resolving the problems 
between different individuals in society by guiding them to form 
alliances based on interests, and then to compete for power to 
protect or pursue their interests. This creates an interest-based 
society where people pursue the interests of their ethnic, religious, 
economic or social groups rather than the interests and well-being 
of the society as a whole. Democracy, or ‘Shura’ in the Islamic 
philosophy, is not merely a problem-solving mechanism that is 
used to prevent conflicts within society. Rather, it is an ethic that 
consultation should take place before taking any decision. 
Therefore, the mindset of the voter is different, as he seeks the 
well-being of the ‘umma’ at large, even if that runs against his own 
personal interests or objectives. This means that votes going to 
different groups is not due to differences in interest, but due to 
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society as a whole….[and]… there is a balance between the 
interests of the individual and the society’. 
5.5  Comparing Europe and the United States  
Egyptian Islamists perceived there to be major differences between the 
European and American models of democracy. They invariably favoured 
the European model, mainly because of the influence of money and the 
media over American democracy. Habib saw the major differences as lying 
in “the use of money, corporate politics, and the media. All play a major 
role in American democracy. Furthermore, the average American is not 
politicised in general”. Abul-Foutouh considers “the American model, in 
general, to be very pragmatic and more materialistic than the European 
model”. Despite the fact that Ghozlan saw “no difference between the two 
models with regards to their philosophical basis”, he claims that 
[T]he difference I see is the greater influence of money and media 
in the American model. This is clearly perceived in the impact of 
lobbies that finance election campaigns, the policies followed by 
the administration, and especially the fact that the American 
people are not politically aware. 
Houdaiby makes a rather detailed comparison between the two 
models of democracy: 
The US model of democracy is inefficient, and maybe designed to 
be so. It is a model in which the checks and balances within the 
system, as well as the relationship between the federal government 
and the state governments, prevent any government from making 
any acute change in policy… The US President does not need to 
have the approval of the people in many cases… He is not elected 
directly by the people in many ways, and can hardly be removed 
by the people, or even their representatives in Congress. Most of 
the systems in the EU … tend to be more representative. People 
directly elected the government… Different governments, in such 
systems, can implement significantly different policies if they 
enjoy enough public support to come to power with a 
fundamentally different agenda, as has happened in Italy and 
Spain lately. This is partially because of the differences in party 
systems in the US and the EU. In the US, there are no clear cut 
differences between the ideologies of Democrats and Republicans 
on most issues….In the EU, the situation is different as there are 
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priorities. Most of these political parties have well-developed 
ideological and philosophical frameworks within which they 
move, but they continue to uphold their principles. In the US, 
political parties tend to be more pragmatic, and care less about 
ideology.  
Most interviewees clearly favoured the European model. Ali Abd al-
Fattah, characterises the European model as “less unfair and less 
discriminatory than the American model. The unfair characteristics of the 
American model appear clearly in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and the 
unequivocal support for the Zionist entity”.  
All the Wasat members articulated preference for the European 
model. For Madi, “the European model is more pluralistic and more 
profound than the American model”. Amr Farid explained that, “the 
European model is more credible than the American one. It is not based on 
excessive fundraising during election time, as is the case in the US for 
example”. As for Khalaf, he sees the European model to be, “based on a 
more cultured people than that of the US”. 
5.6  Muslim minority rights within Europe 
The interviews carried out with Egyptian Islamists revealed that concern 
has grown over what is perceived to be discrimination in at least some 
member states against Muslim minorities. Habib asserted that on this issue 
“each European state is different. However, there is clear racism in dealing 
with certain issues as in the case of France and Britain”. Ghozlan, on the 
other hand, attested to clear violations of Muslim rights throughout 
Europe,  
[I]t is clear that they are treated in a discriminatory way not only 
when it relates to their political, social, and economic rights, but 
also as they are widely exposed to securitisation and detentions 
merely on suspicions. Above all, there is suppression of their 
religious rights as they ban Muslim women and girls from wearing 
the veil and dismiss them from their jobs and schools, and attack 
their beliefs. 
The issue of the veil evokes immediate criticism. Muhammad Sami 
contends that, “Europe does not tolerate seeing a veil on the head of a 
Muslim girl in public schools”. For him this is an indication that “Europe’s 
democracy lags behind [in terms of] Muslims’ rights”. Abd al-Fattah also 76 | EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN 
 
does not consider Muslims in Europe to enjoy equal or full rights. “Their 
conditions run contrary to the principles of human rights”, he asserts. 
Abul-Foutouh expressed some degree of optimism: “The West and 
democracy have adopted citizenship as the basis for rights and 
responsibilities. Therefore, the crisis of minorities, Muslims or non-
Muslims, should presumably dissipate. What is happening otherwise is the 
result of [mistaken] practices”. Madi makes clear distinctions between 
European countries on this issue. “There are differences in the positions of 
European countries with regards to the rights of Muslim minorities. The 
United Kingdom is better than the Netherlands. Germany has not 
recognised Islam as a religion until now”. On the other hand, another 
Wasat member, Farid, links certain European policies to racism. “Racism 
continues to dominate European policies. This is evident through the rights 
of Muslim minorities in Europe (Germany, France), and the countries that 
have a high percentage of Muslims. It is also clear in the way Europe 
handles the Turkish case and its application to join the EU”. Khalaf shifts 
the focus to the Muslims themselves. “There are rights that might be 
threatened, but I am not sure whether this is because the Muslims are 
reluctant to request them or because they cannot request them”. 
5.7  Islamists and EU policies in the Mediterranean: Where is the 
EU? 
It is strikingly evident that the majority of Islamists have no strong 
awareness of EU policies and initiatives in the Mediterranean. The 
following reasons were emphasised by different Islamists for their lacking a 
clear idea of the EU’s Mediterranean policy: 
-  The EU’s policy itself is not clear or transparent;  
-  the EU does not have a strong enough political presence or an 
influential role in the region;  
-  the diversity and inconsistency of European policy towards the 
Mediterranean;  
-  there have been no tangible results or benefits from the 10-year old 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP);  
-  EU interests to regain its lost power in the region undermine 
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-  the dependence of European policy on the US’s agenda, even if this 
agenda is against the people’s preferences, the examples of Iraq, 
Palestine, and Lebanon being good cases in point;  
-  the EU’s association of Islam and the Islamists with terrorism and 
extremism; 
-  Europe’s position towards the Muslim minorities in their countries 
and neighbouring states;  
-  the EU has so far thought little of the Islamists: they claim to stand for 
democracy while excluding the Islamists. 
A general complaint was that Islamists had not taken an interest in 
EU policy because of what they judged to be a lack of vision on the part of 
the EU towards Islamists. A common line was: ‘When they make up their 
mind that they want to include us, perhaps we can crystallise our views of 
Europe’. 
Additional reasons attribute this unclear vision to the conditions of 
the Islamists themselves. One respondent listed the problems as, 
[T]he Islamists are not a monolithic entity; they are not yet in a 
position to make decisions and formulate concrete polices; there is 
a scarcity of intellectuals and strategists among the Islamists; weak 
institutionalisation within the Islamic movements; failure to 
include this issue on the agenda of priorities; and the regime’s ban 
on the Islamists having contacts with the outside. 
Egyptian Islamists admit that they have little idea of the details of 
specific EU policies. They show negligible understanding of or interest in 
the details of the Association Agreements or the way in which the EMP is 
being supplemented by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Commenting on the main features of EU policies in general, Habib thinks 
that “the European Union seeks to have its special policies with the Arab 
and Islamic worlds, but the lack of transparency and its susceptibility to US 
policy constitute an obstacle to the [promotion] of solid and correct 
relations”. Abul-Foutouh contends that “as a member of the MB and as a 
political activist, I do not know much of the policies of the EU. This is 
because of the authoritarian regime in Egypt that attempts to prevent 
contacts between the national forces in Egypt and any outside parties in 
order to circumvent any cooperation between the two. They also try 
continuously to prevent outside parties from having a direct knowledge of 
us, so that the regime can be the only source for the image that Europeans 
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policy to be its “dependency on US policy, and lack of independence in its 
decisions”. Abd al-Fattah thinks that “EU policy has exercised a marginal 
role in the Palestinian problem and a marginal role in Lebanon and 
Algeria”. Houdaiby also criticises EU policy for its lack of autonomy from 
the US: 
EU presence and policy in the region has hardly been autonomous 
from that of the US. Therefore, there has been only a minimal need 
to study it. Nonetheless, and since the war on Iraq, the EU has 
been more outspoken in its refusal to blindly adopt US policies in 
the region. It started formulating its own agenda, based on its own 
interests, and not those of the US. I still do not think that the EU’s 
policy in the region is fully developed. This is because the EU has 
not yet fully developed internally, and therefore has not been able 
to synchronise the foreign policies of its members. Also, the EU has 
neither identified clearly its interests and strategic alliances in the 
region, nor has it fully developed political stances on different 
issues. This is because the EU is not yet well acquainted with the 
major political and social players in the region and does not yet 
fully understand the internal dynamics of its societies. 
From Wasat, Madi believes that “Europe tries to play an important 
role in the region, but the US restricts and limits this role, despite the 
importance of the region for Europe as a neighbourhood, interests, and 
source for migration”. Farid considers the European Union to be “very 
sympathetic towards Israel; dependent in most cases (especially the large 
European states) on US policy”. It is also characterised by “racism towards 
Arab and Muslim minorities, even with their neighbours, such as Turkey, 
and ambitions regarding Arab natural resources”. Khalaf realises that EU 
policy “focuses on economic cooperation, which in the end produces a 
greater benefit for the EU because of the economic under-development of 
the Middle East”. 
The perception is strong that the EU is essentially divided. For Abul-
Foutouh, “we cannot talk about a consistent EU policy. Britain’s position is 
different from France’s. Germany sometimes differs from both”. He 
considers this to be a weakness.  
There is a trend currently underway trying to formulate its 
positions and policies away from the influence of the US. This is 
very important. Some EU politicians are beginning to realise that 
they are closer to the Middle East than to the US, because of 
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slow pace of this move inside Europe. I cannot understand why 
many European states have not objected to US policies. I cannot 
understand it when our regimes follow US policies, because they 
are corrupt, repressive, authoritarian, and weak systems. They 
largely depend on the US. Some European states fear steering 
away from US policies, even if this runs against the interests of 
their people.  
Habib considers “the willingness of some European countries to 
stand up for Arab rights” as a strong point in EU policy. Ghozlan identifies 
the weak points in EU policy in “following US polices; the unjust stands 
towards the causes of Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, 
and Iran; hostility towards a real democracy in Palestine; their support of 
dictatorships in the Arab world; and their harmful position towards Islam 
and Muslim minorities in Europe”. Sami feels that some EU states “are 
expressing a willingness to defy US pressures, but the weak point is that 
they submit to secular extremists that agitate against Muslims in Europe”. 
The member of the Political Office sees a number of strong points: 
“availability of financial support; stability of these programmes and clarity 
of their objectives; and good experience of the Europeans about the 
region”. For him, the weak points are: “internal competition among the 
members over the Middle East region; competition with the US; and weak 
political stability in the region”. For Abd al-Fattah, the strong points of 
European policies are: “dialogue with various partners; not giving in to the 
idea of a uni-polar system”. The weakest point for him is the “EU’s 
submission in the end to US policies”. 
Madi regards European policy as “more supportive than the 
American one of the issues of human rights, freedoms, and democracy”. Its 
weakness, however, is that it exhibits “some degree of dependence on the 
policies of the US, especially in the Middle East, taking the side of Israel in 
its policies in most cases”. Farid thinks that European policy “does not 
believe in cultural dialogue, but in exporting European culture” and that 
“the points of strength show only in individual cases, such as Spain’s 
withdrawal of troops from Iraq, but does not come as a consistent collective 
policy as expected from a union”. Khalaf believes that European policy 
“respects public opinion inside, except for the United Kingdom”. Its 
weakness is the “submission to the agenda of the US in some cases as a 
result of US pressures and not out of persuasion”. 
Despite their reservations about EU policy, Egyptian Islamists view 
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policy as seeking domination and control, exhibiting a high propensity for 
the use of force and not respecting international law. The European Union’s 
policy is – they perceive – more understanding of the conditions and needs 
of the region and pays more attention to human rights and political 
freedoms. However, for some Islamists the lines that demarcate the two 
policies are sometimes blurred and narrow. Habib maintains that, “at least 
EU policies do not exhibit hegemonic practices and attempts to dominate 
the world such as those of the US”. For Ghozlan, “The US seeks to build a 
universal empire in this century. It uses its striking military power – 
disregarding the freedoms, lives, and properties of the people. The EU’s 
policy is based on relinquishing the idea of a universal empire of the 19th 
and 20th centuries”. The member of the Political Office considers EU policy 
to be “more understanding of the conditions and needs of the region. It is 
more calm [peaceful]”. Houdaiby believes that the “US no longer cares 
about international law and pursues its illegal interests causing so much 
global violence, while the EU still tends to abide by international law”. 
Madi also makes a distinction between EU and US policies. He sees 
“room for difference and manoeuvrability regarding some issues such as 
Palestine, Iraq, and Iran’s nuclear issue”. The EU pays “more attention to 
the issues of freedom and human rights”. Farid thinks that these 
differences have narrowed over the past two decades. “There were 
differences during the 1980s and 1990s, but now there seem to be 
similarities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At present, the EU’s 
policies follow those of the US in most cases – except in some manoeuvres 
that Russia undertakes for material gains and not out of support for the 
Arab states”. Khalaf considers that “US policies are based on total 
domination in the name of its interests and those of Israel. For European 
countries, their main concern is perhaps economic interests, not total 
domination”. 
5.8  How Europe can support democracy 
Egyptian Islamists are clear that they are not looking for preferential 
engagement from the EU, but rather that European governments act in a 
way that is more consistent and faithful to their commitment to defend 
democratic values. Abul-Foutouh believes that the EU should begin to ”put 
some pressure on regimes to stop their repression and to start respecting 
the human rights of the Islamists and the national opposition”. Ghozlan 
asserts that the “Islamists are not expecting much from the EU in terms of 
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supporting the despotic regimes in the Arab and Muslim worlds”. The 
member of the Political Office believes that “the EU can defend the political 
rights of Islamists as individuals and give the regimes incentives to adopt 
democracy and respect human rights”. Houdaiby does not expect the 
European Union to do anything specific for the Islamists, he claims 
however that “it could serve its strategic interests in the region by 
promoting real democracy. That means that the EU should stop supporting 
the tyrannical, authoritarian, corrupt regimes in the region politically and 
economically, and pressure them to move towards democracy regardless of 
the outcome. It is important to understand that Islamists do not live in 
isolated islands in their societies, but they are living, integral parts of these 
societies. The only way to defend their political rights is to defend the 
political rights of the societies [as a whole]”. Abd al-Fattah thinks it would 
be useful if “the EU supported the cases of public liberties and the 
detainees; the cases of freedom of opinion, expression, and association; and 
the freedom to form political parties”. 
Wasat members also see a possible role for the EU within the larger 
framework of promoting democracy in Egypt. Madi thinks that the EU 
could “push the issue of freedoms, human rights, democratic 
transformation, and independence of the judiciary for all citizens and not 
only the Islamists”. For Farid, the EU’s policy towards the Islamists needs 
to be reconsidered: “Not to deal with them as terrorists, as the Euro-
American media portrays them; not to pressure them to fail as they did 
with Hamas, but to allow them the opportunity to govern; and to respect 
the international conventions and the resolutions of the UN Security 
Council, especially regarding the Palestinian issue”. Khalaf thinks that the 
EU can do more to “encourage the integration of the Islamists into the 
political process”. 
At present, Egyptian Islamists perceive that the EU continues to prop 
up authoritarian regimes in the region, and only supports democracy in 
principle where it does not threaten to bring Islamists to power. At the 
forefront of their minds are the concrete cases where the EU stood against 
democracy (Algeria and the election o f  H a m a s )  a n d  E u r o p e ’ s  s i l e n c e  
towards the frequently fraudulent elections in the region. Abul-Foutouh 
slightly qualifies his critique of the EU, “Until now it still supports 
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we cannot say that it supports democracy”.72 Houdaiby laments the EU’s 
inability to devise a clear strategy regarding democracy in the region: “It is 
clear that the EU has not yet formulated a well-developed vision and 
strategy for dealing with the dynamic political situation in the Middle East. 
Therefore, it seems the EU has decided to take the easy way, and follow the 
American strategy of supporting tyrannical regimes, and allowing only 
minimal margins of freedom that hardly allow for the people’s will to be 
manifested”.  
5.9  Collaboration with Europe? 
Islamists acknowledge the lack of any meaningful levels of cooperation so 
far between their organisations and the European Union. At most, Egyptian 
Islamists have occasionally participated as individuals in workshops or 
conferences on democracy and inter-faith or cultural dialogues with 
independent European counterparts, but not with the EU as such. They 
have no links in their social welfare activities to any EU programmes and 
initiatives in the country. In principle, they welcomed the prospect of 
greater collaboration, but insisted that this should take place on the basis of 
equality, transparency and respect for independence and cultural 
specificities. Abul-Foutouh asserted that, “As Muslim Brothers we 
reconfirm our rejection of receiving financial assistance (…) However, we 
do not object to cooperation as long as it takes place with transparency and 
clarity and on the basis of the existence of common interests for our country 
and for the Union”. 
Reconfirming their rejection of the possibility of receiving direct 
(financial) assistance or grants, the Muslim Brothers and the Wasat suggest 
many areas that could be ripe for cooperation, including: 
•  assistance; educational and cultural areas;  
•  media and tourism; support for non-governmental organisations and 
civil society institutions;  
•  industrial cooperation; trade and industry, research and professional 
training;  
•  vocational movement; the transfer of experience of democratic 
transitions and ways to build serious and effective parties;  
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•  commercial cooperation; and  
•  transferring experience of successful administrative systems. 
Asked whether an Islamist-oriented government in Egypt would be 
likely to close off trade and investment to and from the EU, members of the 
MB and Wasat rejected this possibility. Abul-Foutouh insisted, “On the 
contrary, we will seek to open new channels for trade with everyone. The 
problem is that the Egyptian regime deals with the West as a follower, an 
approach that we reject. We cooperate and interact on the basis of 
equality”. For Abul-Foutouh, equal trade relationships should be based on 
fair terms of trade and a fair market price. Ghozlan explains that “there is 
no need for more caution as long as investments achieve the interests of 
both sides’. Sami also agreed, “….. Free interaction with all is the essence, 
within the framework of mutual respect”. From Wasat, Khalaf specified, 
“we encourage [more trade and investment] as long as it is in the interests 
of our country and is not based on domination and monopoly”. 
Conclusions 
At the level of declaratory policy, the EU seems to realise the importance of 
engaging with moderate Islamists in Egypt, and in the region as a whole, 
for obvious reasons. Political Islam is one of the realities of the region and 
will not dissipate in the near future. It might even play an increasingly 
influential role in future years. The Islamists are major political actors in the 
political process of their respective countries, as demonstrated by the 
performance of the Muslim Brothers in the 2005 parliamentary elections 
and by their strong social presence in Egypt. The Muslim Brothers are 
potentially a major factor for the political stability of the country, especially 
given the looming succession crisis in Egypt. The EU’s declared policy of 
democracy promotion in the region and respect for human rights as a 
means of achieving stability cannot be credible unless the EU supports the 
integration of the Islamists into the political process. Excluding and not 
recognising mainstream Islamists discredits democracy policy and will not 
promote stability. 
Over the past decade and half, the Muslim Brotherhood has 
experienced a remarkable change in its orientation, discourse, and 
strategies. It seems to be gradually moving towards a mainstream 
orientation, yet is clearly Islamic in outlook. Both the Brotherhood and the 
Wasat adhere to Islamic frameworks as the main source for their policy 
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could appeal to a wider audience, by committing themselves to: a reform 
agenda that is shared by the main pro-reform actors; the civic nature of 
authority; citizenship as the basis of equal rights and responsibilities, 
democratic principles and practices, pluralism, the legal means for bringing 
about change and the transfer of power. The leadership of the Muslim 
Brothers is aware of the domestic, regional, and international constraints 
surrounding them, to the extent of admitting publicly that their possible 
coming to power at present would not be in the interests of Egypt.73 Before 
the parliamentary elections of 2005 were over, Khayrat al-Shatir, the second 
Deputy to the General Guide, tried to allay Western fears, urging the West 
that there was, “No need to be afraid of us”.74 Other leading members 
conveyed a similar message.75 Reassurances were also given to the Copts 
and secular elites. Of course, the Islamists will remain the ‘usual suspects’. 
In other words, their ‘intentions’ and commitment to democracy and 
reform will always be questionable to some. But perhaps this issue has 
already gone beyond intentions. The Brothers’ new orientation has been 
included in the movement’s main documents and reiterated in its 
leadership’s public discourses. Through direct engagement, among other 
measures, the level of this commitment can be discerned. 
In their views of the EU and its policies and initiatives in the region, it 
is clear that the MB and Wasat formulate these views on the basis of their 
Islamic framework and in response to their experience of EU policies on the 
ground. At the theoretical level, they acknowledge the different 
philosophical and moral basis behind the European model of democracy 
and they disapprove of some of its aspects. Yet, they are willing to accept it 
as reflecting Europe’s particular historical and political evolution. 
Nevertheless, they clearly view this model as containing many positive 
aspects and they readily express preference for the European model 
compared to that of the US. The Islamists, in turn, expect the EU to look at 
their Islamic model as reflecting a particular historical and cultural 
experience and to coexist with it as a different model. At the level of policy, 
several issues stand out: the EU’s position towards Israel and the 
Palestinian conflict; EU policy towards the freely-elected government of 
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Hamas; the situation in Iraq; the EU’s continued support for autocratic 
regimes; and the rights of Muslim minorities in Europe. Almost all of these 
issues, regardless of Islamists or political Islam, need to be addressed at 
some point if the EU and the US want to ensure stability in the region. 
Despite the criticisms, the leadership of both the Muslim Brothers and the 
Wasat are still hopeful for better cooperation with the EU, at almost all 
levels, and expect this cooperation to increase if they come to power. To 
what extent are these expressed wishes genuine? This question is 
significant enough for the EU to take its declaratory policy a step further 
and engage with the Islamists at practical levels.  
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6.  POLITICAL ISLAM IN LEBANON  
TALAL ATRISSI 
Introduction 
Lebanon hosts one of the Middle East’s most high profile Islamist parties: 
Hezbollah – and one with a uniquely complex set of international relations. 
This chapter reports that Hezbollah’s criticisms of European policies have 
intensified recently. In particular, the party has expressed anger at what it 
sees as the EU’s unconditional support for the Siniora government, against 
Hezbollah’s efforts to ensure a fairer distribution of democratic power 
between Lebanon’s religious communities. Europe does not figure highly 
in Hezbollah’s calculations, compared to the US, Syria and Iran. The 
possible exception here is France, which Hezbollah criticises for having 
become too anti-Syrian since the assassination of Rafik Hariri. There is still 
some residual good-will towards the EU, but a true partnership based on 
democratic principles is seen by Hezbollah as being dependent on certain 
dramatic changes in European strategy first.  
6.1  Hezbollah’s ideological evolution 
Political Islam was unknown in Lebanon until the end of the 1970s. 
Previously, Islamic organisations and associations of the Sunni majority 
undertook primarily religious and educational missions, just like their 
brethren in other parts of the Arab world. These groups had no direct 
impact on Lebanese political life. Hezbollah only emerged after three 
phases of Shiite political development.  
Shiites were socially, politically, and economically marginalised from 
the creation of greater Lebanon in 1923 through to the 1960s. During this 
period, illiteracy was widespread and underdevelopment commonplace in 
southern Lebanon and the Bekaa region (where most Shiites lived). 
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other jobs were only available in the urban suburbs. Emigration to the Gulf, 
Africa and Australia became rampant. Remittances from relatives were the 
principle source of income to help build houses or schools, buy land or pay 
for a child’s education. Shiites felt that they were treated unequally at the 
political level compared to the other main religious groups in Lebanon - 
Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians. Shiites, particularly in southern 
Lebanon, felt increasingly insecure following the creation of the state of 
Israel in 1948 because Israel deported large numbers of Palestinians from 
Israel to Lebanon. Israel used the presence of Palestinian combatants in 
southern Lebanon as justification for repeated military strikes. The 
Lebanese army was unable to protect the Shiites from such attacks. The 
Lebanese Army likewise could not prevent the Palestinians from carrying 
out military operations in/from southern Lebanon. By the late 1960s, the 
majority of Shiite youths and many members of the educated elite had 
joined Marxist, nationalist, communist and radical organisations to protest 
against the poor economic and social conditions facing Shiites. 
The emergence of a Shiite religious personality in the guise of Imam 
Moussa Sadr in the 1960s marked the beginning of a second phase of Shiite 
political development. Imam Moussa established schools and training 
centres, and urged successive governments to focus their development 
efforts on the traditionally underdeveloped regions where the majority of 
Shiites lived. He also founded a Lebanese resistance movement (Amal) to 
defend the South against Israeli attacks. Sadr called for Christian-Islamic 
coexistence, arguing for the abolition of political confessionalism (wherein 
political and administrative offices were divided between religious 
communities based on an agreed upon framework). Imam Sadr opposed 
the civil war that broke out in 1975 and made every effort to stop it until he 
was kidnapped after visiting Libya in 1978. During the civil war, almost 
one thousand Shiites were killed while many others were forced to leave 
the eastern sections of Beirut where they had lived. Some of the displaced 
Shiites returned to their villages in the South or the Bekaa, but the majority 
settled in the southern suburbs of Beirut. This neighbourhood subsequently 
became Hezbollah's headquarters.  
The third phase of Shiite political development began with the 
Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. This was the first revolution with an 
Islamic religious identity in recent history, and marked the first time that 
Shiites had overthrown a regime firmly allied to the US. It was 
understandable that Shiites in Lebanon and other regions were drawn to a 
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invaded Lebanon, reaching Beirut. Southern Lebanon, with its mainly 
Shiite inhabitants, was under occupation. Iran encouraged Shiite Islamic 
groups to fight Israel by giving them money, weapons and training. After 
three years of resistance, these groups were unified, and later named 
Hezbollah.  
The birth of Hezbollah, however, was also driven by other 
developments in Lebanese society, such as increased remittance payments 
from abroad, rising education rates, and the increasing popularity of Amal. 
After 1979, the political-psychological mindset of Lebanese Shiites changed. 
Feelings of isolation, marginalisation and inferiority were replaced by a 
newfound power and a strong desire for political equality. In 2000, 
Hezbollah contributed to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and 
as a result, Hezbollah’s status and reputation as a regional power in the 
Arab world increased. The rise of Hezbollah as an Islamic party also 
contributed to the waning popularity of other ideologically-motivated 
parties within Lebanon.1 
To understand the evolution of Hezbollah’s political doctrine, one 
must begin by analysing its 1985 ‘open letter’ (or constitutive statement). In 
that letter, Hezbollah publicly announced its existence and described its 
identity, which was internationally-focused rather than strictly domestic. It 
emphasised that Hezbollah was “not locked in as an organised party of 
Lebanon … [but is] a nation connected to Muslims all over the world by a 
deep political and ideological link which is Islam, [that] face[s] the 
problems that Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq and Philippines are going 
through according to a basic sharia obligation”.2  
Hezbollah refused to participate in or deal with the Lebanese 
government, which was not based on religious principles or sharia law. 
Hezbollah wanted to alter the government radically, which it considered 
beyond reform. The group asserted that "[t]hose who do not rule according 
to the laws of God are the tyrants”. Yet it also refused formal opposition to 
the Lebanese government because by doing so it feared being co-opted. 
                                                      
1  Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah: the methodology, the experience, and the 
future, Al Hadi edition, Beirut, 2002, p.115-117. 
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Hezbollah viewed the international forces (UNIFIL I) deployed along the 
Israel-Lebanon borders as cohorts of the “Zionist invasion forces”.3  
After 1990, Hezbollah´s political ideology began to mature, 
progressively renouncing positions previously affirmed in its ‘open letter’ 
in favour of a more pragmatic and moderate political platform.4 
Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, explains that:  
Before 1985, there was no chance to join in political activity. All the 
focus was on the resistance. The party's leadership had no chance 
to discuss many political issues”.5 After 1990, Hezbollah started its 
political activity, becoming an open movement. In fact, it is a 
normal evolution after what we initiated years ago.6  
Not only had Lebanon changed, but with it the way Hezbollah 
viewed itself; 
Hezbollah is in the political opposition that puts forward a 
programme and seeks, by the available means, away from violence 
and in the framework of unquestionable matters, to maintain civil 
peace and the common living in order to reform and develop this 
regime.7  
Other changes in Lebanon´s political and geographic landscape also 
contributed to Hezbollah´s movement towards greater pragmatism and 
moderation. The 1989 Taëf agreement, reached after the end of the 
Lebanese civil war, greatly bolstered the central authority of the Lebanese 
government as well its key institutions. By virtue of this Agreement, all 
Lebanese militias were dissolved and disarmed except for Hezbollah in 
southern Lebanon.  
Hezbollah’s political ideology stabilised after Sayed Abbass 
Moussawi was elected Secretary General in 1991. Even after Moussawi´s 
                                                      
3  Declarations of Hezbollah's spokesman, Ibrahim Al Amin, in Al 'Amal 
newspaper, 26 March 1986; “Al 'Alam” magazine, 3 May 1986; and “Al Afkar” 
magazine, 7 April 1986. 
4 Interview with Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, in Al Liwa’a newspaper, 15 November 
1997. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 90 | TALAL ATRISSI 
 
death in February 1992 (due to an Israeli helicopter strike), Hezbollah 
claimed that it remained committed to a policy of openness. After extensive 
and heated discussions between its members, it agreed to participate in the 
1992 parliamentary elections. As Hezbollah’s membership grew, it 
branched out and began to participate in municipal elections and elections 
for student groups, unions, and professional organisations. Hezbollah 
began to establish Islamic organisations and associations for doctors, 
engineers, and other professionals. The term ‘Lebanonisation’ is used to 
signify this progressive transformation of Hezbollah from a group that 
initially sought to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon to a political 
party actively participating in Lebanese political life. 
Hezbollah ran in the May 2005 elections in alliance with the Future 
Movement (Sunni), the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze) and the Amal 
movement (Shiite). This alliance soon fractured in response to an array of 
differences, leading to Hezbollah’s exit from government. Hezbollah’s 
demands for a blocking (1/3) minority in government (i.e., 8 rather than 5 
ministers in the 24 member Cabinet) and for a national unity government 
that included Michel Aoun were both denied by the Siniora government. 
Hezbollah objected to the Siniora government’s international alliances and 
the growing pressure on Syria.  
Hezbollah then reached a political understanding with the Free 
Patriotic Movement, a secular Christian party. This alliance formed the 
basis of Hezbollah´s present opposition to the Lebanese government. 
Hezbollah was willing to support the nomination of a Maronite leader as a 
presidential candidate.  
Since the crisis of 2006 subsided, Hezbollah has maintained its call for 
a national unity government and maintained its sit-in in down-town Beirut. 
During the military engagement between the Lebanese army and Fath al-
Islam (a radical Islamist group influenced by al-Qaeda) in the Nahr al-
Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon in May 2007, 
Hezbollah declared its support for the Lebanese army. But it also warned 
against attacking Palestinian civilians in the camp and against Lebanon 
becoming an arena of struggle in which the Lebanese fight al-Qaeda on 
behalf of the US. 
Hezbollah believes in Wilayat al-Faqih, the “guardianship of the 
jurist”, the basis of the theocratic regime in Iran. But Hezbollah’s leaders no 
longer announce that “Hezbollah is the Islamic revolution in Lebanon” or 
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Ayatollah Khomeini’s photo is no longer present on the first page of 
Hezbollah’s newspapers and bulletins. Crucially, Hezbollah’s much- 
documented resistance has turned more into a Lebanese than a pan-Islamic 
role.  
Hezbollah has proclaimed a commitment to democratic principles 
and has increasingly pressed for reform to Lebanon’s confessional 
democracy, in order that Shiites gain equal political power and 
representation as Sunnis and Christians. Hassan Nasrallah criticised al 
Qaeda leaders when they accused those who participated in elections in 
Palestine and other Arab countries of being infidels, saying: “Who dares to 
say that those who participate in elections are infidels?” 
6.2  Relations with Iran, Syria and the United States  
While we are concerned here with Hezbollah’s relations with the European 
Union, it is important to appreciate how these relations are themselves 
mediated through the organisation’s relations with the three key states of 
Iran, Syria and the US. 
Hezbollah was founded as an Iranian-backed resistance movement 
against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982. However, the 
relationship between Hezbollah and Iran transcends mere financial, 
military and political support; it is a relationship that fuses politics with 
religion and respects the Fakih, the supreme authority in Iran. Hezbollah 
openly expresses gratitude towards Iran for its support to Lebanon and the 
Resistance. Hezbollah sought a formal alliance with Iran (and Syria) after 
the adoption of UN Resolution 1559, the assassination of former Prime 
Minister Rafik Hariri, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 
mid-2005, and increasing US and French involvement in Lebanese domestic 
affairs.  
Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria differs from that with Iran. While 
it is ideologically and politically connected to Iran, it has a strictly political 
relationship with Syria, which directly controlled Lebanese policy and 
security from 1978 until 2005. The alliance with Syria is deemed by 
Hezbollah to be a strategic alliance against Israel. Hezbollah is not 
concerned by the secular nature of the regime in Damascus. Moreover, 
following the Iranian revolution, Iran and Syria have forged a strategic 
alliance that serves as a unique channel through which Iran can funnel 
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After Syria took control of the internal political situation in Lebanon, 
it provided important political cover and security for Hezbollah in its 
armed resistance against Israel. No Lebanese politicians opposed 
Hezbollah while Syria occupied Lebanon. This helps explain why 
Hezbollah felt it necessary to prioritise more engagement in democratic 
politics after Syrian troops withdrew.  
Hezbollah’s criticism of the US has, if anything, increased recently. 
Party officials believe that the US respects democracy, liberty, equality, 
human rights, the rule of law and sovereignty only inside the US, not in 
foreign policy towards the Middle East.8 Hezbollah criticises the American 
support of Israel, and accuses Washington of supporting Israeli attacks 
against Lebanon and interfering in Lebanese domestic politics. The US has 
included Hezbollah on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs), 
which is why Hezbollah refuses to meet with American officials or 
diplomats.  
Sheikh Qassem advocates dialogue with the West, invoking a belief 
in Islam that calls for rational and peaceful dialogue to “argue with them in 
a way that is better”.9 He asserts that dialogue is:  
[A] long, complex and slow process, but it is always required. It is 
advantageous to dialogue with a great number of sections in the 
Western communities; besides, dialogue prevents the clash 
between civilisations, and the US contributes to the creation of this 
clash in order to impose its standpoints and interests.10  
Hezbollah’s vision has changed since its open letter of 1985 where it 
considered the US, Britain and France as enemies, and the “arrogant West” 
as a singular, evil entity.11 In his speech on 8 March 2005, after the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces, and the huge demonstrations in Beirut, Sayed Nasrallah made more 
of a distinction between the US and France. He attacked the US, calling 
upon it to stop interfering in Lebanese domestic affairs. As for France, he 
                                                      
8  Sheikh Naim Qassem, 2002, op. cit., p. 355.  
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called upon it to look at the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators 
gathered that day in a spirit of democracy.  
6.3  Hezbollah’s views of Europe  
Hezbollah does not explicitly criticise the policy of the European Union at 
the official level, but does criticise Europe for its dependence on American 
policy, and its double standards on human rights issues. 
In Hezbollah’s eyes, Europe joined the American way of approaching 
the war against terrorism following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The 
concern within Hezbollah is that some European governments have, in the 
wake of 9/11, increasingly conflated terrorism and legitimate armed 
resistance, colouring attitudes towards Hezbollah in response to an event 
with which the latter had no connection.12 Hezbollah is also increasingly 
critical of European policy towards Palestine. While Europe refuses to 
condemn the daily Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians, it condemns any 
counter-attack by the Palestinians or the Lebanese against Israel. Here, 
Europe is no different from the US. Some European attitudes differ from 
the American ones, yet such differences are seen as modest by Hezbollah 
representatives.13 Even at the level of the Middle East peace process (not 
endorsed by Hezbollah), Europe has been content to play a marginal role 
without advancing any autonomous initiative.14  
On the other hand, one of Hezbollah's leaders15 clearly distinguishes 
between American and European roles on the world stage. He believes that 
Europe’s power greatly diminished in the last two decades due to exclusive 
US global domination. The British and French have however attempted to 
carve out a role for themselves in the Middle East; France has chosen a 
different role to that of the US, while Britain has chosen to follow US policy. 
As for the other European countries, they do not have an effective voice in 
the Middle East, yet their embassies continue to communicate and meet 
with Hezbollah officials.  
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One Hezbollah official interviewed by the author declared that 
official relations between Hezbollah and European embassies improved 
after 1996. Such contacts were not limited to visits, meetings and exchanges 
of ideas only, but rather amounted to actual cooperation. Many European 
ambassadors, including those from the UK and France, met with 
Hezbollah's Secretary General. Many official delegations from numerous 
European countries visited Lebanon to meet with Hezbollah.  
Relations with Europe deteriorated in 2005 and 2006, however, as 
most of Europe, and in particular France, openly sided with the anti-Syrian 
camp in Lebanon. Sheikh Naim Qassem believes that Europe’s role in the 
Middle East helps to reduce American global hegemony. However, he is 
not overly optimistic about European policy in the region because it 
continually fails to support even the most basic of human rights in 
Palestine and other countries. 
Hezbollah´s leaders share a common view of Europe as dependent on 
the US and defined by double standards. To support their views, 
Hezbollah´s leaders point to the July 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, 
where Europe adopted the same position as the US concerning the war – 
that of supporting Israel and claiming that Hezbollah was responsible for 
the war, while not condemning the massacres perpetrated against innocent 
civilians, including the use by Israel of cluster bombs. Moreover, Europe’s 
support for the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora mirrors that of 
the US. 
One of Hezbollah’s leaders expresses anger that Europe supported 
the demonstrations of what was dubbed the “cedar revolution” but now 
refuses to back Hezbollah’s democratic and peaceful protests and strikes 
against Fouad Siniora’s government. Europe supports the government and 
stands against the Hezbollah-led opposition, which is seeking a more 
balanced democracy. Indeed, the demonstrations led by Hezbollah were 
condemned by Europe. This leader in Hezbollah wonders:  
What’s the difference between the demonstrations held in 2005 
and those in 2006? Does the free demonstration depend on the 
objective? How can we explain the support of the demonstration in 
one case as democratic, and oppose it in another case as a threat to 
democracy? 
Europe also opposes Hamas in Palestine. Although that Islamic 
movement came to power via free and democratic elections, Europe and 
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Hamas government by blockading it economically and politically. The 
Hezbollah leader cited above also mentions Algeria as another case where 
the US and Europe turned against the Islamists when they were poised to 
take power democratically. Instead of allowing the Islamists to govern, the 
Europeans pushed Algeria into a blood bath that lasted for over ten years. 
To Hezbollah, European democracy is not an example to be followed, 
given Europe´s failure to respect democracy in the Middle East. It believes 
that Europe never conducted a serious dialogue with the Islamic world, 
instead maintaining its belief in the superiority of its culture (given its more 
progressive views on family and women’s rights). For this leader in 
Hezbollah, the protection of democracy is not just an empty slogan, as 
many leaders think. In fact, it is a serious commitment shared with 
international institutions. Europe must stop supporting autocratic regimes 
that forbid Islamists from participating in elections or forming political 
parties, and truly promote democracy, whatever its outcome. 
A leader of a Hezbollah student organisation confirms that this party 
is not opposed to every country in the Western world. He cites as proof 
how:  
[W]e changed our attitudes towards France after it changed its 
policies towards Lebanon. We were against President François 
Mitterrand who gave orders to send French soldiers to Lebanon to 
back up Amin Gemayel’s regime with which we were in discord in 
1983. On the other hand, we supported Jacques Chirac’s policy 
which had a more balanced vision towards what’s happening in 
Lebanon, and towards the French role compared with the 
American hegemony over the region.  
He further clarified that: 
[T]oday, we are again in discord with Jacques Chirac’s policy after 
it turned, as we think, from a balanced policy to a partial one 
favouring one of the parties in conflict in Lebanon, which means 
that our position is not constant or aggressive against the West. 
Yet, it changes according to the changes in Western policies 
themselves. On the other hand, we do not mind that our students 
travel to Western states to pursue their studies or that they enrol in 
the American university in Beirut. We also offer outstanding 
students scholarships and subventions.  
Regarding Muslim minorities in Europe, Hezbollah opposes 
decisions by some countries to prohibit girls from wearing headscarves. 
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decisions. It does not want Muslims in Europe to become an isolated and 
closed community. Hezbollah urges them to respect the laws of the 
societies in which they live. It does not want European Muslim 
communities to resort to terrorist acts under any pretext. It likewise 
encourages European governments to respect the religious privacy of these 
minorities and not to provoke them through offensive or anti-Muslim 
statements. 
Hezbollah does not oppose the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in 
principle. It does not oppose establishing political, economic or commercial 
relationships with Europeans that may dilute American power; indeed, 
Hezbollah prefers establishing relationships with Europe over the US. 
More than anything, Hezbollah is disappointed that Europe does not 
adhere to its most fundamental values, such as democracy and human 
rights, in its policy towards the Middle East. 
Hezbollah’s dual role as a political party that accepts Lebanese 
democracy and as an armed resistance group that refuses to disarm 
evidently causes difficulties in its relationship with Europe. If these two 
roles could be considered separately, whereby only the former is relevant 
for Europe’s Neighbourhood Policy while the latter remains a strictly 
domestic issue, Hezbollah is prepared to reach a political understanding 
with Europe in many areas. 
Hezbollah has maintained its ‘special view’ towards France. It still 
does not go as far in criticising France as it does in berating the British and 
Americans. Even after the law was passed forbidding girls from wearing 
headscarves in French schools and after Hezbollah’s Al Manar channel was 
banned from broadcasting in France, the party was tempered in its critique 
of the French government. Despite the concern over the change in French 
policy in recent years, Hezbollah has not rejected French mediation events 
or the donor conferences organised in Paris.  
This flexibility toward France is due to the fact that France does not 
treat Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation. During president Chirac’s term 
in office, France did not support proposals from some member states to 
include Hezbollah on the European list of terrorist organisations.  
As soon as France advanced an initiative for dialogue between the 
Lebanese political parties on July 14 and 15, 2007 in the suburbs of Paris at 
the beginning of President Sarkozy’s term in office, Hezbollah declared its 
approval without criticising France’s role or the initiative itself. Indeed, the 
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of international relations on 5 July 2007 as a preparatory step for the 
meeting. Party officials warned that blocking the French initiative could 
simply drag Paris back to ‘the American camp.’  
It is also worth signalling the change in the French president’s 
attitude towards Hezbollah. Before he took office, Sarkozy used to consider 
Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation. Indeed, he emphasised this point of 
view when he received the families of Israeli soldiers detained in Lebanon 
on 9 July 2007. Yet, French diplomacy was obliged to retract fast because 
Hezbollah declared that it would not participate in the French-sponsored 
dialogue between the Lebanese parties. The Elysée spokesman, David 
Martinon, declared: “Hezbollah is not included on the European list of 
terrorist organisations, and France is not willing to put it on”. He added: 
“Hezbollah is a key player in Lebanon and one of the basic components in 
the national dialogue, and Sarkozy wants it in the Lebanese parliamentary 
democratic game”. 
Conclusions  
Hezbollah’s experience differs from that of other Islamic movements. It 
started as a secret, armed resistance movement against Israeli occupation in 
1982, but subsequently transformed itself into an active participant 
Lebanon’s multi-religious democratic political system. Hezbollah insists 
that its activity within Lebanon since the end of civil war in 1989 has been 
moderate in practice. Hezbollah supports the political reform of the 
Lebanese government. It participates in union, municipal and 
parliamentary elections and accepts the election results because they are 
fair. Hezbollah also forms alliances with non-Islamic parties, including 
Christian, secular, and Marxist groups. It calls for peaceful coexistence 
between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, and supports ‘consensual 
democracy,’ founded upon a mutual understanding between religious 
groups that the majority will not oppress the minority. Moreover, 
Hezbollah has never perpetrated any political assassination against 
Lebanese politicians; it is not analogous to al Qaeda in this respect. 
Hezbollah does not even consider itself a member of the global conflict 
between Islam and the West. It became a leading party in Lebanon only 
after it succeeded in defeating occupying forces. It has never been accused 
of corruption and did not participate in the Lebanese civil war.  
Hezbollah expects Europe to play a more effective role in the Middle 
East and to be more independent from the US. It criticises Europe’s double 98 | TALAL ATRISSI 
 
standards, such as its support for certain political protests but opposition to 
similar, Hezbollah-led demonstrations. Communications have never been 
interrupted between Hezbollah and European representatives. Hezbollah 
does not object to a partnership with Europe, provided it is based on 
respect for mutual interests. But it stresses that EU policy must change 
significantly before this can be realised.  
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7.  POLITICAL ISLAM IN SYRIA 
SALAM KAWAKIBI 
Introduction 
This chapter observes how the trends, tendencies and central figures of 
political Islam in Syria have positioned themselves with regard to relations 
with Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Interviews were conducted with a range of 
individuals representative of different currents of thought, including both 
independent and more government-linked figures. The majority of those 
interviewed live in Syria and preferred to remain anonymous. However, 
certain quotations come from political texts published abroad. Compared 
to some other countries studied in this volume, a complicating factor with 
Syria is that the only variant of political Islam to be found within this 
country is the one sanctioned by political authorities. The only comparable 
case in the Arab world is that of Tunisia. No party, no organisation and no 
individual within the country can claim to be both a representative of 
political Islam and independent.  
7.1  The evolution of Syrian political Islam 
When Bachar al-Assad became Head of State on 17 July 2000, reformers’ 
hopes were high. The President’s own team put forward a policy of 
development and modernisation which, at first, sought to introduce simple 
economic liberalisation following the Chinese model of reform. This was a 
failure, however, and in a second stage the same team turned to 
administrative reform, drawing on the expertise of the French Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration and of the Conseil de l’Etat. A committee of 
technocrats and economists close to power proposed a programme of 
economic reform. Though the programme recognised the close links 
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administrative and political – it prioritised the economic aspects, 
emphasising that political reform could always follow later.  
The summer of 2000 saw the beginning of the so-called ‘Damascus 
Spring’. Reformers issued a declaration demanding greater freedoms of 
association. The state-controlled media were quick to criticise these 
demands for reform, accusing activists of ‘spying’ on behalf of Western 
ambassadors. Debating forums were established in Damascus and other 
large towns. A new declaration was published, signed this time by 99 
intellectuals, demanding the release of all political prisoners, freedom of 
speech and an end to the state of emergency.  
More than 600 political prisoners were released on 17 October 2000. 
New private press publications appeared. Similarly, the authorities allowed 
parties participating in the Front National Progressiste to publish and 
distribute their own newspapers. At the same time, the Association Syrienne 
des Droits de l’Homme was founded and the Comités de Défense des Droits de 
l’Homme were re-established. Though their activities remained under heavy 
surveillance, they were not prohibited. 
The opponents of reform felt threatened by the agitation of civil 
society and the resonance of its actions and positions within the wider 
public. They were especially scared by the sympathy which the young 
President and his close associates seemed to have for the legitimate 
demands of civil society. From February 2001 onwards, this led to a series 
of meetings in large towns, organised by the regional Baath party 
committees. Opposing them was a heterogeneous group of conservatives, 
including the military and security autocracy, and a business class which 
owed its creation to economic and political emergency measures backed by 
institutional corruption. The retaliation of the authorities was brutal. The 
‘Damascus Spring’ found its days shortened and its ambitions in tatters, 
with the detention of activists beginning in March 2001. The activists of the 
emerging civil society did not disarm, however. Despite the obstacles, they 
stuck to their cause, backed by their ever-growing credibility.  
Against this political background, Syria was also caught up in the 
general trend witnessed across the Middle East of a rise in religious 
practice and ‘re-Islamisation’ of both the private and public space. The 
Islamist question and its political implications for Syria have become 
especially prominent since the fall of Baghdad, and the suspected 
participation of Syrian ‘mujahideens’ in the urban violence engulfing Iraq.  POLITICAL ISLAM | 101 
 
Syrian conservatism has its roots in the traditions both of the country 
and of the region as a whole. However, ever since the modern state was 
created and with it a socio-political system drawing on diverse Western 
ideologies, Syria has moved towards secular reform with interpretations 
that were able to influence a particularly religious society. Consequently, 
one saw in the political sphere both the creation of secular parties and the 
development of a ‘purified’ spirituality – independent of this political 
sphere. The political and cultural changes of the 1940s and 1950s took place 
outside though they never sought to undermine religion itself.  
These developments allowed for the creation of a national platform 
which brought together secularists and conservatives. Despite the 
authoritarian nature of the political system, progressive and liberal 
ideologies had a profound influence on society during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The development of all kinds of literary and artistic productions during 
this period, free from almost any religious censorship, was not coincidental. 
At this time political Islam in Syria was incarnated in the Muslim 
Brotherhood which, in the 1950s, sat in the country’s democratically elected 
parliament – a rare occurrence in the history of modern-day Syria. 
However, violent clashes ended this ‘cohabitation’ and the Muslim 
Brotherhood became the sworn enemy of the political authorities. The 
violent confrontations between them and the authorities reached their 
climax with a law making mere membership of the group an offence 
punishable by death. As a result the authorities won this particular trial of 
strength at great cost, and those sympathetic to political Islam scattered 
themselves into exile in the West or in other Arab countries.  
However, when it later became apparent that both Marxist and Arab 
nationalist ideologies had failed, the ‘palace strategists’ sought to re-
appropriate religion and manipulate it to its own ends. This plan did not 
take into account the failed and bloody efforts of other authoritarian 
regimes that sought to manipulate Islam as a bulwark against a ‘red 
revolution’, as in the case of Anwar Sadat in Egypt. The Syrian authorities 
began to introduce religious vocabulary into political discourse and socio-
cultural activities. The state’s implication in this religious resurgence was 
helped by ‘reformed’ former Muslim Brothers. The building of places of 
worship peaked in the 1980s and 1990s with the creation of well-controlled 
religious training schools. The aim was to achieve a monopoly of influence 
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Secularism began to take a back seat with the re-Islamisation of 
society and culture, as indicated by the high percentage of women wearing 
the veil, the dissemination of religious texts that increasingly filled library 
shelves, the Islamisation of higher education, especially in the human 
sciences, and the almost mechanical reframing of all scientific, social and 
cultural phenomena within religious frames of reference.  
Notwithstanding these trends, intellectuals such as Burhan 
Ghalioun91 do not believe that Islamists would dominate the political 
system if democratic reform were forthcoming. Such a scenario is only 
likely “if Islamic-Arabic public opinion were by nature violent”, a notion he 
rejects. This might happen as a result only of a specific conjunction of 
social, economic and political conditions. Michel Kilo92 agrees with this 
analysis and remarks that, with the exception of a small minority, Syrian 
Muslims do not favour violence and would be able to participate in a 
future democracy. 
However, one still observes a strong revival of assertive practices of 
faith. Syria has experienced a somewhat violent escalation of religious 
expression in both the cultural and social spheres. This has led Syrian 
Christians to fear for their rights, long protected by an enforced secularism 
and strong central power. Nor does the current Iraqi experience help the 
situation, taking place so close to Syria. The state, despite its symbolic 
strength and theoretical monopoly over the tools to influence public 
opinion, is for some the big absentee. In practice new religious authorities 
have begun to wield the most influence over public opinion.  
The evidence suggests that the regime is looking for legitimacy in 
letting these developments evolve. The danger would be if the authorities 
lost control of the phenomenon they have been trying to harness. Priests 
are under surveillance, but small mosques escape this. Some Islamic classes 
for women have become brainwashing sessions, notably pushing for the 
wearing of the veil. In a cafe in Aleppo, a leaflet was handed out saying, 
“Become Muslim and you will have peace”. Increasingly, restaurants advise at 
the entrance that “we do not sell alcoholic beverages”. During the Ramadan of 
2004 a judge sentenced a Syrian man for smoking in front of his shop 
during the fast. That was a new development, since failure to respect the 
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fast in public places had previously been universally tolerated. Artistic 
production has also been affected, and intellectuals increasingly witness 
state censorship authorities adopting and enforcing commands made by 
religious leaders.  
While Islamists’ rhetoric often cites human rights as being the 
casualty of a repressive system, they highlight only those aspects which 
help their cause. Their positions are in some respects hesitant, rejecting 
other rights, especially in the social and cultural domains. The defenders of 
human rights do not exclude the possibility that they themselves could 
become the victims of political Islam if the latter gained power. However, 
such a premonition does not stop them from considering Islamic rights to 
be in all cases indistinguishable from the rights of other political 
tendencies.  
Islamists’ rhetoric changes according to the circumstances. They 
consider themselves to be the most active on the issue of human rights, for 
example. Haythal al-Maleh, President of the Syrian Organisation for 
Human Rights for many years, and a lawyer and former political prisoner, 
was associated with Islamic movements.  He is considered by militants, 
activists and opponents to be a person of great humanity. However, that 
did not stop him, at a meeting in Berlin in 2003,93 from stating that he 
considered the death sentence as prescribed in the Koran to be acceptable, 
that homosexuals are sick, and that Islam grants women all the rights they 
need. 
In short, Islamists consider themselves to be best placed to speak 
about, defend and promote human rights, but often speak of the danger of 
introducing certain values. They consider these values to be Trojan Horses 
that will destroy traditional conservative society. It is true that over time 
their position changes, but one must be aware of their selective conception 
of human rights, a conception that is shared by others. 
7.2  The Muslim Brotherhood 
Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) soon became active in 
the cultural and social spheres. However, it did not participate in the 
political fight against French proxy rule. After independence in 1946, its 
role was a discreet one, despite the democratic nature of the government. 
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From the 1950s the MB began to work within the framework of the 
constitution, supporting free elections and the democratic transfer of 
power.  
Although the Muslim Brotherhood was repressed under the United 
Arab Republic with Egypt (1958-61), there were no major clashes with the 
state. Tensions rose however following the coup d’état of 1963, during which 
the Baath party took power. In 1964 clashes took place around the Sultan 
mosque in Hama, and were followed by dozens of arrests. In 1967 the MB 
organised demonstrations, following the publication of an article in an 
army journal that it considered to be blasphemous. At the beginning of 
1973, the Brothers also showed their discontent with the newly-published 
constitution which made no reference to Islam; following this wave of 
unrest, a reference was duly introduced.  
It was only at the beginning of 1979 that events turned violent, with 
the assassination of intellectuals and figures of authority, especially those 
belonging to the Alawite community. The ensuing repression was brutal 
with widespread imprisonment and hundreds of killings. It was then that 
the effort to eradicate the MB began. An armed conflict was to last for three 
years, leading hundreds of members into self-imposed exile. While the law 
of 1980 making membership of the Muslim Brotherhood a crime subject to 
capital punishment has not been repealed, in 1993 and again in 2001 there 
were amnesties for prisoners sympathising with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
such that today there are few political prisoners in this category.  
Within Syria itself the Muslim Brotherhood has ceased to exist as an 
organisation. However it exists in exile, led from London by Ali Sadr al-Din 
Bayanoumi. In May 2001, the Muslim Brotherhood in exile announced their 
“national charter for political action”, in which they rejected violence and 
called for the upholding of human rights. They saluted the modern state 
with its institutions, rule of law and separation of powers. They made 
reference to pluralism – political, ethnic and religious. According to the 
same document civil society was to play an important role in upholding 
democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood signed the Déclaration de Damas pour 
le changement démocratique and formed, with the former Vice-President 
Abdulhalim Khaddam,94 the Front de l’Action National.  
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The ‘independent’95 deputy Mohammad Habach,96 who has Islamic 
leanings, does not see the need to create an Islamic Party. However, “if the 
day comes when Syria is a genuine democracy, I do not see what the 
danger is of having an Islamic State”.97 Paradoxically the Muslim 
Brotherhood – the only religious party in Syria98 and, at that, illegal99 – 
declares that it does not ask for the creation of a religious authority, but 
only of a civil authority that respects both plurality and change.  
7.3  The Islamists and European democracy 
The Muslim Brotherhood ‘guide’ for Syria recently declared that, “we reject 
foreign intervention, but we don’t reject having contacts, whether direct or 
indirect, with the outside world. Since the publication of our programme, 
we have had lots of contact with European countries (...). What I regret is 
the fact that foreign pressure on Damascus sometimes neglects human 
rights: Europe even signed a cooperation treaty with Syria despite the fact 
that its jails are full (...). Arab regimes describe us as barbarians, but the 
majority of Islamic movements are seeking modernity. The persistence of 
some countries in not entering into dialogue with us will serve to 
strengthen the extremists who consider us to be atheists and put us in the 
same bag as Westerners”.100 
This is a résumé of the Muslim Brotherhood’s position in relation to 
opening up towards the West in general and Europe in particular. Though 
not the only example, and not necessarily even the best reference, Europe 
serves as an effective model for the democratic hopes of many Syrians. The 
                                                                                                                                       
corruption scandals. He was also one of the most dogged opponents of the 
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95 Since 1990 independent deputies have sat in the Syrian parliament but they are 
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96 Director of Damascus’ Centre for Islamic Studies. 
97 See www.syria-news.com from 16 June 2006. 
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99 Law No. 49 of 1980 stipulates that membership of the MB is subject to capital 
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reasons for this are many: the quality of democracy that prevails in most 
countries of the European Union; the obligation placed on candidates to 
improve their democracy before applying for membership; the secularism 
that accommodates differences of all kinds; the freedom of expression 
enjoyed by European citizens. Europe is seen by Islamists as a reference 
point for democracy, even though “we know that a price will have to be 
paid [by Europe in distancing itself from the regime in power], but it’s a 
good investment in the medium and long term”. 101 The changing of power 
at the highest levels in Europe is often signalled admiringly by Islamists 
when talking of the European experience.  
On the other hand, this does not stop Islamists from criticising what 
they consider to be Europe’s moral laxity (homosexuality, sexual liberty...). 
Moreover, Europe’s engagement with democratic reform in the Arab world 
is questioned. A large section of the public, both secular and Muslim, limits 
the role of Europe in the region to the simple one of backing authoritarian 
regimes. The same public perceives that Europe’s main aim is to force the 
regimes to become more politically and economically dependent on the 
West. This fear strips references to European democracy of all popularity, 
and leads to rejection. It also creates within the public, especially those with 
Islamic leanings, a negative view of their fellow citizens who do hold such 
ideas. It is even possible for these to be considered as ‘traitors’.102 
As a result, maintaining relations with European non-governmental 
organisations is more attractive to the Islamists. They find that Europe, in 
spite of its colonial past, has been able to develop non-governmental action 
that is genuinely independent from state interference. On the other hand 
they reject any collaboration with the US, be it with the government or with 
NGOs. The reason for this is, according to them, “its continuing colonialism 
and its blind support for the Israeli occupation”.103 Exchanges with Europe 
are encouraged and the Islamists “must make the most of this privilege by 
making real friends and allies by accepting their visions of democracy”.104 
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A distinction is made, therefore, between the behaviour of European 
governments on the one hand, and that of the NGOs and European 
research centres on the other. With regards to the question of democracy, 
one contact speaks of a German politician who underlined the extremely 
democratic nature of Hamas’ election in Palestine in January 2005. Yet his 
country, i.e. Germany, refuses to recognise this democratically elected 
government. An observation often repeated in conversations with Islamic-
leaning intellectuals and with politicians and political activists is that, 
“European governments do not respect the will of the Palestine people, 
contrary to what they pretend”. 
Unfortunately, a growing number of Syrians, amongst them some 
Islamists, consider Europe’s image to have changed as a result of some of 
its actions. Examples include its perceived refusal to let in Turkey 
essentially, it is judged, because it is not Christian; its refusal to recognise 
and support an Islamic government in Palestine despite it having been 
democratically elected; and its lack of commitment to defending 
democratic values in Syria. This has led a leading left-wing intellectual and 
democrat to claim that,  
[I]t is not only authoritarian regimes who point to the Muslim 
threat so as to protect their own power, but also the Western 
powers who look to avoid exerting too much effective pressure so 
as not to impose or inspire democracy. To their minds, the big 
danger is that of leaving the stage free for radical Islamic politics. 
Notwithstanding this, views on European democracy compare 
favourably with those on American democracy. With American 
intervention in the region in its current state, few intellectuals have the 
courage to welcome the principles upon which the US has built itself. At 
this level, any comparison inevitably turns in favour of Europe. However, 
Europe too is seen to have its failings and its blind conformity in following 
the US on issues as sensitive as the fight against terrorism, for example, or 
the right to resistance, which draws considerable criticism.  
Conservative Islamists think in terms of a stereotype that links 
Western democracy to the loss of moral values. For the extremists, such 
democracy has but one objective: “the dismantling of the societies and 
people who adopt it”. It is not, then, a system involving pluralism, 
alternating governments and the separation of powers. This impression has 
been spread within extremist circles and to change it would require huge 
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or indirectly, so as to strengthen itself against demands for democratic 
reform. 
7.4  Muslim minorities in Europe 
Syrian Islamists have no single interpretation of the situation of Muslim 
minorities in Europe. The most open, enlightened and moderate go so far 
as to believe that Europe offers a free and hopeful environment for the 
development of Islam. At the other end of the scale, radicals believe that as 
long as Muslims are not granted the right, by the countries in which they 
live, to practise  their religion exactly as they wish to then they are 
‘persecuted’. Between these two poles, all sorts of intermediary positions 
exist. While for a number of Muslims the issue of Muslim minorities in 
Europe is of legitimate concern, it cannot be isolated from their individual 
positions with regards to democracy. In general, the more democratic are 
more understanding, though they might not be entirely approving of 
certain measures imposed in Europe; the less democratic are more critical. 
Syrian authorities exploit the imperfect situation of the minorities in 
Europe, using this as a pretext to reject democracy at home.  
Views depend mainly on the scientific, cultural and social awareness 
of the individual Islamist figure being interviewed. It should be noted that 
a large part of the elite with Islamic leanings was educated in Europe, 
especially in Germany, France and the UK. This elite is steeped in Western 
values, without necessarily having adopted them; they know how to 
exploit them for their own purposes. For that reason, the way in which the 
Muslim situation in Europe is assessed varies. Any judgement is often 
based on concrete issues, such as the banning of the Muslim veil in schools 
or discrimination in the labour market. 
Similarly, the question of the integration of Muslims into European 
society, especially after 11 September 2001, has become an important issue 
for a minority of the Islamic elite. There is a body of analytical writing that 
examines reactions to this integration, and assesses its impact on European 
Muslims. These studies denounce both the generalised incrimination of a 
whole community and the way in which different concepts are confused: 
Islam, Islamism, Islamist, fundamentalist, integrationist and terrorist. 
For some, Muslims in Europe are citizens like any other. They enjoy 
the same rights as everyone else and should be content, given that their 
country of origin would not grant them these rights. For others, Muslims in 
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of Muslims with that of the Jewish community and find a large divide 
between the two: “Our beliefs are not respected as much as Jewish ones” is 
a common refrain. However, only extremists make violent calls for 
“revenge”. These views may not be immediately evident, but become 
recognisable as soon as the tone of the conversation becomes heated: “in 
any case, the number of believers in their house is rising and sooner or later 
we will have our revenge and the position in society we deserve”. 
7.5  Europe’s foreign policy 
In general terms, the Islamists interpret European foreign policy in the 
Mediterranean in the same way as other Syrians. Some, reacting as Arab 
nationalists would, denounce any intervention as neo-colonialist or with 
the term ‘crusade’. But more generally they have difficulty understanding 
Europe’s interest in the region. One interlocutor explains this as 
characteristic of Islamist thought, which distances its followers from 
international politics. They pay greater attention to domestic politics and its 
compatibility with the ways of Islam. When they speak of European policy 
in the Mediterranean, they point first and foremost to the case of the 
Palestinian elections.  
With regards to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership two currents of 
thought exist. The first, which is the more dominant, rejects the partnership 
outright if it does not go hand in hand with political change in Syria at the 
highest level. This view holds that the Barcelona Process simply supports 
and even profits from corruption within the Syrian regime. As such, any 
partnership formed in the current climate  will aggravate still more this 
deplorable institutional situation. The partnership must, in the opinion of 
Islamists, impose conditions demanding a fundamental reform of the 
mechanisms of power, a state of law and of good governance. “That has to 
be the basis of any partnership if it is to be a stable relationship supported 
by the population”. 
A second view, prevailing especially among those with less education 
and access to information, sees all rapprochement with the West as being 
part of a neo-colonialist strategy, seeking to “rob the country of its experts, 
of its riches and to stop the growth of Islam in the region”. Paradoxically, 
this extreme view is shared by certain members of the Baath party who are 
in power.  
For Syrian public opinion in general, including the Islamists, 
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capable of balancing unfair and biased American policy in the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. However, the partnership is for most Syrians, and especially for 
the Islamists, a peripheral subject, while the image of Europe’s colonial 
heritage is still important for some. There is also a distinction between the 
positions adopted by different European countries – those of France and 
the UK for example. Islamists interviewed for this chapter evoked common 
traits such as the hesitation, instability and apprehension of European 
foreign policy in the Middle East. They remarked on the danger of such 
shortcomings and of their possible repercussions within Europe. “Social 
unrest will affect Europe if we do not resolve the economic, social and 
political problems in our own region”, concludes a moderate Islamist. He 
attributes the region’s problems to the “despotic and corrupt” regimes 
supported by Western policy, and to the West’s “blind” support for Israel, 
which in turn causes unrest in the Muslim communities across Europe. 
Some see Europe as the “source of all our ills”, having been responsible for 
the creation of the state of Israel. 
A problem often raised is that Europe deals only with those in power, 
not with the people. Europeans “believe that these regimes are immortal 
and that they have to deal with them. They avoid change in the region for 
fear of the unknown”. Europe must “change its policies and again try what 
it managed to do well in Eastern Europe. Their Arab neighbours cannot 
continue to be poor and repressed, while receiving aid which does nothing 
to change their sad reality”. 
For Islamists residing in Syria, “the Europeans should and must use 
the means at their disposal to put pressure on regimes by first unifying 
their policies in the region and by then supporting opposition movements 
and not just Islamist ones”. European participation in reconstructing the 
region’s civil society is much sought after by activist of all kinds. Amongst 
these the Islamists are particularly enthusiastic.  
For certain extremists, or those known in Syrian local jargon as 
‘obscurantists’, all that comes from the West is nothing but a manifestation 
of the ‘devil’ and must be cursed. Europe upholds atheist regimes with the 
aim of destroying the “Muslim nation’s moral references”. Such views are 
not widely held, at least openly. However, the political authorities often 
promote this same worldview. In this way authoritarian regimes stress that 
all that the West seeks to export, in the field of law as well as others, is in 
reality nothing more than a neo-colonialist effort seeking to destroy Arab 
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those societies. Thus, one witnesses an alignment between the 
‘obscurantists’ and the political authorities when it comes to debate about 
reforming society and the political system. 
On the other hand, a cooperative attitude can be detected amongst 
those of the movement who live in exile. Years spent in the West have been 
an enriching process, giving their views a democratic dimension. 
Interviewees consulted for this chapter emphasise the importance of Syria 
having close economic relations with Europe after power has eventually 
changed hands. This does not mean that “our movement will necessarily be 
in power, but that at least we will be recognised as an independent political 
entity on Syria’s political scene”. The Islamists would adopt more or less 
the same system of economic liberalism, in the Western sense of the term, 
as Turkey. As a result, any rapprochement with Europe, at least on an 
economic level, would be warmly welcomed by them. As their ideological 
conception of the economy is close to capitalism, they would be able to deal 
with European investors and companies without hindrance. As it is, they 
believe that “we would be better placed to establish transparent and legal 
economic relations than those corrupt regimes, who close the borders in 
order to create a parallel economy of which they are the principal 
beneficiaries”. 
Conclusions 
Studying Islamic movements in the Arab countries seems, for both local 
and foreign researchers, to be richly rewarding. But in some countries this 
area of research is still a minefield. Syria is one of them. For example, in 
considering the inspiration, motivation and policies of political Islam, one 
can hardly make comparisons between such countries as Morocco and 
Syria. 
Syrian society exhibits a simple indifference towards the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership or the European Neighbourhood Policy. This is 
explained by the difficulties of everyday life, the economic crisis, day-to-
day needs and the strict control exercised over political life. But in addition 
it is important to emphasise the informational gap due to the lack of any 
form of communication policy, either by the European institutions or their 
representatives in Syria. As regards the Partnership, the local press, which 
expresses the official view, often mentions it; the Neighbourhood policy is 
completely absent from public debate. When questioning even senior 
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very basic terms what the European Neighbourhood Policy actually 
consisted of.  
For Islamist intellectuals, Europe is relevant only through its policies 
in Palestine and Iraq, and its treatment of its Muslim minorities in Europe. 
The Partnership becomes a significant subject only when dealing with the 
economic liberalisation that it promotes, or the human rights issues raised. 
There is a lot of enthusiasm with regards to the economic side, but a lot of 
doubt, to say the very least, when it comes to the question of whether the 
EU is really serious about the promotion of democracy. 
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8.  POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY 
SENEM AYDIN AND RUŞEN ÇAKIR 
Introduction 
Turkey differs from the Arab states studied in the CEPS–FRIDE Political 
Islam project in not only having a European Union membership prospect, 
but also in the fact that a broadly Islamist-oriented party has been in office 
since 2002. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) still enjoys the 
primary support of pro-Islamic constituencies in Turkish society and its 
orientation towards the EU has not changed since its assumption of power. 
An overwhelming majority in the party still sees the EU as the primary 
anchor of Turkish democracy and modernisation, despite the perceived 
limitations of cooperation on issues relating to the reform of Turkish 
secularism. Yet the growing mistrust towards the EU due to perceived 
discrimination and EU double standards is beginning to cloud positive 
views within the party. Decreasing levels of support for EU membership in 
Turkey society and the fact that explicitly Euro-sceptic positions are now 
coming from both the left and the right of the political spectrum, suggest 
that the sustainability of the pro-European discourse within the party could 
be difficult to maintain in the long run. 
8.1  The AKP’s evolution 
When the Islamist Welfare Party won power in Turkey’s 1995 elections, it 
conspicuously invoked political Islam and took a clear stand against the EU 
and NATO, advocating instead an Islamic common market and an Islamic 
NATO. It adopted anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli language, and tried to forge 
closer links with Iran, Libya and Syria. Such policies and discourse 
alienated the secular political elite, the military and the public to the extent 
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out of government, in what has become known as Turkey’s ‘post-modern 
coup’.  
The Welfare Party’s parliamentary group joined a short-lived Virtue 
Party (FP), only to be closed down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for 
being the ‘centre of anti-secular activities’. The former Mayor of Istanbul, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, together with the reformists of the Welfare Party, 
then formed the AKP and immediately disassociated themselves from the 
old leadership and ideology. The party came to power in the 2002 elections, 
obtaining 34% of the votes. The AKP elite labelled themselves ‘conservative 
democrats’, placed a strong emphasis on democracy and human rights, 
advocated EU membership, supported globalisation and eschewed ‘anti-
Western’ discourse.  
There were a number of reasons for this shift in discourse and policy. 
The opposition of important segments of civil society and the increasing 
resentment of the military during the Welfare Party’s coalition government 
were crucial. The post-modern coup initiated a ‘learning process’ among 
political Islamists, with the latter realising that a party not respecting 
secularism “would have no chance of sustained and effective participation 
in the Turkish political system given its constitutional boundaries”.105 They 
also realised that they needed the West and democracy to build a broader 
front against the centres of radical secularism in the judiciary, at high levels 
of the state bureaucracy, in the mainstream media and especially the 
military. Within this framework, the EU began to be regarded as a natural 
ally in efforts to decrease the power of the military and to achieve a system 
of democratic governance, within which Islamic social and political forces 
would be regarded as legitimate players.106  
Disassociation from the anti-Western discourse went hand in hand 
with the complete abandonment of the anti-globalisation discourse. 
Turkey’s 2001 financial crisis had fully eliminated any possibility of 
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upholding an anti-Western and anti-globalisation discourse when the 
country had to adhere to a strict International Monetary Fund programme 
and was in desperate need of foreign investment. Furthermore, the 
previous Welfare Party experience had also shown that a broad-based, 
cross-class alliance was essential for the party to attract the broader 
electoral base required for it to classify itself as a mass party. This alliance, 
which encompassed “the more dynamic and prosperous segments of 
society that were benefiting from the globalisation process in material 
terms as well as the more disadvantaged and underprivileged segments of 
society”, meant that the party could neither afford to adopt an anti-
globalisation discourse nor become engaged in constant fights with the 
secular centre.107  
The AKP is not a monolithic or homogenous party. It should rather 
be understood more as a coalition of different factions. This was best seen 
in the incident where, despite the efforts of Prime Minister Erdoğan, 99 
AKP MPs in the Turkish parliament voted against the deployment of US 
troops in south-eastern Turkey for the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, as many as 
five factions can be identified within the party. The core of the party and 
the overwhelming majority of its parliamentarians consist of individuals 
who were affiliated with the National Outlook Movement (NOM – the 
Islamist grouping that emerged in response to the 1960 military coup) in 
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. 
Key figures such as Prime Minister Erdoğan, President of the National 
Assembly Bülent Arınç and the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, are among 
those who come from the NOM movement. The second largest faction 
within the party consists of those who joined the AKP from the ranks of 
conventional centre-right parties – mainly the Motherland Party (ANAP) 
and the True Path Party. The other three factions that occupy a smaller 
space within the party involve Islamists from various sects who had joined 
the Welfare Party in the 1980s and 1990s, and moved into the AKP ranks 
after a gradual liberalisation of their views. These include Mr Erdoğan’s 
close associates from the Istanbul municipality, some of whom were 
technocrats not affiliated with the NOM, and some former bureaucrats, 
such as former Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, who had previously served 
under centre-right governments. 
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The AKP elite rejects formal reference to Islam or to the notion of 
their being ‘Muslim democrats’, as often suggested in Europe.108 Their 
preferred label of ‘conservative democracy’ remains vague, however. It is 
less of an ideology, and more of “an organic synthesis” that claims to “give 
voice to the Turkish people’s values and to bridge the gap between the 
state and the people”.109 Hence the party in fact “assumes the presence of a 
set of shared social values, but also claims full knowledge of society’s needs 
and desires”, a view that, according to some analysts, is open to 
“authoritarian expansion as the party assumes it can exercise collective 
reasoning on behalf of the public without making its rationale clear to those 
whom it is governing”.110 The attempt to criminalise adultery during the 
adoption of the new Penal Code in 2005 on grounds of such shared ‘social 
values’ is an example. How such values are defined, justified and selected 
remains (for some, dangerously) ambivalent. 
Ambivalence also remains on how to approach modernity. The 
party’s ideological manifesto, as described in their publication Conservative 
Democracy, highlights that “it is necessary to accept modernity to its full 
extent…nevertheless its philosophical foundations…should be first 
differentiated from their misconceived practices and descriptions, [and 
only then] must be mixed with local values”.111 This stance implies that 
modernity and tradition are not perceived to be in conflict. But the question 
of “whether and how modernity’s philosophical foundations can be 
adopted selectively” remains unanswered.112 
Such ambivalence is also present in the party’s line on the public role 
of Islam.113 The AKP has implemented significant democratic reform, 
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primarily in the fields of the fight against torture; the strengthening of 
civilian control over the military; the reinforcement of human rights; and 
the protection of minorities, freedom of expression, assembly and 
association. But the public role of Islam, a long-disputed cause of tension in 
Turkish politics, has not been addressed. One of the most prominent issues 
in relation to the public role of Islam concerns the headscarf ban. A Council 
of State decision in 1984 and, more recently, a 1997 Constitutional Court 
decision, prohibit the use of headscarves in all public institutions, including 
schools and universities. Mr Erdoğan introduced two proposals to partially 
reverse the ban, both of which were successfully blocked by the secularist 
elite. Some scholars argue that the party dropped this issue without 
encouraging open debates aimed at reaching a societal consensus on the 
matter.114 Likewise, the government’s proposal to increase religious 
vocational schools’ access to higher education was rejected by the president 
and then dropped instead of being amended and re-submitted. On both 
occasions the party had attempted to address issues of concern to its core 
constituency, but had retreated when its proposals were resisted by the 
Kemalist elite – only to blame the failure on insufficient civil society activity 
to pressure traditional state institutions, despite the fact that the party 
allows very little civil society activity in its own policy-making.115 In short, 
the AKP has not resolved the problematic relationship between Islam and 
Turkish secularism. 
In foreign policy, the AKP government has been willing to take risks 
and challenge Turkey’s traditional preference for preserving the status 
quo.116 This characteristic has been seen in the government’s strong 
commitment to the EU, despite the setbacks, but more importantly, in its 
new approach to the Cyprus conflict, wherein a “win-win approach” – in 
Mr Erdoğan’s words – was adopted in support of the Annan Plan. This 
change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy illustrates a ‘civilianisation’ of Turkish 
foreign policy, to which the government contributed through reforms to 
strengthen civilian control over the military. Parliament’s decision not to 
allow US troops through Turkey during the Iraq war and the decision not 
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to intervene militarily in northern Iraq were also signs of the shift in 
Turkish foreign policy from a Hobbesian realism to a slightly more Kantian 
approach that espouses diplomacy, negotiation and other civilian 
instruments such as economic and multilateral cooperation.117 This new 
approach was also adopted towards the Arab world, with which relations 
have significantly improved under the AKP government. Relations with 
the West have been viewed as complementary to, rather than a substitute 
for, relations with the Islamic world. In the context of the ‘zero-problems 
with neighbours’ policy of the government, relations with both Greece and 
Syria have considerably improved.118 Both Prime Minister Erdoğan and 
Foreign Minister Gül have highlighted on various occasions that Israel has 
the right to exist and that violence against it is unacceptable, and have 
conveyed this message to Hamas representative Khaled Mashal, whom 
they agreed to receive after the Palestinian elections. The Turkish 
government has also started to play a much more active role in the 
Organisation for Islamic Countries (OIC), as part of the importance it places 
on multilateral settings for foreign policy-making. In the OIC, it has 
conveyed the message of the need for democratisation in the Arab world, 
embodied in the Istanbul Declaration adopted at the OIC Summit in June 
2004. 
8.2  The AKP and the EU  
The EU’s Copenhagen political criteria mirrored the AKP’s own strategy of 
political survival through the attainment of a wider democratic sphere of 
activity within Turkey, and hence relations with the EU have become a 
central theme of the party’s agenda. In order to gain a better understanding 
of the perceptions of Europe held within the party, interviews with AKP 
members of parliament and party policy advisers were conducted in 
September 2006.119 
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All of the interviewees stated that they do not regard Turkey’s 
political reform process as sufficient or complete. Freedom of speech, 
civilian control over the military, the headscarf ban, more decentralisation 
and reinforcement of local governance, and the quality of democratic 
governance, were the most commonly cited areas where further and far-
reaching reform was deemed necessary. Again, while aspiring to a faster 
and more extensive process of reform in principle, the difficulty of 
attaining rapid reform in the Turkish context was often highlighted. The 
slow changes in mentality among the population and bureaucracy were 
considered a major reason behind the difficulties experienced, especially 
with implementation. As articulated by one MP: 
We need further decentralisation and localisation in all areas 
except for foreign policy, defence and education; this is the ideal 
democratic model.… However, this is impossible for Turkey in the 
next five to ten years. The social, cultural and educational levels of 
the public are not ready to support such a model and the situation 
in Iraq is not making it any easier. So this is indeed the ideal 
among the party’s decision-makers, but there are restrictions that 
are keeping us back… As for the reforms that we have already 
undertaken in the field of democracy and human rights, more 
could be done, especially regarding freedom of expression. 
Nevertheless, a mental transformation is needed, especially among 
the judiciary and the police force for proper implementation. 
Whatever the law is, you can always find a judge to try Hrant 
Dink.120 We can only overcome this through education. We need a 
new generation for the implementation and the sustainability of 
these reforms. 
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A prominent policy adviser within the party also highlighted similar 
points, stating: 
The problem is with implementation. You cannot change an 
established way of thinking and behaving that has been 
entrenched for 40-50 years overnight… There is also the problem 
that some aspects of the process are not shared fully by all the 
relevant actors. Think of our bill on public administration reform, 
which was a very necessary law to strengthen local governments 
and was vetoed by the President. We should be able to achieve 
decentralisation without threatening the unitary nature of the 
state; that should be possible. The Ottoman Empire could have 
kept a few more territories if it delegated more power to local 
administrations. The same goes for civilian–military relations. It 
has to be internalised by all the relevant parties for genuine change 
to take root, but that is going to take an awful lot of time. 
The role of the EU is strongly acknowledged in the progress made in 
the areas of democratisation and human rights. The EU is not just seen as a 
political entity to be joined, but largely as a ‘democratic model’. This 
argument comes with qualifications, however. First, all of the party elites 
interviewed emphasised that democratisation was already among the 
primary aims of the party from the start of their political journey and that 
the EU has been more of an anchor in attaining further democracy in the 
country. As put by a party MP: 
We felt from the very beginning the desperate need for 
democratisation in the country and that was one of our main 
starting points. I view the EU as an anchor in that process…an 
anchor that can help all segments of Turkish society live in peace. 
There will not be any grounds for radicalisation, both ethnic and 
religious, with the EU anchor firmly in place. The EU project will 
also decrease the impact of politics on society by promoting good 
governance. The Turkish people will then expect policy-making 
from the politicians rather than daily demands that are the 
outcome of inefficient and corrupt governance. 
A party policy adviser expressed thoughts along the same line, stating: 
As a party, we wish to see a more democratic Turkey, but we have 
to face the fact that our internal dynamics are not sufficient enough 
to achieve this. The EU compensates for insufficient internal 
dynamism… I am not saying that there are no problems with 
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exploiting French democracy, against the interests of France. But 
you cannot turn your back on it just because it has its problems. 
The democracy in Europe is still the best model today. 
Another MP provided further details as to how the EU’s process coincided 
with the agenda of the party: 
February 28 has shown us that there are some things that Turkey 
cannot achieve on her own. I am not talking about Turkey 
becoming a Sharia state. What I am talking about is an 
environment where you can teach your child as much about 
religion as you want, where my wife can wear whatever she likes 
and where I will not be punished because of my religious beliefs. 
We realised that the prominence of individual rights within the EU 
can actually help us in decreasing the weight of the institutions in 
the Turkish political system and hence achieve the minimum in 
sustaining our lifestyles.  
Second, the EU is not viewed as possessing one single model of 
democracy that the country can take as a point of reference. Several 
different democratic practices on diverse issues are acknowledged to exist 
in Europe. As a policy adviser in the party held: 
There is not a single model of democracy in Europe. It is the 
fundamental principles that matter the most to us, and those are 
embodied in the Copenhagen political criteria and they are not 
exclusive to Europe, they are universal principles. There are vast 
differences between the way in which democracies are 
institutionalised and function in Europe. Just look at the way in 
which religion–state relations are regulated. On the one hand, you 
have a country like France, and on the other hand you have a 
country like Greece, which can be classified as an almost theocratic 
state. Turkey can benefit from different practices in different 
member states, depending on its own needs. 
Regarding the more specific democratic practices that Turkey can 
adopt from Europe, two issues are prioritised, namely minority rights and 
religious freedoms (more specifically, the public role of religion) – the two 
unresolved tensions of Turkish politics. In the case of minority rights, the 
French model is considered to be more suitable for Turkey, whereas in the 
field of religious freedoms, the UK model prevails. 
Third, while these perceptions are dominant among the majority of 
the party elite, this does not mean that problems with European 
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minority discourses that do not hold Europe as a democratic model exist. 
As an MP who explicitly claims to be a Euro-sceptic argued: 
Europe is not a democratic model for Turkey. Europe is the by-
product of ruthless wars, the EU itself is a product of Europe’s 
ruthlessness. It has all been about how three big and three small 
member states control each other. I have in mind a democracy that 
is more replete with virtue and empathy. I find Europe to be too 
‘worldly’.…It is true that reforms are easier to sell to the public 
when the EU is there, it triggers the learning process in society and 
the technical requirements that it introduces can improve living 
standards, but that is all. I don’t share the view that it is a 
community of consistent values. 
The same MP also expressed critical thoughts on the rights of Muslim 
minorities within Europe, “It is true that Muslims benefit from generous 
rights in most member states. However, these rights are not considered 
natural by birth, with their philosophical foundations. They give them 
rights because they have to and this is where the problem lies”. 
Another MP who had reservations about Europe as a normative 
reference for democratic aspirations also expressed his doubts regarding 
the state of Muslim minority rights in Europe: “Europe’s experience with 
minorities only goes back 50 years. It has very little experience on this 
issue. This is why Muslim minorities are experiencing serious problems in 
Europe. Europe does not know how to deal with people from different 
cultures, whereas we have a 1,000 year history of living in a multicultural 
environment”. 
It is not only the more Euro-sceptic elite who are critical of Muslim 
minority rights in Europe. Other more pro-European elites also perceive 
problems with the way in which Muslim minorities are treated in Europe. 
Still, they often distinguish between different country practices, viewing 
some models – the British, the Dutch and the Scandinavian – more 
favourably than they do others, such as that of the French. It is believed 
that in terms of the rights granted to Muslims, even the most restricted 
country, France, where there is no headscarf ban in universities, is a far 
more advanced case than Turkey. In the words of a political adviser: 
Countries have different practices in Muslim minority rights. On 
the one hand, you have the Dutch model, and on the other hand, 
you have the French model. They are all having problems, 
especially with racism and xenophobia, but overall, I don’t see a 
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there is no headscarf ban anywhere in Europe and they can all 
practise their religion as they please. 
An MP voiced similar opinions, stating: 
Problems with Muslim minority rights exist in some, but not in all 
European countries. Look at Holland. There are 264 mosques that 
the Turks go to, there is no headscarf ban, and there are no 
problems with religious education. The Moroccans for example 
have their own separate mosques. However, you also have more 
problematic cases like France. Recently, some problems began to 
emerge in Germany since they want to restrict education in the 
mother tongue. So these problems don’t always have something to 
do with Islam, but they can also be about language. But I still don’t 
see a huge problem there. 
There were other party officials who sought to provide a more 
detailed account of the problems regarding Muslim minority rights in 
Europe, for example one who stated:  
I think the issue has a psychological, institutional and an economic 
dimension. At the psychological level, the prevailing notion of 
Euro-centrism and the feeling of uniqueness among some in 
Europe have prevented Europe from being a melting pot like the 
United States. At the institutional level, you need strong 
institutional mechanisms to integrate these people, to give them 
proper religious education to prevent radicalism, to teach them the 
language of the host country and to preserve the cultures of the 
minority groups. You cannot achieve these via things like 
language tests. At the economic level, you need to make sure that 
these people have a chance to move beyond their ghettos. That of 
course requires strong political commitment. Immigration policies 
also require close relations with the countries of origin. For 
example, our relations with Germany are in a much better state 
now than they used to be. 
The issue of Muslim minority rights in Europe is often related to the 
debate over the differences and similarities between the EU and US models 
of democracy. Such comparison is made in two related spheres. One 
concerns democratic practices within Europe and the US, whereas the 
second relates to the use of the notion of democracy in foreign policy, 
specifically in the southern neighbourhood. Regarding democratic practices 
within the two, despite acknowledging the prevailing notion of ‘security’ 
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US model is still viewed more favourably in the context of minority rights, 
religious freedoms and the application of secularism in the country. As one 
party official argued: 
National identity is very strong in Europe, unlike in the US. Being 
German comes from birth; it is very difficult to acquire it later. If 
you do not speak good French, you cannot be a Frenchman. Britain 
has a rooted past based on traditions. It is easier to integrate in the 
US, to move up in the system. An immigrant can become a foreign 
minister in the US whereas this would be very difficult in the case 
of Europe. 
According to an MP: 
[O]n the issue of religion, the Anglo-Saxons have encountered 
Islam in more peaceful circumstances. So especially until 11 
September, there has been less prejudice towards Islam in the US. 
Continental Europe in particular has fought Islam for centuries in 
its history and so their attitude towards Islam is more hostile than 
the Americans. Religion is a more distinguishing feature in Europe 
than it is in the US. 
Similarly, another MP expressed the following sentiments: 
It is true that the US experienced a serious turning point in its 
democracy after 11 September. It has entered a phase of paranoia 
on security and terrorism. However, as for the upper limits of 
democracy, the margins always were and still are wider in the US 
than in Europe since the regime still has a lot of confidence in 
itself. The democratic system still works better in America. Just 
look at secularism and religious freedoms in the US and you will 
appreciate how wide the margins really are. 
These statements are also in line with the findings of other scholars 
who argue that AKP officials feel closer to the US model, which is referred 
to as a kind of “passive secularism”, wherein “the state is neutral towards 
various religions, but allows the public visibility of religion”, as opposed to 
practices in countries such as France, where “the state favours a secular 
worldview in the public sphere and aims to confine religion to the private 
sphere”, also referred to as “assertive secularism”.121  
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The instance in which American democracy is most criticised is the 
way in which US foreign policy practices are not challenged sufficiently in 
the domestic sphere. As a party official underlined: 
There are two sides to America. It is doing rather well on the 
inside, but its foreign policy practices make us question the 
democratic practice inside the country. In Europe, public opinion 
and civil society are able to constrain governments. Aznar lost the 
elections in Spain because of his stance on the war in Iraq. Blair has 
been put in a difficult position in the UK, but this does not go for 
the US. 
A related argument is put forward by another party MP, “One thing 
about US democracy is that brain-washing of the public is much easier 
there than it is in Europe. In that sense, I see a deeper understanding of 
democracy among the European publics”. 
Some party officials have been highly critical of the way in which the 
notion of democracy is upheld in both European and American foreign 
policies, while others have emphasised that they find Europe to be more 
genuine in its efforts to promote democracy in its neighbourhood. The 
remarks of a prominent foreign policy adviser are exemplary of those who 
criticise the notion of democracy in both European and American foreign 
policy approaches: 
One can argue that the EU is more principled and genuine than 
instrumental when it comes to democratisation in its candidate 
countries. However when it comes to other countries, Europe 
behaves very pragmatically. Look at the way in which they 
supported the military coup in Algeria for example, or look at their 
policies in the southern neighbourhood. The use of democracy in 
US foreign policy can also be considered fully instrumental, even 
more so than in Europe since you cannot be a candidate to join the 
US. For the US, democracy is an instrument that is disguised as a 
principle. You only need to look at the reactions of the US to the 
elections held in Iraq, Egypt and Palestine last year. Palestinian 
elections were the fairest; participation was very low in Iraq and 
there were population displacements; the opposition was not even 
given a chance in Egypt. Elections in Iraq were found much more 
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successful and legitimate, the results in Egypt were considered 
legitimate, but the results of the Palestinian elections were not 
even considered legitimate. So the US only approaches democracy 
from the perspective of its own foreign policy interests and this 
goes pretty much for Europe as well. 
An MP making a similar argument stated, “I think both the EU and 
the US lack sincerity in their foreign policy approaches. For them it is all 
about how democracy can be instrumentalised for their own interest. They 
do not have any problems with authoritarianism in Jordan, Egypt or Saudi 
Arabia, but they are pushing for democracy in other countries”. 
Yet, this dual critique is not shared by all in the party. An equal 
number of interviewees consider EU foreign policy and its emphasis on 
democratisation as more sincere, although they question its effectiveness in 
practice. As one MP stated: 
EU foreign policy is much softer and relies more on diplomacy and 
gradual change. The US tries to bring democracy through force, 
not through dialogue and participation of all the parties 
concerned. The EU expects countries to reform themselves from 
within and lays down the rules for that. The US forces you to 
apply the rules that it has set. Until 2002, Turkey was completely 
under the orbit of the US and its democracy has not exactly 
benefited from it; in fact, just the opposite. 
Another party official expressed similar thoughts: 
I find EU foreign policy to be more genuine than that of the US. 
The problem with the EU is that there are many different member 
states with diverse interests preventing it from having a strong 
common foreign policy. There are those that are closer to the US 
and those that are at the other end of the spectrum. [sic] How can 
you expect them to formulate a coherent and effective foreign 
policy like that? 
A discussion about EU and US foreign policy approaches revealed 
that the party elite has a high level of awareness of EU policy in the 
Mediterranean, and although EU efforts in the region are viewed more 
favourably in comparison with those of the US they are still criticised. The 
criticism is mainly on the grounds that the EU’s primary concern is to 
secure its own interests in the region and that it does not allow for equal, 
sufficient and effective participation of the relevant parties in the southern 
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The ENP is in principle a good policy. Now that the Union has 
new members, the relations between its members in the periphery 
and the new neighbours have become more important than ever. 
You need to establish stronger and institutionalised cooperation 
mechanisms in the neighbourhood. The EU cannot pull its weight 
in the Mediterranean since it cannot escape from its pragmatic 
outlook on the region. It only cares about Tunisia and Morocco so 
that further instability does not lead to mass immigration into 
Europe. So I believe that keeping the region under a certain degree 
of control is more important for the Union than actually 
democratising it. This makes it very difficult for long-term 
principles to take root. This is not very different from what the EU 
is doing in the eastern neighbourhood. For example, it does not 
question what is happening between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
You see an important amount of selectivity there. 
Another party official criticised the policy on the basis that the 
relationship between the EU and the neighbourhood countries is not one of 
equal partners: “I think the EU policy in the Mediterranean has the 
potential to be successful, but the EU has to stop viewing its Mediterranean 
policy as a one-sided favour rather than a constructive dialogue. The policy 
needs to reach a position where the two parties stand on equal grounds. I 
do not think that it has come to that stage yet”. 
8.3  Cooperation and conflict 
There are four main areas that AKP party officials hold to be the main 
spheres of cooperation with the EU, namely the strengthening of 
democracy and human rights (some explicitly mention the further 
civilianisation of Turkish politics), economic relations, good governance 
through the adoption of the EU acquis,  and foreign and security policy 
(including energy issues). 
It is believed that “not only can the EU help Turkey in further 
democratisation but Turkey can also help the EU in spreading democracy 
in its neighbourhood”, as one official put it. In terms of economic relations, 
the levels of trade and investments between the EU and Turkey are often 
cited as the primary indicators of how the two economies are intertwined 
and how further investment in particular would be beneficial for the 
Turkish economy. Regarding foreign and security policy, the 
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often found to be ‘under-utilising’ the potential for collaboration with 
Turkey in this area. According to a party official: 
Foreign policy issues that are not primary to Europe are of crucial 
importance to us, like Northern Iraq and Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
Turkish foreign policy agenda coincides with the UN’s agenda. 
Turkey has more foreign policy responsibilities and concerns than 
the EU. As long as the EU does not feel the same degree of 
importance in the same areas, effective harmonisation and 
cooperation will be difficult to achieve. There is a significant 
degree of cooperation and consultation mechanisms…when it 
comes to domestic policy. We need equally strong consultation 
and cooperation mechanisms in foreign policy matters. The EU has 
turned to Turkey on problems with Iran; Turkey’s policy in the 
Iraq war and in Lebanon was in line with the EU; consultations 
were made on Palestine; but these need to be strengthened and 
better institutionalised. 
Conflictual areas can be classified under two main headings. One 
concerns the headscarf ban, which is viewed by an overwhelming majority 
of party officials as a human rights problem that is overlooked by the EU. 
The other conflictual area relates to the perception that the EU is applying a 
policy of double standards to Turkey.  
Concerning the headscarf ban, on 29 June 2004, in the case of Leyla 
Şahin v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights decided that the 
Turkish state had not violated the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Freedoms by expelling Leyla Şahin from university because of 
her headscarf. The interviews conducted for this paper confirm that this 
decision has led to a significant degree of disappointment with Europe 
within the AKP, although it would be wrong to state that it has 
substantially reversed the party’s overall pro-EU orientation. It can be 
argued that the case led to a reassessment among certain segments of the 
party as to how far Europe could contribute to changes in Turkish 
secularism. The fact that EU reports only focus on the rights of Alevis and 
the non-Muslim minorities while keeping silent about the situation of the 
Sunni majority is also a factor that has helped strengthen this opinion. As a 
parliamentarian highlighted: 
I am very sensitive on the headscarf issue. Europe is liberal about 
the rights of everyone, but very cruel when it comes to one of the 
most important issues. They do not see this as a human rights 
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disappointment with the EU. We feel really alone in an essential 
area of cooperation. Some in Europe understand, some do not. I do 
not know how we can ever put the message across. 
Another MP expressed similar sentiments: 
What really bothers me about the silence of the EU on the 
headscarf ban is the fact that nowhere in Europe is there a stricter 
ban than the one in Turkey, not even in France. For a pious 
woman, the headscarf is not the symbol of oppression but of 
liberation; this is what they do not understand… What is even 
worse is the fact that when the issue is the headscarf or the 
religious freedoms of the Sunni majority, the EU sides with the 
Turkish military. The Turkish military then cleans its hands of the 
issue and leaves it to the EU, knowing that they can be just as 
strict. 
Although these criticisms seem to reflect the stance of the majority in 
the party, there are also the voices of others in the margin who do not see 
this as a conflictual issue in relations with the EU. As one parliamentarian 
argued: 
I do not think that the headscarf issue in Turkey has anything to 
do with the EU. True, Europe has its own issues with the 
headscarf, but I do not think that the EU should interfere in how 
Turkey deals with this issue. This is something that we ourselves 
have to resolve, through societal consensus; the EU does not have 
enough knowledge or experience of Turkish customs, traditions or 
religion to intervene in this matter.  
In the second area of conflict, namely the perception of EU double 
standards and discrimination, concerns seem to be even more profound 
and unanimously shared. It also needs to be noted that these concerns 
overlap almost entirely with those of the secularist establishment about the 
EU. Such perceptions of double standards are invoked in relation to 
various issues. EU policy in Cyprus is chief among them. All of our 
interviewees berated EU policy in Cyprus as a blatant act of discrimination 
against Turkey. As one policy adviser argued, “the constant rewarding of 
Greek Cypriots after the referendum has led to cleavages within the party”. 
Another issue in which discrimination is inferred relates to minority rights, 
particularly regarding the rights of the Kurdish minority. The example of 
the French model often arises as the most suitable for Turkey in this 
respect. It is also very commonly held that the EU overlooks its own 
minority problems such as the situation of the Turkish/Muslim minority in 130 | AYDIN & ÇAKIR 
 
Greece while it is applying pressure on Turkey. The issue of minority rights 
is often brought up together with the Armenian genocide debate. This issue 
is influenced by the fact that the European Parliament’s Eurlings report in 
its draft format asked for recognition of the Armenian genocide as an 
official criterion for Turkey’s accession. In the words of one MP, “You 
cannot possibly force this population to endorse a crime that it has not 
committed. This is a problem with the EU’s own collective sub-conscious, 
trying to spread its own guilty conscious onto others”. 
Another issue that elicits the discrimination argument involves the 
clause that allows permanent derogations in the EU’s negotiating 
framework with Turkey. As one party official underlined:  
The EU is saying that they need to allow for permanent 
derogations to ease the concerns of their public. They are also 
saying that it is our duty to win the hearts and minds of European 
citizens. Why was this argument never made for any other 
candidate country? I really believe that the EU is not being fair to 
Turkey. 
Such double standards are very often held to be the symptomatic 
surface of the EU’s unwillingness to have a Muslim country ‘in the club’. 
As the same party official remarks, “The main perception in the party is 
one of being discriminated against by t h e  E U  b e c a u s e  w e  c o m e  f r o m  a  
different cultural and religious background. The EU cannot be explicit 
about this, so instead they are trying to make us give up on the way by 
asking for requirements not asked from other candidates”. 
8.4  Islamists outside the AKP 
The AKP is not the only party in the Turkish political landscape that has a 
pro-Islamic orientation. The party that it split from – now functioning 
under the name of the Saadet [Felicity] Party (SP) – tries to appeal to a core 
Islamist constituency from further to the right of the political spectrum and 
a more explicitly Islamic outlook. The SP only managed to win 2.5% of the 
votes in the 2002 elections and hence it is not represented in parliament.122 
Nevertheless, it can still be considered a challenger to the AKP’s core 
constituency who may be alienated from the party because of its reluctance 
to act on issues regarding the public role of Islam. In this respect, the party 
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programme states, “The artificial impediments in education that are against 
human rights and the principles of belief will be abolished, the practices 
that prevent the graduates of religious schools to enter the faculty of their 
choice will be lifted. Human rights and democracy courses and courses on 
religion and ethics will be compulsory in schools”. 
The party has also returned to its 1970s slogan of ‘ethics and morality 
first’, which was not present in the discourse of its predecessor party in the 
1980s and 1990s: 
Ethics and morality are our flags. History has witnessed that 
nations who stick to their moral and ethical values have 
established big civilisations whereas those that deviated from them 
have lost their power… For that reason, we believe that the 
strengthening of our ethics is compulsory for a healthy 
community. 
The SP also adopts an anti-Western outlook with a discourse that is 
once again reminiscent of the 1970s National Salvation Party. It is explicitly 
against the US and is strongly opposed to accession to the EU. Europe is 
viewed as a ‘Christian club’ that a country of Muslim people should not 
seek to join. As the head of the party, Recai Kutan, has recently stated: 
Is there any other party in Anatolia that supports opposition to the 
US other than us? No. There is only the Felicity Party that 
represents the National Outlook. The obsession with the European 
Union has destroyed them [the AKP]. They keep on saying ‘we 
will never let Turkey join, not in a thousand years’. When will 
Turkey join the EU then? Only when religious people die and 
those young generations [of Turks] who are able to convert are 
fully grown up. Only then Turkey will be accepted in the 
European Union, which is a Christian club.123  
The incompatibility of Western values with Islam is also often 
invoked together with claims that instead of pressing for EU membership, 
Turkey should look more towards the East. According to Mr Kutan, “full 
membership of the EU means compromising independence and 
surrendering to Western culture and civilisation”, whereas Turkey should 
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be “leading the Islamic world to create a more just world order”.124 Europe 
and Islam are often placed in binary opposition to each other where Islam 
is looked upon as the biggest enemy of Europe today. It is observed that 
such SP discourse usually intensifies in the immediate aftermath of key 
events such as the visit by Pope Benedict XVI to Turkey and the Danish 
cartoons crisis. Immediately following the latter episode, the party’s Vice 
President, Lütfü Esengün, argued that “this event has revealed once again 
Europe’s true face as an enemy of the East and Islam with its media, 
governments, courts and civil society institutions…this comes from history. 
Animosity towards Islam is in the genes of the West…Europe displays its 
hatred and vengeance…at every available opportunity”.125 
It is very often claimed that Western civilisation, of which Europe is 
held to be an essential component, is unjust and consists of double 
standards. In the words of the party’s vice chairman, “The main source of 
the problems that we are suffering today lies in modern Western values. In 
this sense we are facing a civilisational crisis… The values of the Western 
world can no longer sustain this world”.126 
The SP is not only opposed to closer relations with Europe solely on 
cultural and civilisational grounds, but also on the basis of the extreme 
nationalist stance that Europe’s ultimate aim is to divide and partition the 
country. The two arguments are often combined in expressing oppositional 
views to Europe: “The concessions given to Europe threaten the country’s 
unity, enslave the Turkish economy and corrupt our moral values”127 and 
“Europe’s aim is to have a disintegrating and Christianised Turkey”.128  
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The ‘hostile’ Europe that the SP discourse constructs is not a model of 
democracy and human rights, but one of a ruthless entity that turns a blind 
eye to developments in the southern neighbourhood: 
Those Europeans who teach us human rights lessons are 
themselves human rights violators. Hundreds of thousands of 
people are being slaughtered only because of their beliefs in Iraq, 
Palestine and Lebanon. This is the Western conception of human 
rights; their civilisation upholds blood, tears and sheer force…the 
AKP is talking of attaining EU standards. Europe is not a 
civilisation; who are you taking as a model?129  
Turkey’s Hezbollah party is a marginal force; based in south-east 
Turkey, it is a militant Islamist Sunni group unrelated to the Lebanon-
based Shi’ite Hezbollah, with a history of violent struggle with the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Turkish Hezbollah is not a strong 
political force; rather it has managed to survive by virtue of its social roots. 
It is the part of the Islamist spectrum most clearly at odds with the EU. 
Indeed, the main preoccupation of the Turkish Hezbollah is now related to 
European countries’ clampdown on (what are deemed to be) terrorist 
groups, rather than its opposition to the Turkish state. Hezbollah claims 
that it has renounced violence, but serious doubts remain over the 
compatibility of its ideology with the democratic values pursued by the 
government in cooperation with the EU. There is no strong evidence to 
suggest that the ultimate goal of jihad has been dropped from the 
Hezbollah agenda. Although a marginal force, Hezbollah still competes 
with Kurdish nationalism for the allegiances of people in the south-east, 
presenting a potential threat of further instability in a region that already 
requires far-reaching reforms on the road to EU accession.  
Conclusions 
An overwhelming majority of AKP members view the EU as the primary 
anchor of Turkish democracy and modernisation, despite the perceived 
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limitations of cooperation on issues relating to the reform of Turkish 
secularism. Yet growing mistrust towards the EU as a result of inferred 
discrimination and double-standard practices by the EU has a serious 
potential to reverse these perceptions within the party. This concern also 
links to arguments over the emergence of a Turkish model for other 
Muslim countries. Turkey is indeed a case in which an Islamic legacy has 
not prevented democratic reform and it is being watched closely by some 
of the political movements in the Arab world, thanks also to Turkey’s 
improving relations with its southern neighbours. Nevertheless, the EU 
accession process, which has played a crucial role in triggering change, 
remains uncertain and Turkey still has not come to terms with issues 
arising from the politics of Islamic identity that lie at the heart of the 
debates over Islam and democracy. On top of this, the Turkish experience 
with secularism, however problematic, has also played a unique and 
powerful role in shaping the opinions of Islamists in the country, making it 
very difficult to emulate Turkey’s reform process elsewhere in the Muslim 
world. Hence, rather than being a “model”, one can at best see Turkey as 
“an example from which lessons can be drawn”,130 hoping that it will, in 
the meantime, stay on course for full democratisation and EU accession.  
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9.  THE IMPACT OF WESTERN POLICIES  
TOWARDS HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH: 
WHAT WENT WRONG? 
NATHALIE TOCCI 
Introduction 
International policies and in particular EU and US policies towards Hamas 
and Hezbollah have had multiple and interlocking effects in the last two 
years. Most visibly, Western policies have impacted upon the two 
movements themselves, on the domestic governance systems in Palestine 
and Lebanon, and on the relations between Hamas and Hezbollah and their 
respective domestic political rivals. In turn, they have also had an impact 
on the conflicts between Israel and Palestine/Lebanon, and on the 
mediating roles of the international community. The balance sheet is far 
from positive. Paradoxically, western policies have often hampered the 
quest for international peace, democracy and good governance, as well as 
inter- and intra-state reconciliation. This chapter offers a comparative 
analysis of the impact of Western policies on three principal domestic and 
international dimensions of the Middle Eastern conundrum: 
o  the transformation and popularity of Hamas and Hezbollah, 
o  Lebanese and Palestinian governance and 
o  intra-Lebanese and Palestinian reconciliation. 
9.1  The impact on the transformation and popularity of Hamas and 
Hezbollah 
Western policies have not succeeded in their intention to weaken Hamas 
and Hezbollah, but have on the contrary have entrenched their popular 
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large-scale and growing popular bases, a fact that western policies seem to 
have willingly ignored. 
Hezbollah first emerged as a highly ideological/religious and 
internationalist resistance movement.131 The party was established in the 
context of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which hit Lebanon’s 
south – densely populated by Shiites. In articulating its resistance identity, 
Hezbollah opted for an ideological, internationalist and revolutionary 
outlook, taking as its inspiration the Iranian revolution, which over the 
years was consolidated through Iranian finance and training. Hezbollah’s 
resistance identity persisted after the 1989 Taef accords, when it retained 
separate militias in the south, which ultimately contributed to Israel’s 
withdraw from Lebanon in 2000.  
Yet beyond resistance, Hezbollah gradually also developed into a 
Lebanese political force. While its 1985 ‘open letter’ placed primary 
emphasis on Hezbollah’s international rather than Lebanese character and 
rejected participation in Lebanon’s institutions, Hezbollah’s identity 
progressively changed with and after its participation in the 1992 elections. 
This entailed a growing focus on Lebanese rather than international 
problems. Hence, Hezbollah refocused its attention exclusively on Israel’s 
continuing occupation of the Sheba farms post-2000 rather than of 
Palestinian territories. It also entailed a growing acceptance of the 
specificities of the Lebanese political system and in particular its 
confessional nature, which it had hitherto opposed. In turn, Hezbollah 
renounced any aspiration to enforce Islamic law in Lebanon and accepted 
that Lebanon could only be governed through a delicate inter-confessional 
balance. 
This transformation in the nature and strategy of Hezbollah was 
determined above all by changing Middle Eastern politics and power 
balances. Just as the Iranian revolution and its success in overthrowing the 
Shah had inspired Hezbollah’s early internationalist and revolutionary 
outlook, the death of Khomeini coupled with the post-cold war and post-
Gulf war reconfiguration of the Middle East induced Hezbollah to redirect 
its attention to Lebanon. At the same time, Israel’s occupation of Lebanon 
until 2000, its ongoing occupation of the Sheba farms and its war in 
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Lebanon in the summer of 2006 continued to feed Hezbollah’s resistance 
identity, even while it was abandoning its revolutionary character. Finally, 
the 2003 war in Iraq, the 2005 assassination of Refik Hariri and the ensuing 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon have all strengthened the rationale for 
Hezbollah’s tightening ties with Iran and Syria – political, financial and, in 
the case of Iran, ideological. Western policies do not appear to have had a 
discernible direct role in these developments, beyond naturally influencing 
the wider Middle Eastern spectrum.  
In contrast to Hezbollah, Hamas has transformed itself into a 
resistance movement, rather than being born as one. Hamas emerged in the 
1980s as a social movement conducting charity-based social work, and only 
later developed into a militant group in the 1990s. Like Hezbollah, by the 
turn of the century, Hamas also shifted into the domestic political arena, 
entailing its growing co-option into Palestinian political dynamics. Moving 
away from its rejection of both the PLO132 and the PA, Hamas has 
participated in municipal elections since 2004, in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections and in the ensuing PA governments. It has also officially 
requested to be included in the PLO since the March 2005 Cairo 
Declaration. Hamas’ co-option into the Palestinian political system has led 
to an incremental change in its political strategy. Its participation in the 
PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) and the PA since 2006 meant that its 
outright rejection of the Oslo accords (by which the PA was legally 
founded) was no longer tenable. Likewise, its claims to enter the PLO, 
whose 1988 Charter endorsed a two-state solution, meant that its 
categorical non-recognition of the State of Israel became more nuanced. 
This gradual co-option into the Palestinian political system is by no means 
irreversible. Far more than Fateh, which particularly during Arafat’s era 
was highly centralised, Hamas, like Hezbollah, has a diversified leadership. 
There are several currents within Hamas pushing the movement in 
different directions. These can be roughly sub-divided between currents 
closer to the Muslim Brotherhood, currents that are more pragmatic and 
technocratic in nature, and currents that are more prone to confrontation 
and violence. In other words, Hamas’ transformation is the product of the 
movement’s changing internal balances. 
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The reasons for Hamas’ transformation lie first and foremost in 
domestic Palestinian politics. Hamas’ entry into the domestic political 
arena is the product of domestic political calculations, i.e. its growing 
popularity due to the failure of the Oslo process and Fateh’s failures in 
governance and the peace process with Israel.133 A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
Hezbollah, Western policies played no role in inducing Hamas’ 
transformation into a mass domestic political force. Western policies did 
not even influence noticeably the progressive shift in Hamas’ political 
strategy, and in particular its growing implicit acceptance of a two-state 
solution, which was consolidated with the February 2007 Mecca agreement. 
According to all interlocutors in the region, the principal reasons for these 
shifts lie in Hamas’ decision to enter the PA and the PLO, and Hamas’ 
awareness of the necessity to compromise with Fateh in order to do so. 
If Western policies have had any impact on either Hamas or 
Hezbollah and their respective roles in Palestinian and Lebanese societies, 
they have been, in this author’s view, counterproductive. The US, in 
particular, and to a lesser extent the EU, have opted for a strategy of hard 
negative conditionality towards both movements, i.e. the threat of inflicting 
punishment (such as sanctions) or withdrawing benefits (such as aid or 
diplomatic contacts) unless certain conditions are met. Hezbollah is 
included in the US terrorist list, while Hamas is considered a terrorist 
organisation by both the EU and the US. In addition, since Hamas entered 
the PLC and the PA, both the US and the EU in the context of the Quartet 
have insisted on three ‘principles’ (see below), which evolved into 
becoming de facto conditions for their having contacts with the Hamas 
government, and the delivery of aid to this government.134  
In view of the inclusion of Hamas on the EU and US terrorist lists, 
some form of conditionality was necessary. Most evidently, for normal 
diplomatic contacts to take place, Hamas would have to be removed from 
the terrorist lists and to do so it would have to demonstrate its disavowal of 
terrorism. Yet the US and the EU, and in turn the rest of the Quartet, went 
much further, a mere five days after the Palestinian elections. On 30 
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January 2006, the Quartet announced that only if Hamas i) renounced 
violence, ii) accepted previous agreements and iii) recognised Israel (or 
according to some, Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state), would the 
Quartet deal with the PA government.  
With the exception of the conditionality on violence, these political 
conditions are legally dubious, a fact whose seriousness is magnified by the 
participation of the UN in the Quartet. The conditionality on Israel’s 
recognition has no legal grounding in so far as only states and not political 
parties can recognise other states (at most the PLO as the internationally 
recognised representative of the Palestinian people can do this, of which 
Hamas is not yet part). Furthermore, as Palestinians promptly note, the 
peace process between Israel and other Arab states has never been made 
conditional upon the Arab world’s recognition of Israel or its right to exist. 
Yet this demand was placed on the PA, leaving unanswered the key 
question of on which borders should Israel be recognised, not to mention 
the fact that the PLO’s recognition of Israel in 1988 hardly brought with it 
tangible gains for the Palestinians. Moreover, little attention was paid to the 
fact that the same conditions had been flouted by Israel over the years. The 
international community has in fact repeatedly condemned Israel for its 
disproportionate use of force harming Palestinian civilians and its violation 
of international law and previously signed agreements. Regarding the 
acceptance of previous agreements in particular, it was Sharon’s 
government in March 2001 – and not the PA – that first claimed it would 
only ‘respect’ rather than ‘accept’ previous agreements, adding to this that 
its respect would be conditional on the conduct of the other side.135  
Predictably Hamas, the Hamas-only and the ensuing National Unity 
Government (NUG) did not fully endorse the three conditions. While 
refraining from the use of suicide attacks against Israel since the 2005 Cairo 
Declaration, Hamas and the NUG – on the basis of Article 3 of the May 
2006 prisoners’ document – did not renounce the use of violent resistance. 
Neither did Hamas nor the PA ‘accept’ previous agreements, but rather 
agreed to ‘respect’ them at Mecca. While Khaled Meshal has repeatedly 
declared that “[i]t is true that in reality there will be an entity or state called 
                                                      
135 Akiva Eldar (2007), “The Syrian secret Sharon did not reveal to Olmert”, 
Haaretz, 20 March. POLITICAL ISLAM | 141 
 
Israel on the rest of Palestinian land”,136 the Hamas leader has also stated 
that “[t]he agreement reached at Mecca does not mean recognition of the 
Israeli entity”.137 In response, the US, the EU, and surprisingly also the UN 
boycotted the PA, and the EU and the US withheld assistance to it.138  
In punishing Hamas and Hezbollah, the Bush administration seems 
to have aimed at weakening or defeating the two movements. Others, 
principally in Europe, hoped to induce their ‘moderation’ or ‘cooptation’. 
Both aims have failed, and their failure appears rooted in the lack of 
understanding of the two movements and their roles in their respective 
societies. Aiming to defeat Hezbollah or Hamas through violence, sanctions 
and boycotts misses the key political reality that – unlike global jihadist 
groups – both are mass nationalist movements, which are by now deeply 
engrained in Lebanese and Palestinian societies. As such they cannot be 
eradicated through targeted negative international policies.  
Western policies have failed to weaken these two movements. On the 
contrary, by supporting Israel, undermining democratic processes, and 
imposing sanctions on a democratically elected government and a 
population under occupation, Western policies have discredited their 
legitimacy and enhanced the resistance images of Hamas and Hezbollah in 
the region. Hezbollah’s resistance to Israel, unstopped for 34 days by the 
international community (and indeed encouraged by some quarters in 
Washington), or Hamas’ persistence in government despite international 
sanctions and Israel’s attacks and imprisonments, have at the very least left 
the domestic popularities of these two movements untarnished. In fact, 
these policies have most likely raised support for the two movements.139 In 
the case of Hamas, it is also important to note that amongst the most 
harshly hit by Western sanctions have been PA employees, the vast 
majority of whom are Fateh supporters. 
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Finally, while both Hamas and Hezbollah have become increasingly 
co-opted into their respective political systems, this has occurred in spite of 
rather than because of Western policies. Indeed, especially in the case of 
Palestine, far from inducing Hamas to accept the Quartet’s conditions, 
Western policies could re-empower currents within Hamas that are more 
prone to violence and refuse engagement with Israel. Hamas’ take-over of 
Gaza suggests that these developments may well already be happening. As 
the honeymoon of the NUG came to an end in May-June 2007, in view of 
persistent international boycotts and stalemate on the reunification of the 
security apparatuses, the more extreme fringes within Hamas (largely 
unrepresented in the NUG and thus not having a stake in it) routed the 
PA’s security apparatus in Gaza after violent fighting in mid-June 2006.  
9.2  The impact on Lebanese and Palestinian governance 
Western policies towards Hamas and Hezbollah have also had a 
problematic impact on the evolution of democracy and governance in 
Palestine and Lebanon.  
In the case of Palestine, both the US and the EU have repeatedly 
called for democracy and good governance, and indeed the Bush 
administration made the reform of the Arafat-led PA a sine qua non for the 
resumption of the peace process in 2001-02. Beyond declarations, the EU in 
particular has supported democracy and good governance in Palestine in 
several ways. In 2001-05, it carefully conditioned its budgetary assistance to 
reforms in the fiscal, judicial, executive and administrative domains of the 
PA, and it provided financial and technical support for elections and 
technical reforms.  
Yet subsequent policies towards Hamas since 2006, by trumping all 
other aims, have undercut the West’s own professed aims in Palestine. 
Hamas’ electoral victory presented the international community with 
critical challenges and opportunities. First, Hamas’ participation in 
elections offered the opportunity to overcome a major anomaly in 
Palestinian political life: the existence of an increasingly popular mass 
movement operating outside the legal confines and control of the 
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war crimes, in its struggle against Israel.140 Including Hamas in the legal 
Palestinian political system could have opened the prospect for a much-
needed Palestinian re-think of their national liberation strategy within the 
confines of the law. This all the more so given that Hamas itself, far from 
expecting a landslide electoral victory and not quite knowing how to 
handle governance, had invited Fateh to join a coalition government in 
January 2006. Second, Hamas’ victory presented the opportunity for a 
healthy transition of power in Palestine, a critical transition in view of the 
symbiosis between the PA and the PLO’s political class, represented 
principally by Fateh and constituted predominantly by returnees from 
Tunis.141 This transition not only offered the scope for greater democracy 
and better governance, but it could also have provided the necessary 
stimulus for the rejuvenation of Fateh. Related to this, this transition of 
power could have added momentum to the reform of PA institutions. 
Capitalising on Fateh’s ill-governance, Hamas’ 14-page ‘Change and 
Reform’ electoral platform, and its clean-hands reputation in the 
governance of municipalities, could have provided an additional push in 
the reform efforts supported by the West. 
Unfortunately, however, none of this occurred. Following Hamas’ 
rejection of the Quartet’s principles, the West boycotted the PA 
government, withheld aid to it, and the international community froze 
international bank transactions in Palestine in view of the US Congress’ 
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Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act.142 In addition, Israel, in violation of 
previous agreements and international law, has withheld Palestinian tax 
revenues since January 2006 (approximately $50 million per month 
amounting to one-third of the PA’s monthly revenues), it has repeatedly 
arrested dozens of Hamas ministers and parliamentarians, and it has 
restricted their movements both between the West Bank and Gaza and 
within the West Bank and Jerusalem. In addition, the PA government has 
also been boycotted from the inside. In view of the symbiotic relationship 
between Fateh and the PA, the new government took office in a hostile 
internal environment in which the vast majority of public employees were 
affiliated with Fateh. This culminated in the 4-month strike by public sector 
employees in the fall of 2006, which paralysed the crumbling PA. In other 
words, Western sanctions, coupled with Israel’s policies and internal power 
politics, made Western pleas for democracy and good governance in 
Palestine appear only as a stunning illustration of the notorious double 
standards. 
But not only have Western policies contributed to a paralysis of the 
PA, the resumption of assistance since June 2006 has contributed to a 
reversal of the few steps forward made in Palestinian governance in 2002-
05. In early 2006, international and Israeli policies were pushing Palestine 
to a dangerous humanitarian and economic brink, setting off alarm bells 
from UN agencies, the World Bank and international NGOs.143 In response, 
at the EU’s instigation, the Quartet agreed on a Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM): a mechanism through which funds would be channelled 
to the Occupied Territories (OTs) while bypassing the PA with the 
exception of the presidency. The TIM indeed pulled the OTs back from the 
brink, providing social allowances (rather than full salaries) to almost 90% 
of non-security public sector employees and emergency assistance and food 
aid for approximately 73,000 low-income households. It also provided 
direct financial and material support to the health, education, water and 
                                                      
142 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-4681 
143 See, for example, the Office of the Special Envoy for Disengagement (2006), 
Periodic Report, April; UN (2006), Assessment of the Future Humanitarian Risks in 
the Occupied Palestinian territory, April; or Oxfam (2007) “Poverty in Palestine: 
The human cost of the financial boycott”, Briefing Note, April 
(http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bn070413_palestinian_aid_boycott.pdf/downlo
ad). POLITICAL ISLAM | 145 
 
social sectors, channelled though international agencies and NGOs, as well 
as funds to pay fuel bills (principally to Israeli providers) after Israel’s 
destruction of the power-plant in Gaza. The TIM, coupled with the growing 
need for humanitarian assistance, led to a critical rise in Western assistance 
to the OTs. Between 2006 and 2007, in the words of UN envoy de Soto, 
“Europeans have spent more money in boycotting the PA than what they 
previously spent in supporting it”.144 Indeed EU aid to the OTs (including 
member states) rose by 30% in one year, totalling €700 million in early 2007.  
While preventing a much-dreaded humanitarian catastrophe, the 
sanctions regime and the ensuing TIM had catastrophic effects on 
Palestinian governance. In terms of civilian rule, the OTs increasingly 
resembled a semi-international protectorate, in which Palestinian 
institutions function predominantly as a skeleton allowing the international 
community to deliver aid to the population under occupation.145 This has 
had several detrimental effects. First, the PA no longer remotely resembles 
a state-in-the making. As such, the PA is largely absolved from any 
responsibility towards its public regarding both governance and internal 
security. In this respect, a recent declaration by Khaled Meshal is revealing: 
“we are determined to make sure that the recent internal fighting, which 
appalled our people and dismayed their supporters around the world, 
becomes history. We firmly believe that it would have never happened had it not 
been for foreign intervention and the brutal sanctions imposed on our people by 
Israel and its allies”.146 Indeed, despite Hamas’ non-delivery on its ‘Change 
and Reform’ platform and the spiralling security situation on the ground, 
Palestinians have by and large not held Hamas responsible.147  
Second, the sanctions and the TIM have reversed the few steps 
forward made in PA governance reform in previous years. The bypassing 
of official institutions with the exception of the presidency has led to a re-
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centralisation of powers in Abbas’ hands. This situation drew much 
criticism from the West during Arafat’s rule. It has also generated an 
increasingly unaccountable and opaque management of the available PA 
funds. It is revealing that when Salam Fayyad, former Finance Minister 
under Ahmed Qureia’s governments, was re-nominated minister under the 
2007 NUG, he set out to repeat the fiscal reforms he had implemented three 
years earlier.148 Finally, the TIM and its focus on humanitarian rather than 
development assistance has generated a dangerous culture of dependence 
in the OTs. Whereas for example in 2005 only 16% of EU aid to Palestine 
constituted humanitarian assistance, this rose to 56% by the end of 2006.149  
Finally, Western policies have contributed to Gaza’s dangerous slide 
into chaos and lawlessness. Beyond the boycott of the PA, the EU and US 
have not held Israel accountable to its legal obligations, including the 
delivery of tax revenues, the easing on restrictions on movement and its 
implementation of the November 2005 Movement and Access Agreement. 
Admittedly, the EU has repeatedly called upon Israel to deliver,150 yet 
neither the EU nor the US has followed up its words with action. The EU 
has also not objected to carrying out its border monitoring mission at Rafah 
according to Israel’s decisions (thus accepting the border crossing to be 
closed over 40% of the time, and permanently so since the end of the NUG 
in June 2007). The ensuing absence of effective Palestinian government and 
Israel’s hold over the Gaza Strip have created fertile ground for criminal 
mafia-style gangs and al-Qaeda-like cells to operate in Gaza’s open-air 
prison.151 Beyond threatening Gazans (e.g. the bombs planted in Gaza’s 
internet cafés) and international staff (such as the kidnapping of BBC 
journalist Alan Johnston), the growth of criminal gangs and Islamist cells 
also poses a threat to Hamas. The emergence of small Islamist groups cages 
Hamas in. On the one hand, having been co-opted into the PA, extremist 
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militant groups appeal to disaffected and radicalised segments of Hamas’ 
constituency. On the other hand, Hamas is further delegitimised by the 
international community by being associated with these al-Qaeda-like 
groups by the West. It is notable that in a May 2007 statement, the Quartet 
jointly condemned in the same sentence “Hamas and other terrorist groups 
in Gaza”.152 Since the end of street fighting in Gaza and Hamas’ take-over 
of the Strip in June 2007, the internal security situation has improved. In 
particular, Hamas’ executive force succeeded in liberating BBC journalist 
Alan Jonhston, captured by the jihadist group Jund al-Islam, linked to the 
Dagamush clan in the Strip. Yet while law and order may have improved, 
it is unlikely that Hamas can restore governance, let alone development, in 
Gaza without a reversal of Western and Israeli policies towards Hamas. 
Since June 2007, the Rafah crossing has remained closed, entry access for 
humanitarian assistance remains limited and salaries to Hamas affiliated 
public employees remain unpaid.153  
Turning to Lebanon, the EU in particular has placed much emphasis 
on democratic and governance reforms. Especially since Lebanon was 
included in the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 and the EU 
published an ENP Action Plan for Lebanon in 2007, the Commission has 
carefully spelled out in agreement with the Lebanese government a wide 
array of reform priorities across different policy fields. The Action Plan 
includes priorities in the fields of democracy (e.g. reform of the electoral 
law), human rights and the rule of law (e.g. the adoption of a human rights 
strategy) and institution-building (e.g. security sector reform). To support 
these nationally-agreed reform priorities, the Union has declared its 
willingness to offer Lebanon a “stake in the single market”, enhanced 
political cooperation and dialogue and support in legislative 
approximation aimed at reducing trade barriers. Most significantly, at the 
January 2007 donor conference for Lebanon, the EU pledged $520 million, 
France a further $650 million and the US $1 billion in assistance.154 In 
addition, the European Investment Bank has committed €960 million in 
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loans. EU funds have been earmarked for political and economic reforms, 
economic recovery, reconstruction, infrastructure rehabilitation, de-mining 
and assistance to Palestinian refugees.  
In presenting these reform priorities and the policy and financial 
instruments to support them, the West, and in particular the EU, has 
repeatedly underlined the need for a national and inter-confessional 
understanding and agreement. The Commission stated that “[o]nly if the 
reform process is backed by a national pact, encompassing all political 
forces as well as religious and ethnic groups, and thereby overcoming 
political rivalry, vested interests and clientelism, will it have a chance of 
actually being implemented”.155 Indeed this appeared to be the case when, 
after the 2005 Lebanese parliamentary elections, an inter-confessional 
governing coalition was established between the Future Movement (Sunni), 
the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze) as well as the two Shiite parties, 
Amal and Hezbollah. It was during this period that negotiations between 
the EU and Lebanon on the Action Plan were carried out. Although the 
Action Plan was agreed in January 2007, it largely responded to the 
Government of Lebanon’s Ministerial Declaration of July 2005, a 
declaration made at a time when Hezbollah was represented in the 
Lebanese cabinet and parliament. Negotiations on the Action Plan were in 
fact carried out before May 2006, that is, before Hezbollah’s walk-out from 
the government in November that year. EU officials involved in the 
negotiations have privately noted Hezbollah’s constructive attitude in these 
talks.156  
Notwithstanding the Western appreciation of the need for a national 
pact, at no time did EU actors or the US express reservations regarding 
Hezbollah’s exit from government and its formation of an opposition front 
with Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement in the fall of 2006. More 
worryingly, no action has been taken by the West to resolve the Lebanese 
impasse following the demonstrations and strikes organised by the 8 
March opposition front in December 2006, the ensuing freeze in regular 
parliamentary activity and the ongoing political tensions and violence.  
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The weakening of Lebanon’s governance due to the domestic 
stalemate between Fuad Siniora’s government and the Hezbollah-Aoun 
opposition front has been exposed and imperilled further by the 
confrontation with Fateh-al Islam in Nahr al-Bared and Jund-al Sham in 
Ain al-Helwa in May-June 2007. Similar to the situation in the Gaza Strip, 
Lebanon’s pockets of lawlessness and widespread poverty (notably in 
Palestinian refugee camps) have provided fertile ground for small al-
Qaeda-like cells to establish themselves and threaten both the Lebanese 
government and the Hezbollah-led opposition, as well as the Lebanese 
state as a whole. The external dimension in this last tragic twist in Lebanese 
politics is difficult to assess. Some argue that Fateh al-Islam has been 
financed by Syria to counter the Siniora government. Others suggest that 
these Salafi groups are close to the Future Front and have been supported 
by Saudi Arabia and thus indirectly by the West as a means to expose the 
weakness of the Lebanese army and empower UNIFIL to disarm these 
groups and Hezbollah and to control the border with Syria (through which 
Iranian financial and material support to Hezbollah is provided).157 The 
truth in these and other allegations is difficult to ascertain, and possibly 
both may be partly true. The only conclusion that can be drawn from these 
explanations is that whether Syrian and/or Saudi/American, the external 
dimension of the current violence in Lebanon is highly likely, and it is 
dangerously weakening the fragile Lebanese state. 
9.3  Impact on intra-Lebanese and Palestinian reconciliation 
The most worrying impact of Western policies towards Hamas and 
Hezbollah is the polarising effect they have had on intra-Palestinian and 
intra-Lebanese politics, polarisation that has led to tension and standstill in 
Lebanon and pushed the Gaza Strip into a bloody civil war and political 
separation from the West Bank.  
Despite its Islamist identity and evident appeal to the Shiite 
community, Hezbollah has traditionally opposed Lebanon’s confessional 
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system, which maintains a careful balance of power between confessional 
communities in government, parliament and civic administration. It 
accuses the system of fostering corruption and undemocratic practices and 
hindering modernisation and reform.158 Hezbollah often declares that its 
neighbour Israel – a confessional state – is its starkest reminder of why of a 
mono-confessional system should be avoided.159 Indeed, following the 2005 
assassination of Refik Harari, Hezbollah’s leader Sayyid Nasrallah was 
among the first Lebanese actors to call for the resolution of the crisis 
through inter-confessional dialogue and elections. In the elections and 
government that followed, Hezbollah entered a cross-confessional 
government with the Future Movement, the Druze Socialist Party and the 
Shiite Amal. When Amal and Hezbollah left government, the ensuing 
cleavages between government and opposition continued to be cross-
confessional, with the Shiite parties allying with Michel Aoun’s Free 
Patriotic Movement. Furthermore, beyond Hezbollah’s demands for a 
blocking (1/3) minority in government (i.e. 8 rather than 5 ministers in the 
24 member Cabinet), amongst the official reasons for the walk-out was 
Hezbollah’s demand for a national unity government that included Aoun, a 
demand which the Future Front refused to concede. The cross-cutting 
confessional split in Lebanese politics notwithstanding, the current political 
situation is highly polarised between the 14 March (government) and the 8 
March (opposition) fronts, representing two political coalitions.  
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In principle, the West and the EU in particular supports the 
reconciliation between Lebanese forces, as stated, inter alia, in UNSC 
resolutions 1559 (2004), 1701 and 1680 (2006). More specifically, EU High 
Representative Javier Solana has called upon “the different leaders of the 
different forces [to] work together for all that supposes progress”, while 
Commissioner for External Relations and the ENP Benita Ferrero Walder 
has advocated a “pro-Lebanon consensus” amongst Lebanon’s political 
class, free from external interference by great powers.160  
But alas, Western policies have exacerbated this polarisation and the 
ensuing stalemate in governance. Beyond the disagreements on domestic 
power-sharing, representation and Hezbollah’s disarmament, the political 
split between the two fronts largely reflects their different views regarding 
Lebanon’s international alliances. The Future Front instead accuses 
Hezbollah of accepting Syrian and Iranian meddling in Lebanese affairs 
and thus hindering Lebanon’s much-sought sovereignty and 
independence. Hezbollah instead accuses the Future Front of acting as a 
Western stooge and tacitly accepting Israel’s 2006 attack as a means to 
achieving Hezbollah’s disarmament. It also resents the American and 
French support for Siniora’s anti-Syrian coalition, and the one-sided 
approval by the Western media to the February-March 2005 
demonstrations (dubbing these a ‘cedar revolution’), in contrast to their 
relative silence over the 2006 Hezbollah strikes and demonstrations. 
Indeed, amongst the triggers for Hezbollah’s government walk-out was the 
controversy over the UN Security Council resolution establishing an 
international tribunal for Hariri’s assassination and Hezbollah’s resentment 
towards Siniora for not having appropriately discussed the draft within the 
government.  
This resentment grew in view of Hezbollah’s reservations about the 
broad powers for criminal prosecution the UN draft entrusted to the 
international community, resulting, in Hezbollah’s view, in a crucial 
limitation of Lebanese sovereignty and a legally sanctioned forum to 
prosecute Syria. Moreover, by passing the resolution under Chapter 7 of 
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the UN Charter, Hezbollah is concerned that the powers entrusted to the 
international community would ultimately empower the West to forcefully 
disarm Hezbollah itself. This is a prospect that Hezbollah believes the 
Future Front is actually pushing for in view of its disappointed reaction to 
UNIFIL’s limited mandate under Chapter 6.161 Prominent government 
leaders such as Walid Jumblatt (Socialist Progressive Party) have in fact 
openly called for a revision of UNIFIL’s mandate to ‘implement’ the 
provisions of the Taef accords and thus Hezbollah’s disarmament. Finally, 
Western aid to post-war Lebanon has also fuelled cleavages between 
government and opposition in view of the government’s refusal to share 
Western funds with Hezbollah in order to reconstruct the devastated south, 
inducing Hezbollah to rely on Iranian funds to undertake these tasks, thus 
exacerbating the intra-Lebanese political divide. 
In the case of Palestine, polarisation took far graver proportions, 
culminating in the slide towards civil war between Hamas and Fateh. The 
principal actors in this confrontation are concentrated in the security sector, 
and indeed a major source of division lies precisely in the control of the 
security services. The roots of this conflict lie in the 1990s, when Fateh’s 
Mohammed Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub, heads of the Preventive Security 
Forces in Gaza and the West Bank, respectively, undertook a series of 
arrests of Hamas militants in view of the wave of suicide attacks that 
followed the 1996 Hebron massacre.  
This latent conflict came to the fore after Hamas’ 2006 electoral 
victory, when Fateh – in shock over its electoral defeat – refused to devolve 
power to the new government as well as to participate in a coalition with 
Hamas, fearing this would reinforce and legitimise Hamas further. In 
particular, despite the fact that reforms in the 2002-05 period had partly 
shifted control of the Palestinian security forces from the presidency to the 
Interior Ministry, Fateh refused to devolve security competences to the 
Hamas-controlled Interior Ministry. In turn, Hamas established its own 
security apparatus, linked to its militant wing, the Iz’a din el Qassam (the 
Executive Forces), and pitching these against Abbas’ presidential guard led 
by Dahlan and linked to Fateh’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. More generally, 
key elements in Fateh set out to make the Hamas government fall in order 
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to return to power without having to compromise with it. In May-June 
2006, President Abbas engaged in a series of ploys, including the call for a 
referendum on the ‘prisoners’ document’ and early elections in order to 
alter Hamas’ policies with respect to the conflict.162 In the autumn, 
(predominantly Fateh-affiliated) PA employees went on a four-month 
strike, which, together with international sanctions, paralysed the Hamas-
led PA. 
This is not to say that the two fronts were inevitably set for 
confrontation. There are important forces within each faction that 
supported reconciliation, as evidenced by Abbas’ support in 2005 for 
Hamas’ participation in elections, Hamas’ invitation to Fateh to join a 
coalition government in January 2006, and above all the two factions’ 
acceptance of the February 2007 Mecca agreement and the ensuing 
formation of the NUG. The latter was represented principally by Fateh 
(with six ministers, including the deputy prime minister) and Hamas (with 
nine ministers, including the prime minister) as well as by independent 
representatives nominated by either one faction (e.g. Fateh nominated the 
Foreign Minister – Ziad Abu Amr) or another (e.g. Hamas nominated the 
Interior Minister – Hani al-Kawasmeh). There were strong forces pushing 
for the Mecca accord. First and foremost was the impending threat of intra-
Palestinian violence and civil war in Gaza, which in December 2006-
January 2007 had claimed over 100 lives.163 According to one analyst, rather 
than national unity, the Mecca accord offered the scope for ‘national 
salvation’.164 Both factions in fact realised that internal violence would 
completely discredit them vis-à-vis their constituencies.165 Hamas in 
particular appreciated the fact that it could not counter the rising 
lawlessness and extremism in Gaza without a strong and united Palestinian 
security force. It also realised that unless it reached a compromise with 
Fateh, it would be unable to govern. Fateh instead seemed to appreciate 
that regaining power by force was not an option. Second, both factions 
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were receptive to Saudi Arabia’s role and influence. Fateh saw this as a 
means to revive the Arab peace initiative and not appear as a Western 
puppet in the eyes of its electorate, while at the same time compromising 
with Hamas without losing face with the US. Hamas saw the Saudi role as 
a means to gain legitimacy and standing in the Arab world.  
Interestingly, not a single interlocutor attributed the sanctions regime 
with having a direct impact on the incentives of the two factions to reach a 
national unity government. At most, some argued that sanctions 
contributed indirectly and in extremely costly ways to this outcome. By 
weakening Hamas’ capability, the sanctions – it is argued – contributed to a 
(bloody) balance of power between Hamas and Fateh, whereby a 
disgruntled and unmotivated Fateh would not completely ‘lose’ to Hamas, 
given that the latter was being weakened by external forces. This balance of 
power meant that the internal conflict could not be resolved through 
confrontation, but would require compromise. Yet in contrast to arguments 
suggesting that sanctions weakened Hamas into a compromise, one should 
note that it was Fateh and not Hamas that refused to form a coalition 
government a year earlier.  
The general view thus seems to be that a national compromise was 
reached in Mecca thanks to Saudi mediation in spite of rather than due to 
Western policies. Yet, the reaction of the West would be pivotal in 
determining the fate of the newborn government. All interlocutors made 
two principal points. First and most intuitively, the government could only 
survive if it was allowed to function. In order for this to happen in a non-
state, aid-dependent and occupation-ridden situation, Western aid would 
have to resume and Israel would have to fulfil its legal obligations by 
delivering Palestinian tax money, easing restrictions on movement and 
releasing imprisoned Palestinian law-makers and ministers. Second and 
most challengingly, Palestinian security forces, effectively operating as 
militias for either one faction or the other, would have to be reunited, in 
order to foster reconciliation between the factions and allow the PA to 
restore law and order. Third, the government would have to show its 
electorate it could deliver some, even if marginal, successes in its relations 
with Israel, such as, for example, a prisoner exchange.  
None of this happened. Europeans, including the Commission and 
several member states, initially showed cautious relief and optimism 
following the formation of the NUG. Indeed the Mecca accord and the 
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Quartet ‘conditions’ had imposed upon them, and out of which they 
attempted to extricate themselves through the TIM. But the tune from 
Washington remained unchanged, as the US (and Israel) soon made clear 
that the Mecca agreement and the ensuing NUG fell short of meeting the 
Quartet principles.166 With the exception of non-EU states such as Norway 
or Switzerland, which indeed opened formal contacts with Hamas, Europe 
followed Washington, muting its initial support for the NUG and retaining 
its boycott and aid block on the PA. The Union only marginally deviated 
from Washington’s stance by establishing contact with non-Hamas 
ministries.167 Taking the cue from this line, the Commission reactivated its 
technical assistance to the Palestinian Ministry of Finance under the 
leadership of Salam Fayyad in June 2007. The EU’s policy reversal was thus 
marginal as well as ill-thought out. In the event that the NUG worked 
cohesively, the EU’s choice of dealing exclusively with non-Hamas 
members would be purely abstract, in so far as each and every member of 
the government would represent the NUG as a whole. In the event that the 
NUG failed, as turned out to be the case, the EU’s choice of one-sided 
contact and assistance would create further divisions between Fateh and 
Hamas. 
More gravely, Israel continued withholding taxes to the PA, with the 
exception of $100 million allegedly delivered by Israel to the presidential 
guard (Fateh).168 It also maintained movement restrictions and arrested 
further Hamas parliamentarians and ministers in the West Bank. Finally, 
the US continued to provide military assistance and training to Fateh 
militias.169 Since Hamas’ electoral victory, strong currents in the US have 
been fomenting confrontation between the two factions, hoping to see 
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Fateh’s return to power through a hard coup if need be.170 In early 2007, the 
US delivered $60 million in training and non-lethal weapons to the 
presidential guard and the newly founded National Security Council under 
Dahlan’s leadership. This had the effect of removing any incentives to unify 
the security forces under the PA Interior Ministry.171  
All was set for a new round of confrontations in May-June 2007. Over 
the course of a few weeks, Interior Minister Hani al-Kawasmeh resigned 
following Abbas’ refusal to unite the security forces, hundreds of US-
trained forces loyal to Mohammed Dahlan entered the Gaza Strip from 
Egypt, unprecedented street fighting and political violence re-erupted and 
Hamas violently took control of the security forces in the Strip. The 
violence culminated in mid-June 2007 with Hamas’ ‘victory’ in Gaza, the 
flight of Fateh militants (including Mohammed Dahlan, Rashid Abu 
Shabak and Samir Mashharawi) to either the West Bank or Egypt, and 
Abbas’ dissolution of the NUG and nomination of a non-Hamas 
government in the West Bank under the premiership of Salam Fayyad. In 
response, the West, far from reversing its strategy, has reinforced it. It has 
immediately stated its willingness to work with the (unelected) Fayyad 
government in the West Bank and resumed aid and assistance to it. Israel 
has also declared its willingness of devolve approximately $300-400 million 
of withheld PA tax money to the West Bank government.172 In Gaza instead 
the West appears intent on defeating Hamas through a tightened boycott 
and isolation on the Strip.  
The future evolution of the OTs is difficult to predict. What can be 
safely concluded is that, unintentionally or not, Western policies have 
contributed to this tragic outcome, having de facto fomented civil war and 
triggered a political, aside from the physical, separation between the West 
                                                      
170 “Elliot Abrams’ uncivil war”, Conflict Forum, 7 January 2007 
(http://conflictsforum.org/2007/elliot-abrams-uncivil-war/). 
171 “Abbas faces showdown as outlawed Hamas force increases”, Sunday Herald, 7 
January 2007. 
172 Adam Entous (2007), “US, Israel plan to ease sanctions to boost Abbas”, Reuters, 
15 June. POLITICAL ISLAM | 157 
 
Bank and the Gaza Strip.173 With this last tragic twist in events, the 
moribund two-state solution appears to have reached its final death-bed.  
Conclusions 
The international community, and in particular the policies of the US and 
the EU, have not achieved their intended results of weakening or 
‘moderating’ either Hamas or Hezbollah. On the contrary, they have 
contributed to the stalemate in governance in Lebanon and the lawlessness 
and lack of governance in Palestine. Western policies have also fuelled 
polarisation and confrontation within both Palestine and Lebanon, leading 
most dramatically to a civil war in Gaza, the ensuing political split between 
the West Bank and Gaza, and with it the disappearance of any realistic 
prospect for a ‘two-state solution’. In addition, Western sanctions and 
boycotts have complicated further the prospects for Arab-Israeli peace. The 
West has de facto inserted preconditions into the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process. In conflict situations, it is normally the international community 
that engages in diplomatic acrobatics and at times exerts hard-nosed 
pressure to ensure that conflict parties abandon preconditions and similar 
delaying tactics for their engagement in negotiations. This has indeed been 
the case in the Middle East since 2000, when Israel insisted on a set of 
preconditions for its reengagement with the Palestinians. Through its 
‘principles’, this role has now been taken over by the Quartet. Israel’s 
ongoing preconditions and its illegal withholding of Palestinian revenues 
are simply presented as acts of compliance with Quartet’s policies.  
In doing so, the EU in particular has effectively out-manoeuvred itself 
from having effective influence on the two conflicts. This is because its 
influence principally derives from its disbursal of financial assistance 
contingent upon the recipient’s compliance with specified conditions and 
rules. In Lebanon, while assistance is disbursed and Hezbollah has not 
been subject to sanctions and boycotts, aid is not being made contingent on 
efforts at national reconciliation between the two fronts, without which 
effective reconstruction and reform cannot be easily achieved. The sheer 
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amount of European assistance to the war-torn country could, however, if 
carefully conditioned, prove to be a critical incentive to achieve national 
reconciliation, reform and, in due course, Hezbollah’s disarmament. 
In Palestine, the withholding of aid and the institutionalisation of the 
TIM have diminished the EU’s influence on the day-to-day development of 
Palestinian institutions and policies, entrenched its dependence on aid and 
undermined the reform process in the PA. The ensuing resumption of aid 
to the unelected Fateh government in the West Bank and continued boycott 
of the Hamas government in Gaza have entrenched the political separation 
between the West Bank and Gaza, while confirming in the eyes of the 
public the West’s lack of respect for democratic standards. If instead EU aid 
had been deployed on the basis of legally and politically sound conditions, 
it could have greatly contributed to inducing reconciliation between the 
factions, the development of a more coherent Palestinian national strategy 
and the establishment of good governance, prior to the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. 
These results are far-removed from the EU’s policy intentions and 
objectives in the Middle East. The sentiment expressed by a US envoy to 
the Quartet who privately declared that he “like[d] this violence”, referring 
to the quasi-civil war in Gaza in early 2007, is certainly not shared by the 
vast majority of the public in the EU.174 Most EU policy-makers closely 
involved in Middle Eastern affairs are also ready to recognise in private 
that the Union has often operated against its declared interests in the 
Middle East. The reason for this is largely rooted in the reality that, when 
decisions ultimately have to be taken, the EU is highly reluctant to break 
ranks with the US. The same goes for the Quartet as a whole, which in de 
Soto’s words acts more as a “Group of Friends of the US” than as a 
mediating forum for the Middle East.175 This has dramatically reduced the 
EU’s room for manoeuvre, confining it to working on the margins of US-
dictated policies. There are voices within several member states that are 
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agitating for the Union to give greater priority to its Middle Eastern 
interests alongside its transatlantic priorities. It is only if these voices can 
acquire greater weight within the EU that policy suggestions and indeed 
policy reversals can be contemplated and elaborated upon. 
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10. POLITICAL ISLAM AND EUROPE VIEWS 
FROM THE ARAB MEDITERRANEAN 
STATES AND TURKEY 
ROBERT SPRINGBORG 
Introduction 
The social, political and even economic power of moderate Middle East 
Islamists has been growing for a generation or so, but the phenomenon was 
not given the attention it deserved by outside observers and policy-makers 
until the impressive recent electoral performances by Arab Islamists in 
Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco and, most recently, Bahrain. Earlier 
accomplishments at the polls by the Islamic Action Front in Jordan in 1989 
and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey in 2002, although 
signalling the importance of political Islam, did not establish its status as 
the pre-eminent oppositional political force in the region. Now that status 
cannot be disputed. As a result, the question of how to deal with Islamists 
who reject violence, embrace democracy and outperform their competitors 
at the polls has become a central concern not only of incumbent Middle 
East elites, but of interested foreign actors as well.  
For the European Union (EU) and its member states, the US and the 
governments of other member countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the present political configuration 
in most Middle East and North African (MENA) countries presents a well-
known and fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, they are 
uncomfortable both with the authoritarianism of most incumbents and 
with much of the content of Islamists’ beliefs and policy preferences. On 
the other hand, they are comfortable with the semi-secular policies of most 
incumbents and with moderate Islamists’ apparent embrace of democratic 
processes. Hence the question these foreign governments confront is how POLITICAL ISLAM | 161 
 
to square the circle in their dealings with MENA countries, ruled over by 
authoritarians with (at least, nominally) acceptable policies but 
unacceptable methods and challenged by Islamists whose democratic 
methods are acceptable but many of whose policy preferences sometimes 
seem to be inimical to Western interests and beliefs. The purpose of this 
volume has been to begin to explore ways in which this dilemma might 
best be resolved.  
Because relatively little is known about the attitudes and opinions of 
moderate Islamists and because most have yet to establish track records in 
government, this investigation has focussed on them, leaving aside 
questions concerning the beliefs and behaviour of the semi-secular 
incumbent MENA elites and, for that matter, of Western political elites as 
well. Recognising then that this is a first step in seeking information to 
address the dilemmas posed to Western governments by authoritarian 
incumbents and apparently democratic Islamist challengers, it nevertheless 
provides a useful introduction to understanding the relevant views of 
moderate Islamists. This information can in turn assist in evaluating the 
costs and benefits to concerned parties in the West of entering into dialogue 
with Muslim democrats; in understanding how such a dialogue might best 
be structured; and in anticipating realistic expectations of any dialogue that 
might occur. 
In order to accomplish these objectives the contributors to the volume 
were instructed to utilise a standard protocol176 for their investigation of 
Islamism within the country of their concern. The subjects of focus in the 
protocol were the evolution of Islamism and the views of Islamists on 
several related issues, including political reform, democratic models, EU 
foreign policy, and areas of potential collaboration and difference with 
Europe. The findings reported in the various chapters are thus sufficiently 
comparable both to discern differences between countries and to formulate 
empirically-based generalisations about Islamism within the MENA 
generally. The purposes of this chapter are to do just that, as well as to 
draw out the implications of these empirical findings for a potential 
dialogue with Europe. To do this the chapter will first identify empirical 
regularities and differences across the case studies. It will then take up 
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some issues that the data do not address or provide insufficient bases upon 
which comparative observations can rest. It will then shift to a 
consideration of the costs and benefits of engagement with Islamism. 
Finally, it will conclude with some recommendations as to how a dialogue 
might best be conducted. 
10.1  Who are the Muslim Democrats? 
Muslim democrats consist of those movements and organised political 
parties that have either rejected violence and radicalism or restricted its 
application to what they see as efforts to achieve national liberation; or 
have evolved from being politically passive and focused on encouraging 
personal religiosity and/or providing social services, into being political 
activists. Many of them are former exiles, who have returned to their native 
countries following previous confrontations with incumbent regimes. In 
some cases movements and organisations of Muslim democrats combine 
these different backgrounds, having formerly been supporters of political 
violence and in other periods having operated primarily in exile.  
All of the Muslim democrats under study, with two exceptions, are 
national Islamists in that their political focus is on their own nation-state, 
where they are seeking through democratic means to exercise political 
power. The two exceptions are Hamas and Hezbollah, which are more 
correctly thought of as Islamist liberation movements in that the primary 
stimulus for their creation and for much of their present raison d’être has 
been confrontation with an occupying power. These two parties have also 
not completely and absolutely eschewed the use of violence in the domestic 
politics of Palestine and Lebanon, respectively. They can possibly be 
thought of as Muslim democrats, however, because they have accepted the 
rules of democratic contestation in their respective national settings and are 
not substantially more inclined to violence than other political actors with 
whom they are competing.  
The long political journey of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or 
Muslim Brothers) illustrates the tortuous path followed by many Muslim 
democrats, which is hardly surprising given that the leading organisations 
in most Arab countries are either national organisational offshoots of the 
MB or were inspired by it. It commenced essentially as a social movement 
dedicated to personal spiritual regeneration and social service provision in 
Egypt in 1928. As the anti-British struggle intensified in the post-war era, 
the MB was both politicised and radicalised, with its armed wing entering POLITICAL ISLAM | 163 
 
into guerrilla combat in the Suez Canal zone against the British and its 
secret underground organisation engaging in assassination of leading 
Egyptian political figures. Accused of plotting against Nasser in 1954 after 
it had been afforded special political status by the Free Officers who sought 
to use its power to bolster their own, the MB was crushed.  
Upon Nasser’s death in 1970 his successor, Anwar al Sadat, 
commenced almost immediately to court the MB as a counterweight to the 
then powerful left. But as Sadat’s domestic political position deteriorated 
following his trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, he began to clamp down 
on all forms of autonomous political activity, including that by the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
The same scenario of a new regime courting popularity through a 
political liberalisation played itself out under President Mubarak, who, 
succeeding Sadat in 1981, let MB members and other political figures out of 
jail and permitted the MB to run for elections in alliance with the Wafd 
Party in 1984, despite the fact that it was not allowed to register as a 
political party. Since that time the MB has increased its political presence, 
although in zigzag fashion as the regime has alternated between allowing it 
political space and cracking down on it. It steadfastly refused to be drawn 
into the early 1990s insurgency led by the more radical Islamist 
organisations, chief of which were Islamic Jihad and Gama`a Islamiyya, but 
this did not prevent the regime from accusing it of so doing and harassing 
it in various ways. The combination of its political experience gained 
through electoral campaigns and membership in parliament, along with its 
solid membership base, enabled it to win 88 seats in the 454 member 
parliament in the 2005 elections, a remarkable achievement in the face of 
voter intimidation and general electoral fraud perpetrated by the regime.  
In sum, the Egyptian MB at various stages in its almost 80-year 
history has manifested virtually all forms and stages of Islamist political 
organisation. In its early period it was politically passive, focused instead 
on personal behaviour and social services. It then became politically 
engaged and was swept up in anti-colonial and internal violence. Crushed 
by Nasser and then revived by Sadat, who permitted its leading members 
to return to the country, it definitively turned its back on political violence 
in the 1970s and has sought since then to build its capacities to compete for 
power within that political space the regime allows. It has used its 
influence in recent years to impact policies, especially in the cultural 
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and its trajectory to non-violent, democratic participation has no doubt 
served as a model for many of them.  
Whatever the particular path MENA Islamist organisations have 
followed to arrive at their present state of Muslim democrats, their 
moderation is now comprised of several different components. First, they 
renounce violence against domestic actors, although not against Israel in 
the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, organisations which also maintain 
significant coercive capacities that have direct relevance to the internal 
politics of Lebanon and Palestine, respectively. So by this measure the 
status of Hezbollah and Hamas as Muslim democrats is somewhat 
ambiguous and will remain so unless and until, as a minimum, they 
absolutely and unequivocally renounce the use of violence in domestic 
politics and take practical steps to implement that policy. Whether or not a 
renunciation of violence against Israel is also required for them to be 
dubbed Muslim democrats is a much more complicated matter and 
involves considerations of international law and foreign policy that are 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
Second, these parties and movements have engaged directly in 
democratic practices, especially elections, although it is probably also true 
to say that they would not reject other paths to power, such as through co-
optation by the military. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that their 
political manoeuvring is intended to m a k e  t h e m  s u i t a b l e  p a r t n e r s  f o r  
politically beleaguered militaries and security forces that might one day 
find themselves in need of such allies. Still, this scenario, which was acted 
out in Egypt in the 1952-54 interregnum and for some period of time after 
the Umar al Bashir coup in 1989 in the Sudan, seems less likely than a 
democratic scenario in most national settings. For one thing, Islamists have 
learned through the experiences of Egypt and Sudan that a Faustian 
bargain with the military is fraught with peril. For another, Hamas has 
recently demonstrated that electoral victory is possible; while Hezbollah 
has shown that even minority participation in government as a result of 
electoral performance provides substantial benefits. The Turkish case of the 
Justice and Development Party assuming the reins of power is also 
instructive. For Muslim democrats to throw away their chances of 
exercising governmental power through the ballot box in favour of a short 
cut via an alliance with the military would suggest political despair, to say 
nothing of poor political judgement, neither of which seems to characterise 
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Third, Muslim democrats are measured in their approach to 
Islamicisation. Unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Muslim democrats of 
Turkey and the Mediterranean Arab world have been reasonably cautious 
in their efforts to spread Islamic practices, although there is considerable 
variation in how strident these efforts have been. In Palestine Hamas has 
explicitly renounced any desire or attempt at imposed Islamicisation, while 
Hezbollah has taken the position that Lebanon is a pluralistic, multi-
cultural society in which religious diversity must be respected. Morocco’s 
Justice and Development Party (PJD), despite its status as the third largest 
party in parliament, has not vociferously advocated measures to impose 
Islamic dress or other manifestations of religiosity. On the other hand, 
Egypt’s MB has used its presence in parliament to launch attacks on 
governmental actions that they deem to be too liberal or secular and have 
also sought through the courts to restrict personal freedoms that they deem 
to violate strict interpretations of Islam. Whether it and others like it would 
seek to impose Islamicisation if the y  w e r e  t o  a t t a i n  p o w e r  i s  a n  o p e n  
question, but there are good reasons to suggest that they would not, chief 
among which are political calculations based on fear of backlash by both 
domestic and international political actors were they to do so. For Egypt, 
the presence of a Christian minority that comprises some 6-10% of the 
population and is actively supported internationally poses a further 
restraint.  
Fourth, some Islamists have demonstrated, at least at the elite level, a 
willingness to engage directly with non-Muslim international actors, such 
as democracy promoters from the US and the EU and its member states. In 
Egypt, for example, both the parliamentary and party leadership of the MB 
have worked with the Westminster Foundation’s project to strengthen 
various capacities of parliament. Similar cooperation has occurred in 
Morocco, whereas in Palestine Hamas has conveyed its willingness to work 
with Western governments, who have refused to reciprocate. While all 
Muslim democrats express reservations about involvement of European 
and North American actors in their respective political systems, this in no 
way differentiates them from most secular nationalist opposition figures or 
even from incumbent authoritarians, the latter of which typically condemn 
external support for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
democratisation activities in general, but which have no qualms about 
themselves receiving various types of support from those same external 
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In addition to sharing a growing tendency towards moderation, the 
movements and political parties labelled here as Muslim democrats are also 
characterised by significant gaps between their leaders and followers, 
precisely because they are mass-based organisations. Unlike most of their 
secular and semi-secular competitors within political oppositions, which 
are typically coteries of elites without popular bases, or government-
controlled and -created single parties that are loosely-knit patronage 
vehicles, Muslim democrats typically span the social order. Their leaders 
are normally educated professionals, while at the base they recruit 
successfully from among the petty bourgeoisie and even among the socially 
marginal, including unemployed and undereducated youths. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that within the same organisation a wide variety of 
different interests and outlooks exits.  
A key question (beyond the scope of this book) is how leaders of 
these movements and organisations retain the loyalty of their followers, for 
objectively their interests are not identical and socially they may inhabit 
and reflect quite different milieu. A common observation about moderate 
Islamist leaders is that they appear remarkably familiar with Western 
models and procedures and seem to have no difficulty in interacting with 
Westerners, even in their own languages. Presumably if asked about the 
reasons for the loyalty of their followers, these leaders would invoke 
explanations to the effect that they share common views of social, economic 
and political problems precisely because they are all committed Muslims. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether or not shared ideological commitment 
provides sufficient glue to bind together those of markedly different social 
backgrounds within a single political organisation, the question remains of 
how such coherence is created, maintained and acted upon operationally. 
Might it be middle level apparatchiks who provide key linkages between 
elites and the mass base? Alternatively, might it be that these Islamist 
organisations are comprised of coalitions based on pre-existing social units, 
with the organisational sinews thus linking the leaders of these social units, 
who in turn deliver their followers? 
Whatever the answer is to the query of how the gap between leaders 
and their followers is bridged in these organisations, it is apparent from the 
evidence presented in this volume and more generally that Muslim 
democrats are under constant threat of being outflanked by extremists. 
Indeed, in virtually every country under study both moderate and radical 
Islamist organisations coexist. In the case of Egypt, for example, the 
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former, Islamic Jihad, Gama`a Islamiyya and a host of smaller 
organisations have track records of violence and uncompromising stands 
towards the government and its Western backers, even though some have 
in recent years renounced violence. On the right, al Wasat, as suggested by 
the very name - which means ‘the middle’ – is an attempt led by young 
political entrepreneurs to capture the political middle ground between the 
MB, on the one hand, and those who are less committed Islamists and even 
Christians, on the other. In Palestine, Islamic Jihad stands firmly on Hamas’ 
left flank, frequently refusing to honour ceasefires and other concessions 
that Hamas is willing to make. A similar relationship exists in Morocco 
between the establishment-oriented PJD and the more radical Justice and 
Charity. The history of the Islamist insurrection in Algeria cannot be told 
accurately without reference to the split between the Islamic Salvation 
Front (FIS), which gradually eschewed violence, on the one hand, and the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), on the other, which intensified it. All Islamist 
organisations are banned in Syria, but the Syrian Muslim Brothers 
operating from exile are pursuing a moderate, non-violent line, while 
occasional acts of political violence, such as the attack on the US Embassy 
in 2006, suggest that radical underground Islamist organisations are not 
content with non-violent means to deal with their perceived enemies. In 
comparatively democratic Turkey the ruling moderate Islamist AKP has to 
be wary of the appeals of the considerably more radical Felicity Party. The 
fragmentation of both Sunni and Shi`a communities in Iraq into numerous 
Islamist political organisations, with some eschewing violence and others 
perpetrating it on a daily basis, is the extreme case that exemplifies the 
general trend. 
This evidence suggests that Muslim democrats do not have the 
Islamist political  field to themselves. Others who claim to be yet more 
democratic than they or, more typically, more effective because they have 
not ‘sold out’ by renouncing violence and accepting democracy, are present 
in virtually every country in the region. The relative strengths of moderates 
and radicals are determined in large measure by the contexts in which they 
operate. Probably the most common theme running through the recent 
history of these countries is that the radicals overplay their hand, inviting 
massive and successful retaliation by governments, leaving the ground 
clear for the moderates. This scenario played itself out in Syria in the early 
1980s, in Egypt in the early 1990s, in Algeria later in that decade. In Turkey 
one can read the history of the last quarter century as one in which 
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moderation, leading ultimately to their successful assumption of 
governmental power in 2002. It would be incorrect, however, to assume 
that history moves in a uni-linear, predictable fashion and that present 
contexts, which by and large favour moderates, will persist. The volatile 
situations in Lebanon and Palestine are possibly the most likely candidates 
for a return to conditions in which moderation is overwhelmed by violent 
approaches, but they are by no means the only possible candidates for such 
changes.  
That moderation is in significant measure a product of context and 
that radical organisations are for the most part still present, but sitting on 
the political sidelines presumably waiting for a return of conditions that 
will favour them rather than Muslim democrats, suggest the tenuous 
nature of the present conjuncture. Moderation has yet to be firmly 
institutionalised, which requires it not only to be incorporated into the 
political system and to be accepted by important external actors, it also 
requires accommodation and ultimate acceptance by other domestic 
political forces. Not even Turkey has yet met those preconditions, as many 
significant Turkish political actors still harbour ambitions of turning back 
the political clock to Kemalist secularism and evicting Islamists not only 
from government, but from the political and social systems more broadly. 
It would hardly be surprising, therefore, if Muslim democrats were 
contingent ones. Threatened on their flanks by other Islamists, in the front 
by opposed governments and powerful foreign actors, and in the rear by 
the frailties of their own organisations, they naturally must feel compelled 
to keep all options open. Democracy is the preferred, but not the only 
option. They would be politically foolish to make their last stand for 
democratic principles when other actors in the system are violating them. It 
is thus vital that so long as democracy remains contingent in the mind of 
those who are in positions to help bring it about, that the conditions which 
nurture it are as favourable as possible. In the case of Islamist moderates, 
most have recently witnessed the heavy price paid by failed direct assaults 
on entrenched political power and have drawn the conclusion that 
compromise is preferable to ‘all or nothing’ approaches. But that situation 
cannot continue indefinitely if all paths to power appear irrevocably 
blocked, if only because Islamist radicals are already there to pick up the 
challenge. 
A final feature common to Muslim democrats observed in the 
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or economic interests. Indeed, the very concept of interest is inimical to 
them and, they would claim, to Islam itself. Good Muslims are, by 
definition, united, forming a society that is cohesive, fair and moral. The 
divisions that Islam sanctifies are between those who are Muslim and those 
who are not. Contemporary Islamists implicitly also distinguish between 
engaged and disengaged Muslims, that is, those who are committed to 
establishing Muslim social and political orders and those who are not. The 
task before them is thus to engage those Muslims, not to represent interests 
of specific classes, regions, ethnic or other group interests. Reflecting this 
orientation is the Islamist concern with moral issues in society, which takes 
the form of preoccupation with education, culture and the media. So, for 
example, in the 2000-05 Egyptian parliament, the seventeen MB deputies 
devoted 80% of their interpellations, or questions to ministers, to matters 
concerning those issues, leaving a scant 20% for matters of economics, 
foreign and defence policies, and other vital governance issues.177 
Materialists naturally find this argumentation to be both temporising 
and self-serving. In reality, according to them, Islamists can claim to be 
above the fray of politics that decides who gets what, how and when, only 
as long as they are not in government. So, presently, most Muslim 
democrats have the luxury of being all things to all people, not having to 
make hard choices on resource allocations while reinforcing claims to 
moral superiority by focusing on culture and education. But when and if 
they confront material reality, according to this view, they will have to 
reveal which interests they favour and which they ignore. This in turn will 
tend to fracture their political organisations and possibly bring about 
broader political realignments, with Islamists forging new coalitions with 
non-Islamists on the basis of interests rather than on the basis of moral 
convictions and claims. 
Islamists would naturally reject this reasoning and scenario, not only 
on philosophical grounds but possibly also by pointing out that Islam is 
generating a new calculus of interest, with Islamic banking and finances 
being but one manifestation of this re-ordering of the material according to 
Islamic precepts. They might also point to the Turkish case, where the AKP 
has in fact been in government for more than four years and if anything, 
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appears to be as united and in a stronger political position than when it 
first swept into office, despite having had to wrestle with allocation issues.  
Resolution of these philosophical and empirical debates is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that Islamist democrats reject the 
epistemological foundations of Western political science and political 
economy, which prioritise the material over the spiritual and are sceptical 
of those who claim to be acting on moral grounds. The tests of whether or 
not moderate Islamists can rise above specific material interests and 
maintain coalitions of Muslim wholes have yet to be undergone. With the 
partial exception of Turkey, Muslim democrats remain on the sidelines of 
MENA governance. In the case of Turkey it can be argued that 
countervailing forces have reduced both the AKP’s control of and 
perceived responsibility for public policy, so the Turkish test is yet to really 
commence. And one can also argue that in Turkey the AKP more clearly 
represents the interests of the independent small and middle bourgeoisie, 
especially its Anatolian core, so that it does indeed rest on a solid material 
base. But this is to prejudge the issue, for it cannot at this stage be resolved 
empirically. All that can be said with complete confidence is that there are 
profound differences between Western and Muslim political philosophies 
and that the views of each will colour the manner in which they would 
enter into and conduct dialogue with the other. 
In conclusion, these chapters reveal remarkable consistency about the 
nature of Muslim democrats, given that they are a political phenomenon 
present in so many different countries in the region. Their evolution, 
however, has followed similar patterns in those various countries, with the 
MB in Egypt not only having the longest such history of evolution, but 
serving as a model for Arab Muslim democrats elsewhere. Presently 
favoured by the historical conjuncture that has seen radicalism eclipsed, at 
least for the time being, Muslim democrats must nevertheless be cautious 
of their commitment to democracy, for the systems in which they operate 
are at best quasi-democratic and their challengers do not necessarily share 
such a commitment. Not having been called upon to formulate and 
implement public policies, the ‘real’ nature of Muslim democrats remains – 
aside from the case of Turkey - untested. They themselves profess that the 
moral imperatives of Islam provide sufficient guide for public policy and 
establishing and maintaining a coherent, Muslim socio-political order, 
whereas many non-Muslim observers remain sceptical of their ability to 
remain united in the face of the difficulty of reconciling competing material 
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10.2  Muslim Democrats’ views of the EU 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Muslim democrats interviewed for this 
volume, with the partial exception of the Turks, appear to know little about 
EU policies, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). After all, EU policies are not 
particularly well-known to European audiences and those policies relevant 
to MENA countries have been negotiated almost exclusively on 
government to government bases. Other issues, such as the Lebanese war 
of 2006, the civil war in Iraq or the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict, to say 
nothing of domestic political issues in the countries concerned or US 
policies towards the region, have all captured greater media and public 
attention than European policies, which seem in fact to have little impact 
on the ground. Thus Muslim democrats, like their fellow countrymen, have 
had few opportunities to learn about relevant EU policies, to say nothing of 
participating in their formulation.  
The impact of this lack of knowledge is that most Muslim democrats 
appear to evaluate the EU at a general perceptual level, rather than on an 
empirical basis. Not knowing what the EU has proposed to do vis à vis 
their country or what in fact it is doing, they report in general how they feel 
about the EU. Not surprisingly they say that they feel distant from the EU 
and its negotiations with their respective governments. Interestingly, this 
lack of engagement does not seem to translate into hostility. Most 
respondents report a generally favourable view of Europeans, European 
countries and the EU and would like to have more direct interactions with 
them. In some cases they differentiate between European countries, with 
France typically being evaluated more favourably than the UK, for 
example.  
Muslim democrats express no profound reservations about 
interaction with Europe, at least as far as economic and technical matters 
are concerned, although members of Hezbollah evince concern that the EU 
will seek to impose privatisation and other elements of neo-liberal 
economic policy. MENA Muslim democrats are more cautious about 
interactions over socio-cultural and political issues, however, with some 
expressing their opposition to direct EU involvement in democracy 
promotion, for example. Virtually all moderate Islamists caution the EU 
about interference in the cultural domain, in which they see Islam as 
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Europeans in various fields, albeit with qualifications about political and 
cultural matters.  
Muslim democrats are thus quite unlike more radical Islamists, who 
reject interaction with the European Union on principle. The possible 
rationales underlying the accommodating approach of the former are 
probably driven as much by their present political circumstances as they 
are by their broader philosophical outlooks. Their more moderate views, 
coupled in many cases with direct familiarity with the West and desire to 
learn more from it, predispose them to want to engage. But they must also 
see direct political benefits from such engagement or they would not be 
such strong supporters of it.  
The benefits in question grow out of their special status as Islamist 
opposition forces in authoritarian political systems. They are seeking 
legitimacy and recognition, both domestically and internationally. In some 
countries, such as Egypt and the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), it is unlawful for them to operate as political parties, 
whereas in others, such as Syria and Tunisia, membership in an Islamist 
organisation is illegal, in the former constituting a capital offence. Only in 
Turkey, Lebanon and Palestine do they have an established presence in 
government, but even in these comparatively open systems they are 
confronted with politically existential threats. It is not inconceivable, for 
example, that in the wake of a political change they could face severe 
restrictions or even worse. Elsewhere, the existential threats are more real 
and pressing and the challenges to operating as democratic organisations 
yet more profound. So to protect themselves against autocratic regimes or 
not fully institutionalised democratic or quasi-democratic ones, they need 
broader recognition and the legitimation such recognition provides. 
Entering into direct dialogue with the EU, even informally, provides some 
measure of that recognition and thus legitimation.  
The content of interaction with the EU might from Islamists’ 
perspective also be beneficial. Material resources, depending on how they 
were provided, might be welcome. Moderate Islamists are well aware that 
substantial resources flow not only to governments, but also to secular 
oppositionists in the region. To be put on an equal footing with secularists 
would be of substantial symbolic value even if resources were not part of 
the exchange. Of still greater value would be pressure on regimes by the 
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necessarily provide greater political space within which Muslim democrats 
could operate.  
The potential downside for Muslim democrats of substantially 
enhanced interactions with the EU would be threats to their reputation and 
unity. Their opponents might use such interactions to discredit them, as 
governments have done with other opposition organisations, for example. 
Such criticism could exacerbate internal tensions that might arise over the 
issue of whether or not and how to engage with the EU. Criticism from 
elements within the broader Islamist movement could be anticipated by 
Muslim democrats unless the terms of such engagement were delineated in 
what was seen to be appropriate fashion. Overall, however, the possible 
benefits to Muslim democrats of engagement considerably outweigh the 
potential costs. They seem to indicate a clear awareness of that as suggested 
by their manifest desire to engage.  
10.3  Muslim Democrats’ comparative views of the EU and US 
Muslim democrats interviewed for this volume differ more in their views 
of the EU and US than they do on matters previously discussed. This seems 
to reflect their different experiences with the EU and US. In Morocco and 
Turkey, for example, countries where they have a long history of 
engagement with the US, Muslim democrats believe the US to be more 
interested in them and their welfare than is the EU. This apparently reflects 
not only the proactive nature of US government policy towards these 
countries, but more generally it probably also reflects the comparative 
plethora of US-based private or quasi-governmental democracy promotion 
organisations. Europe, by comparison, relies more heavily on 
governmental actors for democracy and human rights promotion. Because 
those actors are more restricted by government policy than are those of 
civil society, the likelihood is that if Muslim democrats have interacted 
directly with democracy promoters, they will be Americans.  
But the general impression held by Islamists of the US as compared to 
the EU does not favour the former. The EU is seen as being more 
sympathetic and better informed about the region. US policies, such as 
those towards Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, are roundly condemned, with 
special criticism being levelled at US efforts to isolate Hamas and 
Hezbollah. In general the informants see the EU as being sympathetic but 
weak in the face of US pressure, whereas they see the US as being strong 
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independent of the US. While one might discount somewhat the 
comparatively favourable assessments of the EU because informants were 
aware they were talking with individuals who were connected to an EU-
related project, the fact that those assessments were expressed in such 
fulsome terms and by so many informants indicates that it is not just 
anticipated reactions by informants that underlie them.  
As far as the appropriateness of the two social and political models is 
concerned, views differ. With regards to the former, the treatment of 
indigenous Muslims is seen as being less favourable in Europe than the US. 
The multiculturalism of the American melting pot is contrasted favourably 
to the ‘uniculturalism’ of most European nation-states. But paradoxically, 
the multicultural model is not held out as being appropriate for the MENA, 
unless you accept the proposition put forward by a member of Turkey’s 
AKP that his country has been multicultural for centuries. Indeed, quite the 
contrary is the case. Muslim democrats are seeking to establish ‘unicultural’ 
Muslim societies, with special conditions being granted to non-Muslim 
minorities. So while they are highly critical of the treatment of fellow 
Muslims in EU member states and in comparison laud their treatment in 
the US, they do not even entertain the possibility that the American socio-
demographic model might be the more appropriate one for them to 
emulate.  
With regards to the comparative attractiveness of political models, 
the reverse is the case. Muslim democrats are more attracted to EU than US 
models and do see those models as having direct relevance for their 
conditions. This preference seems to reflect various considerations. First, 
some of the informants are not distinguishing between the nature of the 
political systems and the foreign policies they generate. Thus European 
parliamentary democracies are seen as preferable because by and large 
European policies are seen as being more sympathetic and understanding 
of the MENA countries and of the role of moderate Islamism than is the US. 
Second, the US political system seems to most of the informants to be much 
more disorderly and ‘capitalist’, or at least more penetrated by special 
interests, than European parliamentary democracies. The free-wheeling, 
bargaining nature of American politics is seen as distasteful. Moreover, 
none of the MENA countries copied US governmental models, as they are 
all either parliamentary democracies of the European variant or are 
monarchies. So there is no first hand familiarity with the American system 
of balance of powers achieved through separation between the three 
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Finally, underlying the preference for European-style parliamentary 
democracies might well be a broader philosophical concern, which is that 
the good Muslim polity, hence by extension, any good polity, is a united 
one that does not admit of divisions along the line of particularistic 
interests. The American model of government is founded on the very 
opposite notion, namely, that different interests need to be protected by 
dividing and counterbalancing governmental power. The motor force of 
American politics is special interests and the channels through which 
power flows are multitudinous and only quasi-institutionalised, thus 
admitting of endless bargaining and coalition formation. In Europe, by 
contrast, government is formed by the party or parties that capture a 
majority of seats in parliament, thus the channels of influence are well 
defined and comparatively rigid. The European model, in other words, 
more closely approximates the Muslim ideal, with the ruling party or 
parties being able to act on behalf of the entire policy to a much greater 
extent than the American counterpart.  
In sum, perceptions of the EU and its member states tend to be more 
favourable on the grounds of both policies and models of government than 
the US, with the obvious and important exception being that of treatment 
of Muslim minorities. Those Muslim democrats who feel that the US has 
been more forthcoming than the EU seem to be those who have had first- 
hand experience in dealing with US officials and private actors involved in 
democracy and human rights promotion, suggesting in turn that dialogue 
and engagement by Western actors results in more positive assessments of 
them by Islamists. The already comparatively favourable views of the EU 
further suggest that engagement by it, both formally and informally, would 
have immediate and positive impacts on the attitudes towards it held by 
Muslim democrats.  
10.4  Muslim and Western conceptions of democracy and human 
rights 
The interviews revealed unequivocally that Muslim democrats and most 
Westerners do not share the same weltanschauung when it comes to their 
understanding of democracy and human rights.  It is important to 
emphasise this point because of a prevailing tendency in some circles in the 
W e s t  t o  d o w n p l a y  o r  e v e n  i g n o r e  these philosophical differences. Their 
reaction to Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism typically underlies their 
view and it may in fact be an overreaction. Before Said’s pioneering work, 
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being ‘essentialist’ in nature, owing to inherent differences between the 
cultures and, most importantly, the religions of the peoples concerned. This 
extreme view was rightly and effectively debunked by Said.  
It has been replaced by an emphasis, and possibly an over-emphasis, 
on the role of situation in determining outlooks. This implies a plasticity of 
beliefs that may be excessive, as suggested by Muslim democrats’ 
reflections on democracy and human rights as recorded in this volume. 
Virtually all of the interviewees draw sharp distinctions between Islamic 
and Western conceptions of representative government and protection of 
individual rights and freedoms. Yet it is also clear from available polling 
data that experience with democracy is the most important single factor in 
explaining Muslim’s attitudes about that system of government.178 In short, 
it is important to recognise that both ‘essence’ and ‘situation’ condition 
politically relevant beliefs. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that when 
grounded in other systems of thought and practice, such as religion, and 
reinforced by well-structured organisations, these political beliefs are 
unlikely to change dramatically as a result of intermittent engagement with 
outside actors, although they may undergo some modification. This is not 
to suggest, however, that enhanced mutual awareness is of no value, for it 
clearly is. It is to suggest though that expectations of changes of values, 
beliefs and behaviour as a result of engagement should not be excessive. 
With regards to the content of views on democracy and human 
rights, the relevant difference in philosophical orientations of Westerners 
and Muslim democrats is that the former believe in universal norms, 
whereas the latter do not. The Islamist view is that the West is seeking to 
portray its own notions and practices of human rights and democracy as 
universal in nature. Instead, they contend, these conceptions of human 
rights and democracy reflect the particular cultures and histories of 
European nations. They are not relevant for all peoples at all times, 
especially for Muslims, who have their own religious, cultural and 
historical bases for human rights, political freedoms and democratic 
practices. The moderate Islamists interviewed noted the excessive 
‘individualism’ of European ideas, arguing that conceptions of human 
rights and democracy founded on individualism had no resonance in 
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Islam, in which social obligations and solidarities are of greater importance. 
Western liberal values that prioritise individual freedom over community 
rights are, in short, seen as being un- or anti-Islamic. Finally, the elevation 
of human over divine wisdom, a concept which lies at the heart of Western 
representative institutions and legal systems, is also seen as being 
antithetical to Islam.  
These profound philosophical differences underlie disagreements 
over specific policies, which in turn t e n d  t o  b e c o m e  h i g h l y  e m o t i v e ,  
symbolic issues for both sides. Competing views of appropriate gender 
roles and relations are possibly the most critical of these symbolic issues. 
Muslim democrats deeply resent what they see as an attempt by Europe to 
impose its own preferences for gender relations, a step which they view as 
neo-imperialist, rather than reflecting the application of so-called universal 
norms. So the wearing of headscarves, the recognition of equal rights for 
women and the treatment of homosexuality are issues about which Muslim 
democrats and most Europeans have profoundly different views that will 
be difficult to reconcile, no matter how long and intense the dialogue over 
them. But it is nevertheless important to recognise that enhanced 
awareness of other perspectives, even if they are not shared, is a potential 
benefit of dialogue.  
10.5  Additional issues that might be addressed 
The approach utilised in this volume of interviewing moderate Islamists 
might fruitfully be extended to some other, relevant issues. Possibly the 
most interesting, directly relevant issue that could also be included is that 
of connectivity in the region in general and that between Muslim 
democrats specifically. Indeed, the research already undertaken and 
reported upon revealed that reactions to specific events in the region, such 
as the Lebanese war of 2006, may be of profound significance. It is clear 
from existing evidence that Muslim democrats, as well presumably as most 
residents of the region, are closely attuned to events not only in their 
country, but in the region as a whole. These are not hermetically sealed 
political systems. Indeed, the Middle East is more of a region than possibly 
any other in the developing world in the sense that political events in one 
part of it quickly impact other sub-regions and countries within it. Shared 
language, culture and history contribute to the strongly systemic nature of 
the MENA, a strength now reinforced and reflected politically by the 
ubiquitous nature of Islamism. It would of course be useful to assess more 
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Muslim democrats and to determine if they are yet more attuned to those 
events than are their compatriots of different political persuasions. 
Possible connections between Muslim democrats in different 
countries were not directly investigated. The degree to which they interact, 
learn from one another, and provide tangible and intangible resources is an 
important, yet largely unknown aspect of moderate Islamism. Intensive 
research which has been conducted on connections has focused on those 
among radical Islamists. There is nevertheless evidence that Iranian 
support has been vital for the creation and continued effectiveness of 
Hezbollah. Similarly, arguments have been made that Saudi support for 
Egyptian Muslim Brothers and, by extension, moderate Islamists 
throughout the Arab world, has been a key factor in their success. So while 
there has been some research on connections between radical Islamists and 
considerable speculation on the role of Saudi Arabia, in particular in 
supporting both mujahidin in Afghanistan and moderate Arab Islamists 
elsewhere, little is known in detail, particularly about the latter, to say 
nothing about direct dealings between moderate Islamists in the various 
countries. The Turkish case is being followed closely by Arab Muslim 
democrats, but whether that is simply a monitoring exercise or consists of 
more direct engagement is unknown. Precisely because there are good 
reasons to believe that there may be extensive interactions between 
moderate Islamists and that those interactions may have significant 
impacts, it is important that this aspect of connectivity be more thoroughly 
investigated. Indeed, if the EU is to adopt a policy of more extensive and 
intensive engagement with moderate Islamists, it would want to consider 
the relevance of such regional connections to its dealings with moderate 
Islamists on a country by country basis. 
The other major issue that remains largely unaddressed is what 
Muslim democrats do when they exercise political power. Of course there 
is little empirical evidence to report, for it is only Turkey, Palestine, and 
Lebanon where they are currently in government in greater or lesser 
measure. The two cabinet portfolios (health and education) the Jordanian 
Islamic Action Front was briefly awarded in the wake of the 1989 elections 
hardly qualify. 
Yet this question is vital to understanding the political nature of 
moderate Islamism. The allegation that Muslim democrats have an 
opportunistic rather than abiding commitment to democracy is 
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thoroughgoing Islamicisation once they had sufficient power to do so is 
shared by secularists everywhere in the MENA. The Turkish case has not 
provided much comfort to those with such doubts, precisely because in 
Turkey the AKP is confronted with the countervailing power not only of 
the military, but also by the reasonably well institutionalised legal/judicial 
system and by firmly held public opinion, buttressed by a comparatively 
well-developed civil society. Thus the AKP’s capacity to impose 
Islamicisation is limited, whatever its will might be. 
The same may well not apply in Arab countries. Military traditions 
are not those of nation-guarding, Kemalist secularism. Courts are not 
independent of the executive and public opinion is comparatively diffuse 
and poorly aggregated within civil society. Moreover, in opposition, 
Muslim democrats, such as the MB in Egypt and the Islamic Action Front in 
Jordan, have been vociferous in their criticism of manifestations of secular, 
‘global’ culture and adamant in insisting upon censorship, prohibition of 
alcohol, imposition of dress and behaviour codes, revision of school 
curricula and the like. The question can rightly be raised that if this is what 
they are like in opposition, what would they do once in power? Alas, the 
track record is too short for a definitive answer to be given, but a more 
thorough search of the existing evidence might provide more informed 
assessments.179 
A related area of ambiguity is what Muslim democrats think about 
the relationship between the state and the exercise of power. At a 
theoretical level it can be argued that since Islam encompasses both din wa 
dawlah, or religion and state, the latter is the instrument of the former, being 
responsible for implementation of Islamic precepts in society. In this view 
Muslim democrats are focused on achieving political power so that they 
can utilise the state to implement Islam as they conceive it.  
At the level of practice, however, recent social and economic history 
suggests a somewhat different approach. Authoritarian states in the MENA 
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have been inhospitable to moderate Islamists, so they have set about 
constructing parallel structures in civil society. This is true in the economic 
realm, where various forms of Islamist finance and business have sprouted 
and multiplied, as well as in service delivery, where a rich array of Islamist 
NGOs have set down roots as they have provided health, educational, 
sanitation, transport and other facilities. Many of those involved in these 
economic and social activities have become highly sceptical not only of the 
authoritarian, semi-secular states under which they live, but presumably 
also of the notion that the state should be the repository of all political, 
hence also all economic and social power. So it is important to know not 
just what Islamic doctrine says about the state, but what Muslim democrats 
think its appropriate role should be. What limits should be imposed upon 
its reach? What relationship should it have to the economy and to private 
providers of social services? What should the mechanisms be that protect 
individuals against possible excesses of the state? In sum, this is a 
potentially rich and important area for investigation and one that is very 
relevant to relations between Muslim democrats and external actors, 
including the EU.  
10.6  A preliminary cost/benefit analysis of engaging with Muslim 
Democrats 
A thorough cost/benefit analysis from a Western perspective of engaging 
with Muslim democrats would require clear parameters defining that 
engagement, including answering such questions as with exactly whom, 
over what topics, in what settings and so on. Prior to that undertaking all 
that can be done is to suggest some possible costs and benefits in general 
terms. As far as the former are concerned, chief among them might well be 
the risks of not engaging. The evolution of moderate forms of political 
Islam could serve to alleviate problems arising from ethnic and sectarian 
divisions, undercut support for violent Islamist movements, and strengthen 
connections between economic and political elites and the grass roots of 
civil society. In the absence of Muslim democrats taking on these 
challenges, it is hard to envision what other resources are available to 
address these problems, which if they are not tackled, will intensify. 
Engagement might also contribute to rendering authoritarian regimes more 
susceptible to reforms, while challenging the systems of corruption and 
patronage politics that underlie them. A careful engagement could also 
serve as a means for drawing important parts of MENA societies into a 
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and philosophical issues of governing societies in democratic, accountable 
and effective ways, while also respecting the rule of law and human rights. 
Although engaging Muslim democrats is unlikely to solve all the political 
problems of the region, a thoughtful and careful engagement could clearly 
be a part of encouraging reform and political evolution in the region in 
directions that the EU would welcome. While this is obviously a long term 
project, it may represent one of the best uses of ‘soft power’ in the region.  
There are also potential costs to engagement. It is unlikely to bring 
about coincidence of views and there is a possibility, if not carefully 
managed, that it could exacerbate differences and increase tensions. At the 
more directly political level, engagement may enhance the resources of 
moderate Islamists at the expense of other political actors who might in fact 
be more natural allies of the West. As mentioned above, engagement would 
necessarily provide some measure of legitimacy to moderate Islamists, 
which is a valuable gain for them in its own right, as authoritarian regimes 
are seeking to deny them this legitimacy.  
But EU engagement might also contribute to a shift in the balance of 
power within political oppositions away from secularists and towards 
Muslim democrats. The former are politically less well-organised in 
virtually all of the countries under consideration, as evidenced by their 
weak electoral performances compared to the Muslim democrats, not only 
in national elections, but in elections in syndicates, student bodies, 
chambers of commerce, and indeed in virtually any setting in which 
elections are conducted. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
moderate Islamists outnumber secularists. In addition to the organisational 
factor, which favours Islamists, is the fact that Islamist political parties and 
movements are seen as posing the only viable alternative to incumbent 
governments, hence are the recipients of protest votes by those who do not 
necessarily endorse their Islamist platforms. Finally, actual voting results 
that have been referred to as proof of the political predominance of Muslim 
democrats are not as conclusive as such claims suggest. In Palestine, for 
example, Hamas won about 40% of the popular vote in the January 2006 
election, just slightly more than Fatah. But the electoral system converted 
that plurality into a substantial parliamentary majority, much to the 
surprise of even Hamas and Fatah operatives. Hezbollah’s share of the 
Lebanese vote is of course kept small by virtue of the fact that it appeals 
virtually exclusively to the Shi`a community. It is also the case, however, 
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instead to vote for the secularly inclined Amal party, or for traditional 
notables who eschew Islamism or any other ideology, for that matter.  
It is thus important not to think of moderate Islamism as constituting 
a political wave that is sweeping all before it. It is of large and probably still 
growing importance, but its support level in the population may well be 
lower than is typically projected by election results, even though 
governments have in many instances sought to discourage votes for 
moderate Islamist candidates. Secularists are not a small minority in any of 
these systems and may in fact constitute silent majorities in most. It is 
important, therefore, not to write them off as political dinosaurs on the 
verge of extinction in the MENA. That could happen, but it is not pre-
ordained. To the extent dialogue influences the balance of power between 
moderate Islamists and secularists, it needs to be evaluated from that 
perspective.  
10.7  Recommendations 
Probably of greatest importance is the need to clarify what the EU is 
seeking from engagement with Muslim democrats. While information 
exchange and general dialogue serve the purposes of increasing mutual 
familiarity and probably reducing misunderstandings and associated 
tensions, these are not truly strategic objectives. The one such objective that 
stands out is to help facilitate the transition to pluralist democracy through 
gradual incorporation of democrats, including Muslim democrats, into 
their respective political systems. This will require various compromises 
and changes by virtually all actors within these political systems, and those 
in turn will take time and possibly support by outside parties, including the 
EU. The systems themselves are also in need of change, for they are 
structurally inhospitable to democrats. They have been built around the 
principle of expediting the unfettered exercise of centralised executive 
power and hence have an absence of checks and balances and alternative 
sources and centres of power. Thus the transition to pluralism under the 
rule of law requires the democratic development of both actors and 
institutions and it is that development that should provide the focus for 
engagement not only with Muslim democrats, but other actors and 
institutions within these systems. 
A related consideration is that despite Muslim democrats’ rejection of 
the concept of interest representation, unless and until that feature 
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relationship between political organisations, including parties and broader 
movements, on the one hand, and specific interests, whether economic, 
regional, ethnic or whatever, on the other, is weak to non-existent. 
Authoritarian governments have systematically sought to prevent the 
emergence of such linkages. They have built patronage parties as 
alternatives to interest-based ones. And the political societies in question 
have not had long histories of organised political representation of specific 
interests, as opposed to political leadership by notables of various types. 
Thus a major transition in the concept of representation is necessary if 
mature, stable democracies are to emerge in the MENA region. This 
transition can only happen once competitive, democratic politics begin to 
take root and provide the opportunities for that competition to facilitate the 
emergence of interest representation. It is in the intervening period that 
Muslim democrats are likely to be powerful actors within these political 
systems. It should not be assumed that their prospects will be enhanced by 
the institutionalisation of pluralism. As presently constructed the 
organisations of Muslim democrats are more akin to broad protest 
movements and service providers than to interest-based political parties. 
They are thus appropriate for this particular historical circumstance, but 
not necessarily for the one that hopefully will follow. It is thus important 
that those involved in engagement appreciate the historical circumstances 
that have given rise to the popularity of Muslim democracy and also realise 
that those circumstances are not likely to persist forever.  
A third recommendation is for engagement to be concerned primarily 
with the practical, not the philosophical. As discussed above, there are clear 
and profound philosophical differences between Europeans and Muslim 
democrats and those differences are unlikely to be resolved soon or 
through any imaginable sort of dialogue that could occur. Divergent views 
on many key issues, including human rights and especially gender 
relations, are embedded in these different philosophies. That does not 
mean, however, that compromise on the handling of these issues cannot be 
reached until the underlying philosophical differences are dealt with. 
Indeed, quite the opposite is the case, for the more the root causes of these 
differences are explored, the less easy will it be to reach compromise at a 
practical level. The search for common ground in resolving practical issues 
might be assisted by a general awareness of the philosophical orientations 
of both parties, but this could be severely impeded were the search to 
enhance that awareness to turn into exercises in self-justification. Possibly 
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discussions, so that those with immediate policy relevance are isolated 
from engagement over philosophical issues, which can occur on a separate 
track.  
A related recommendation is that engagement should be concerned 
with institutions and the nurturing of professionalism associated with the 
growth of both personal and institutional loyalties and capacities. The 
MENA is an area of strong societies and weak states, meaning that informal 
associational ties, such as those of kinship, region or sect, typically 
command greater loyalty than do ties to formal institutions. Mature 
democracy depends upon the effective functioning of such institutions, 
whether they are of government itself or in civil society. It is thus vital for 
the long term prospects for MENA democracy that such institutions, and 
loyalties to them, are strengthened. In the short term they also serve as 
valuable conduits through which democratisation assistance can reach 
wide audiences, including Muslim democrats. Assistance provided to 
parliaments, for example, is of at least indirect and frequently direct benefit 
to parliamentary delegations of Muslim democrats. Providing such 
assistance through institutions avoids the necessity of picking individual 
beneficiaries and also serves to cement linkages between civil society actors 
and state institutions. Thus to the extent that engagement with Muslim 
democrats can simultaneously serve to strengthen their commitments to 
institutions and the institutions themselves, it will maximise its impacts. 
Finally, the evidence presented in this volume points to the need for 
the EU to clarify its policies towards the MENA and, specifically Muslim 
democrats within it, as well as to communicate those policies to non-
governmental audiences, including to Muslim democrats. The present 
situation is one in which lack of knowledge of EU policies, combined with 
the actual lack of EU policies towards engaging with moderate Islamists, 
cause Muslim democrats to at best be curious about the EU and at worse to 
be suspicious of it. Engagement might itself help to contribute to policy 
formation in this important area, while also serving as a vehicle to 
disseminate relevant information about EU policies.  
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Annex A: Check-list of topics and questions for interviews 
 
I. The evolution of Islamist parties and movements in the political system 
•  How have the structures of the various Islamist groups/parties 
evolved, what is their relative importance, and what are their formal 
ideological/theological leanings? 
•  In particular, how have the ideas and strategies of the predominant 
Islamist party developed? 
II. Islamist views on political reform process in the country in question 
•  Do Islamists aspire to more gradual change or a faster and further 
reaching process of reform, and in which directions? 
•  What alliances and divisions have taken shape between different 
Islamist groups/parties? 
•  How well embedded are Islamists' democratic credentials, as they have 
developed in practice? 
III. General Islamist views on Europe as a democratic model 
•  To what extent does Europe serve as a normative reference point for 
democratic aspirations? 
•  If it does not, what are the negative factors that account for the lack of 
normative influence? 
•  How is the issue of Muslim minority rights within Europe perceived by 
Islamists? 
•  How do Islamists compare European and US models of democracy? 
IV. Islamist views on EU foreign policy, including Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
•  Do Islamists have a high or low level of awareness of the nature of EU 
foreign policy in the Mediterranean? 
•  What do Islamists see as the strong points and the weak points of EU 
policies? 
•  How do they think EU policies compare with those of the US? 
•  What more could Europeans have done to defend Islamists' political 
rights? 
•  Is Europe seen as a supporter of democracy or of authoritarianism? 
•  What, if anything, does the move from EMP to ENP mean to Islamists? 188 | ANNEX A 
 
 
•  If EU policy has been largely irrelevant to the evolution of Islamist 
identities and policy positions, how do we account for this? 
V. Areas of potential collaboration with Europe 
•  Have links with the EU taken root in any specific areas of 
cooperation? 
•  To what extent do Islamist opposition groups want EU support? 
•  Is there any link between Islamists' social welfare work and EU 
grsss roots programmes and intiatives? 
•  Where do Islamists think collaboration with the EU might be most 
possible and desirable? 
VI. Areas of potential difference with Europe. 
•  Is there any evidence that in power (or stronger positions in 
government/parliament) Islamists would dilute cooperation with 
the EU?  
•  Would they be more cautious on opening up to European trade and 
investment? 
•  Are there human rights issues where Islamist policies are likely to 
clash with European views? 
If Islamists have so far thought little about their views towards the EU, why 
is this?  
| 189 
 
Annex B:  
Questionnaire submitted to the Muslim Brothers and Wasat party 
ﺪﻴﺴﻟا                                                                       :
_________________________________________  
ﺔﻴﻃﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻠﻟ جذﻮﻤﻨآ ﺎﺑوروﻷ ﻦﻴﻴﻣﻼﺳﻹا ﺔﻳؤر :  
 
1 -   ؟ﻢﻜﻴﻟإ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻠﻟ ﺎﺟذﻮﻤﻧ ﺔﻴﺑوروﻷا لوﺪﻟا ﺾﻌﺑ وأ ﺎﺑوروأ ﻞﺜﻤﺗ ﻞه  
______________________ _________________________  
 
2 -   ـﺑ ﺔﺑﺎﺟﻹا ﺖﻧﺎآ اذإ ) ﻻ ( ؟ﺔﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻠﻟ ﺎﺟذﻮﻤﻧ ﺎﻬﻨﻣ ﻞﻌﺠﺗ ﻻ ﻲﺘﻟا بﺎﺒﺳﻷا ﻲه ﺎﻣ ،  
_____________________________________________________  
3 -   ؟ﺎﺑوروأ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻤﻠﺴﻤﻟا تﺎﻴﻗﻷا قﻮﻘﺣ ﺔﻟﺄﺴﻣ ﻰﻟإ نوﺮﻈﻨﺗ ﻒﻴآ  
_____________________________________________ _ _____ __  
 
4 -   ؟ﻢآﺮﻈﻧ ﺔﻬﺟو ﻦﻣ ﺔﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻠﻟ ﻲﻜﻳﺮﻣﻷا جذﻮﻤﻨﻟاو ﻲﺑوروﻷا جذﻮﻤﻨﻟا ﻦﻴﺑ قرﺎﻔﻟا ﻮه ﺎﻣ  
______________________________________________  
 
 ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻼﻟ ﺔﻴﺟرﺎﺨﻟا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻠﻟ ﻦﻴﻴﻣﻼﺳﻹا ﺔﻳور )  ﺔآاﺮﺸﻟا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺳ ﻚﻟذ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻤﺑ
ﺔﻴﺑوروﻷا راﻮﺠﻟا ﺔﻴﺳﺎﻴﺳو ﺔﻴﻄﺳﻮﺘﻣوروﻷا (  
 
1 -   ﻞه  ﺾﻴﺑﻷا ﺮﺤﺒﻟا ﺔﻘﻄﻨﻣ ﻩﺎﺠﺗ ﺔﻴﺑوروﻷا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﻦﻋ ﺔﺤﺿاو ةﺮﻜﻓ ﻢﻜﻳﺪﻟ نأ نوﺪﻘﺘﻌﺗ 
؟ﻂﺳﻮﺘﻤﻟا  
______________________________________________  
2 -   ؟ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﻩﺬه ﺢﻣﻼﻣ ﻢهأ وأ ﺔﻌﻴﺒﻃ ﻢآﺮﻈﻧ ﺔﻬﺟو ﻲﻓ ﻲه ﺎﻣ  
______________________________________________ ____ ___  
 
3 -    ﻢﻜﺘﻓﺮﻌﻣ نﻮﻤﻴﻘﺗ ﻒﻴآ  ﺔﻴﺑوروﻷا تﺎﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟﺎﺑ )  ﻦﻣ 1  ﻰﻟإ  5  نﻮآ ﻊﻣ  1 و ﺔﻓﺮﻌﻣ ﻞﻗﻷا  5  ﻲه 
ﺔﻓﺮﻌﻣ ﺮﺜآﻷا (  
______________________________________________ ___ ____  
 
4 -    ﻲه ﺎﻣ – ﻢآﺮﻈﻧ ﺔﻬﺟو ﻲﻓ - ؟ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﻩﺬه ﻲﻓ ﻒﻌﻀﻟاو ةﻮﻘﻟا طﺎﻘﻧ ﻢهأ   
______________________________________________ ____ ___  
 
5 -    قرﺎﻔﻟا ﻮه ﺎﻣ  ﻲﺴﻴﺋﺮﻟا –  ﻢآﺮﻈﻧ ﺔﻬﺟو ﻲﻓ –  تﺎﻳﻻﻮﻟا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺳو ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺳ ﻦﻴﺑ 
؟ﺔﻴﻜﻳﺮﻣﻷا ةﺪﺤﺘﻤﻟا  
______________________________________________ __ __ _ __  
 
6 -   ؟ﻦﻴﻴﻣﻼﺳﻺﻟ ﺔﻴﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا قﻮﻘﺤﻟا ﻦﻋ عﺎﻓﺪﻠﻟ ﻪﺑ مﺎﻴﻘﻟا ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻼﻟ ﻦﻜﻤﻳ يﺬﻟا ﺎﻣ  
____________________________________ __________ _____ _  
7 -   ؟ﺔﻴﻄﻠﺴﺘﻟا ﻢﻈﻨﻟا ﻢﻋﺪﻳ ﻪﻧأ مأ ﺔﻴﻃاﺮﻘﻤﻳﺪﻟا ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻢﻋﺪﻳ ﻞه ،ﻢآﺮﻈﻧ ﺔﻬﺟو ﻦﻣ  
______________________________________________ __ __  190 | ANNEX B 
 
 
______________________________________________ ____ ___  
 
8 -   ﺔﻴﺑوروﻷا ﺔﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﺔﻴﻤهﺄﺑ سﺎﺴﺣﻹا مﺪﻋ بﺎﺒﺳأ ﻢهأ ﻲه ﺎﻣ ؟ﻦﻴﻴﻣﻼﺳﺈآ ﻢﻜﻟ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻟﺎﺑ   
______________________________________________ ____ ___  
 
ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻹا ﻊﻣ نوﺎﻌﺘﻟا تﺎﻧﺎﻜﻣإ :  
 
1 -   ؟ﻞﻌﻔﻟﺎﺑ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا أﺪﺑ ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻊﻣ نوﺎﻌﺘﻠﻟ تﻻﺎﺠﻣ كﺎﻨه ﻞه  
______________________________________________ ____ ___  
 
2 -   ر ﻢﻜﻳﺪﻟ ىﺪﻣ يأ ﻰﻟإ  ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻹا ﻦﻣ ةﺪﻧﺎﺴﻣ ﻞﻴﻧ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺒﻏ ) ﻲﺘﺴﺟﻮﻟ - ﺐﻳرﺪﺗ  -  
ﻲﻨﻘﺗ ... ﺦﻟإ ( ؟  
______________________________________________ ___ ____  
 
3 -    دﺎﺤﺗﻻا تاردﺎﺒﻣو ﺞﻣاﺮﺑ ﻦﻣ يأو ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا ﺔآﺮﺤﻟا ﺔﻄﺸﻧأ ﻦﻴﺑ تﻼﺻ يأ كﺎﻨه ﻞه
؟ﺮﺼﻣ ﻲﻓ ةدﻮﺟﻮﻤﻟا ﻲﺑوروﻷا  
__________________________________ ____________  
4 -   ؟ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻊﻣ نوﺎﻌﺘﻟا تﻻﺎﺠﻣ ﻞﻀﻓأ ﻢآﺮﻈﻧ ﺔﻬﺟو ﻲﻓ ﻲه ﺎﻣ  
______________________________________________  
 
ﺎﺑوروأ ﻊﻣ فﻼﺘﺧﻹا ﻖﻃﺎﻨﻣ  
 
1 -    تﺎﺳﺎﻴﺴﻟا ﻊﺿوو راﺮﻘﻟا ﻊﻨﺻ ﻦآﺎﻣأ ﻲﻓ ﻢآدﻮﺟو ﺔﻟﺎﺣ ﻲﻓ )  ﻢﻜﺤﻠﻟ لﻮﺻﻮﻟا ﻖﻳﺮﻃ ﻦﻋ ءاﻮﺳ
ﻪﻴﻓ ﺔآرﺎﺸﻤﻟا وأ (  روﺎﻌﺘﻟا صﺮﻓ نوﺮﺗ ﻞه ؟ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻊﻣ نوﺎﻌﺘﻟا ﻰﻠﻋ ﻚﻟذ ﺮﻴﺛﺄﺗ ﺎﻣ ،
؟ﻞﻗأ مأ ﺮﺒآأ  
______________________________________________ __ _____  
 
2 -    ﺢﺘﻓ ﻦﻣ ارﺬﺣ ﺮﺜآأ نﻮﻧﻮﻜﺘﺳ ﻞه ؟ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻊﻣ رﺎﻤﺜﺘﺳﻻاو ةرﺎﺠﺘﻟا تﻻﺎﺠﻣ  
_____________________________________________________  
 
3 -    قﻮﻘﺣ ﺎﻳﺎﻀﻗ ﻲه ﺎﻣ ؟ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﺔﻳؤر ﻦﻋ نﺎﺴﻧﻹا قﻮﻘﺤﻟ ﻢﻜﺘﻳؤر ﻒﻠﺘﺨﺗ ﻒﻴآ
؟دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻒﻗﻮﻣ ﻦﻋ ﻢﻜﻔﻗﻮﻣ ﺎﻬﻴﻓ ﻒﻠﺘﺨﻳ ﻲﺘﻟا نﺎﺴﻧﻹا  
________________________________ ______________ __ _____  
 
4 -   ؟ﻲﺑوروﻷا دﺎﺤﺗﻻا ﻦﻣ ﻦﻴﺤﺿاو ﻒﻗﻮﻣو ﺔﻳؤر نﻻا ﻰﻟإ نﻮﻴﻣﻼﺳﻹا رﻮﻠﺒﻳ ﻢﻟ اذﺎﻤﻟ  
______________________________________________  
 
ﺮﻜﺸﻟا ﻞﻳﺰﺟ ﻊﻣ   
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